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1.2 Abstract 
Although the Iranian buyback contract has been widespread since 1989, this model has not 
been sufficiently and comprehensively analysed in academic works. Hence, this research 
offers a critical examination of the Iranian method of oil transactions, buyback, from 
distinctive perspectives in order to clarify the reasons behind the creation of the model, as 
well as applicable ways to modernise the mechanism. Initially, the work focuses on the 
development of the method of petroleum transactions in Iran from the early concessions, 
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the Nationalisation event, and the annulment of all agreements, due to the Revolution of 
1979 in order to point out the reasons behind the adoption of such a harsh model by 
analysing the historical, political, geo-political, and legal concerns about Iranian buyback. 
Considering the Iranian buyback from such angels has crystallised that this harsh model is 
the outcome of the constant argument between the necessity of international investment 
and knowledge to develop the petroleum sector, from one side, and the weariness of 
International participation in oil industry, from the other side, due to the negative historical 
and political experience of Iranians towards foreign involvement in the oil sector. This 
research, by analysing the current practice of the model, has proven the fact that despite 
the long duration of exercising the Iranian buyback, it could not compete with other 
mechanisms in absorbing international investments which is the consequence of the 
unattractive features of the model, including the unnecessary preventive provisions. As a 
result, this study, based on the detailed examination of the model from the above-
mentioned angles and comparative analysis of the other major international contractual 
mechanisms, firstly, highlights the necessity of improving the efficiency of the model, 
secondly, it selects the evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach towards the future 
of Iranian buyback, and finally offers applicable reforms to make the model more attractive. 
Consequently, this research concludes that although changes to the current Iranian 
contractual system will probably occur, a radical change to another method is a very remote 
possibility, as a result of the permissive historical, political and legal attitudes towards such 
radical changes. Thus, this study confirms the superiority of the evolutionary approach over 
revolutionary reform. 
 
1.3 Aim and Objectives  
The goal of this study is to offer a comprehensive understanding of the present Iranian 
contractual system used in petroleum transactions by critically examining the historical, 
political, geo-political and legal factors of Iranian buyback, in order to highlight the idea 
behind the creation of this model, and accordingly clarify the particular concerns of Iranian 
buyback. Following the detailed analysis of Iranian buyback and to answer the question of 
this research which is discovering the most applicable and effective way to increase the 
efficiency of the model, this study aims to propose the solution to make the model more 
attractive to absorb the foreign investment after removing the nuclear sanctions. 
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Accordingly, the main research question of this study is to determine the most effective and 
applicable approach among the evolutionary attitude and the radical shift towards the 
future of Iranian buyback, in other words, what approach can obtain a higher commercial 
efficiency for Iranians in petroleum deals with consideration of the current political and 
economic situation.  In order to answer this question, this work has recognised the need to 
ask and answer other questions such as what are the reasons of introducing buyback, what 
are the main ideas behind buyback, its features and restrictions, and what approach can 
guarantee the effectiveness of proposed changes. To answer these questions, the legal 
analysis of the effective historical events in formation of the model, shortcomings of the 
model from both international and domestic sides, as well as comparative studies of the 
issue with other international common models of petroleum transactions will be provided 
to determine the most applicable and effective approach towards the future of the Iranian 
scheme of buyback with consideration for the historical, political, geo-political and legal 
concerns. The last objective in this study is analysing some case studies which have been 
carried out on the formation of the buyback mechanism with the aim of examining the 
applicability and the efficiency of the proposed reforms to the model when put in practice.  
2. Literature Review 
Basically, in the context of the Iranian buyback a precise and complete grasp of its 
mechanism, contractual foundation, and applicable views towards the model’s future 
developments are crucial for the purpose of increasing the commercial efficiency of the 
method. Therefore, this work through providing a comprehensive grasp of Iranian buyback’s 
legal mechanism will firstly explain its current situation for contractors, and also will 
enhance their level of capability to predict the prospect changes in Iran’s oil sector. In 
addition, this research will serve the host state’s interests via improving the model to make 
it more attractive in order to absorb international investments to Iran with no need to 
breach any historical, political, geopolitical and legal limitations existed in Iranian society 
and Iranian national laws. As a result, this study aims to fulfil these goals from a national 
and international perspective to ensure the interests of both parties in the contract for the 
aim of offering an adequately precise academic work.  
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2.1 Background and research context 
The initial deals for the extraction of Iranian oil blocks begun in the 19th century. First 
agreements were fully dictated and controlled by foreign petroleum companies on the basis 
of concessionary deals1 whereby the Iranian government’s role in those projects and shares 
in the interests were considerably unimportant compared to the exclusive rights of the 
foreign companies in the deal2. The public discontent towards the exploitative nature of the 
concessions resulted in the nationalization event of 1951 which changed the Iranian 
petroleum framework from concessionary deals to a contractual system such as PSA.3 The 
1951 Petroleum Act acknowledged the wish to nationalisation of the natural resources by 
expressing that all activities regarding exploration, development and production have to be 
entirely operated by the NIOC to permanently preserve the ownership right on oil and gas 
reserves. Thus, this Act prohibited the government from engaging in any type of oil 
transaction that would permit the foreign sovereignty over natural assets including PSA4. 
However, following the removal of the nationalist government in 1953 via a British and 
American sponsored coup, the new government under the pressure of foreign powers 
began to implement the production sharing agreements model by ignoring the essence of 
the nationalisation event which resulted in public protests and impacted on the economic 
grievances of the people leading to the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Islamic government 
nullified all previous petroleum deals and on the basis of the new Constitution introduced 
the Iranian model of buyback whereby a foreign company supplies the required services and 
equipment for the discovery and development of the field, and will be compensated via 
selling the final product5. Therefore, the buyback agreement has become the key element of 
the Iranian oil industry which has been defended as an effective means to render an 
appropriate balance between national interests such as expanding exports and attracting 
foreign investment.6  
 
2.2 Critical review of similar research studies 
                                                 
1 Teimoury, 1., 'Asre Bikhabari ya Tarikhe Emtiyazat dar Iran'( History of concessions in Iran), Eghbal, Tehran, 1363(1984)p 25-32 
2 Fesharaky, Fereidun, Development of Iranian Oil Industry, New York 1976 p.ll-12 
3 The chronological account of the nationalisation’s unfolding is found in Benjamin Shwadran, 'The Anglo Iranian Oil Dispute 1948-1953', 
Middle Eastern Affairs, June-July, 1954, pp. 193-230. 
4 NIOC, Brief History of Iran's Oil. p.3 
5 Fasrshadgohar, N.'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',(A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements).2002,Tehran.P.20-22 
6 Makki, H., "Dr Mossadegh and his Historical Speeches", p. 46-52 
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Despite the long existence of the Iranian model of buyback, it has not been enough the 
topic of detailed research. Amid the limited studies on this subject the research carried out 
by Dr. Ule and Dr. Brexendorff7 is crucial, as this work provided the detailed critical analysis 
of Iranian buyback. However, a careful examination of the authors' examination of the 
current model's shortcomings exposes an obvious prejudice trend. While this research dealt 
with the government's relevant issues solely to highlight the foreign investor’s objections, 
international oil companies’ concerns are precisely discussed. As a result, hence foresee of 
the future development of the model necessitates the examination of government’s' 
complaints in addition to the international investors, the analysis provided by this author 
cannot enable the parties in buyback to predict the future changes of the model.8. On the 
contrary to the research of Ule and Brexendorff, this study for the purpose of ensuring the 
benefit of both parties in buyback via enabling them to predict the changes of model in 
future will equally consider the deficiencies of the model from the view of the national and 
international stakeholders to determine the accuracy of proposed reforms9. 
Another weakness of the above mentioned research is the inappropriate balance between 
the examinations of the deficiency of the model and the legal issues. In other words, 
although this research precisely discussed the restrictions on Iranian Constitution and other 
relevant laws, it devoted inadequate attention to the process and formation of such laws10.  
On the contrary, this work to respond its research question will point out the different 
obstacles against introduction of any new model including historical, political, geo-political 
and legal restrictions rather than simply suggesting the solution only on the basis of 
commercial purposes. Therefore, this study in order to create a real effect on the current 
legal environment of the Iranian buyback contracts will present an alternative according to 
the existing situation instead of proposing an inapplicable solution which has no influence 
from the practical point of view.   
More importantly, an overview of this work demonstrates that the emphasis has been put 
on the immediate explanation and examination of the model rather than its origins and 
prospects. Although a comprehensive analysis of the current state of the buyback model are 
                                                 
7 Ule, C. and A. Brexendrorff, Investing in the Oil and Gas Industry 2005: Mena. 
8 Ule, C. and A. Brexendrorff, Investing in the Oil and Gas Industry 2005: Mena 
9 Kakhki, Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati (2008) A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the context of international petroleum 
contractual systems, Durham theses, Durham University. P20  
 
10 ibid 
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provided in that work, especially in regards to foreign companies' concerns, it suffers from 
lack of consideration of the Iranian buyback from different angles, particularly historical, 
political and geo-political to accurately assess the present situation of the model, as well as 
predicting its future development, as the consideration of historical, political and geo-
political events can determine both of these factors, and, crucially, can ensure the 
applicability of proposed solutions to increase the efficiency of the model.  However, this 
study, unlike Ule's and Brexendorffs work, recognises the importance of providing such 
analysis as the basis for reaching its conclusions. Therefore, this work will be able to offer 
applicable and effective solutions for the future development of the model by 
understanding its historical, political and geo-political roots. Lack of such vital consideration 
led the Ule's and Brexendorffs research to propose an alternative system, merely based on 
commercial purposes which is not necessarily applicable within the current political, geo-
political and legal environment of Iran, while, this study via providing the above-mentioned 
analysis will consider vital concerns such as negative historical experience of Iranians 
towards foreign involvement in the oil sector and the Constitutionally forbiddance of 
ownership of Iranian natural reserves by foreigners, which ensure the applicability of the 
proposed reforms by this work. 
Unlike the Ule's and Brexendorffs study, which focus on the critical analysis of the current 
mechanism of buyback, the examination of several publications on the issue of Iranian oil 
agreements demonstrated that most of these works, despite concentrating on explaining of 
the background and current legislations concerning buyback agreements, suffer from 
providing sufficient analytical content, as well as failing to propose solutions for the future 
of the model. "Contract Laws"11 and "A Survey on Iran's Oil Agreements"12 are two examples 
of sole explanation of the related legislations and social facts summary with a lack of critical 
analysis13. Albeit above mentioned works are respected due to offering the related social 
data, these studies cannot, consequently, be useful in demonstrating the contemporary 
practice, as well as, Iranian buyback’s deficiencies, because of their lack of analytical 
consideration of the model. Thus, these works are unable to propose the necessary reforms 
                                                 
11 Rabiee, F, Hoghoogh-e-Gharardadha (Contract Laws) 1381, Tehran, Behnami 
12 Farshadgohar, N., A Survey on Iran's Oil Agreements. 2002, Economic Research Institute, Tehran 
13 Kakhki, Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati (2008) A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the context of international petroleum 
contractual systems, Durham theses, Durham University. P 22 
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to improve the efficiency of the model. On the contrary, this study aims to offer solutions to 
make the Iranian buyback more attractive, and a detailed analysis of the current mechanism 
of the model including an examination of domestic and international factors, as well as a 
comparison with other methods used, in order to offer practical solutions to modernise the 
model and attract foreign investment after the removal of the nuclear related sanctions.  
Unlike the Ule's and Brexendorffs study, the PhD thesis at Durham University, A Critical 
Analysis of Iranian Buy-Back Transactions in the Context of International Petroleum 
Contractual Systems 2008, conducted by Dr. Kakhki provided historical information, case 
studies, and proposed the solution for the future of the model. However, the work offered 
general historical information that in some points suffers from lack of critical analysis, 
moreover, the thesis simply described some cases, and did not explain the link between the 
theoretical analysis of the model and its practical review which accordingly cannot prove 
the applicability of proposed attitude regarding the future of Iranian buyback. The Dr. 
Khakhkii’s work was concluded by suggesting the evolutionary approach which is a vague 
concept, and did not specifically addressed the applicable revisions with regard to defective 
provisions of the model. Nevertheless, this work instead of providing massive information 
on Iranian history and politics critically analyses only those historical and political fact that 
are crucially influenced on the Iranian present petroleum framework. This work examines 
cases in Iranian buyback to point out the problematic provisions and their effects in practice 
to create the link between the theoretical and practical study of the model for the purpose 
of great understanding of the model, moreover, this work attempted to utilize the cases to 
analyse their consequences with the current situation and needs of the model to ensure the 
applicability of proposed solutions. This work in final stage chose the evolutionary approach 
over the radical shift, however, it specifically suggests the applicable and effective reforms 
to defective provisions of Iranian buyback to convince the Iranian law makers to improve 
the model for the purpose of absorbing more foreign investment.  
The recently published book, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law, Nima Mersadi 
Tabari14, despite offering an extensive analysis of all methods of oil transactions in the 
Persian Gulf, suffers from a lack of comprehensive consideration of the Iranian buyback. 
                                                 
14 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf. 2016. Page 152-193 
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Although this book contains an examination of the Iranian buyback from historical, political 
and legal perspectives, it fails to provide any case studies in order to analyse the model from 
a practical view point. Thus, the work only focused on a substantive analysis of the model, 
whilst failed to offer a comprehensive examination of the model. Nevertheless, the 
distinguishing feature of this study is to provide an examination of case studies via 
considering the past projects of the Iranian oil fields which have been governed on the basis 
of Iranian buyback for the purpose of examining the applicability and efficiency of the 
proposed reforms by this work. Such analysis is vital from the point that this study focuses 
on offering an applicable and effective solutions instead of simply suggesting a hypothetical 
improvement which might not be applicable or effective in the current situation of the 
country. This book unlike the above mentioned thesis which provided the unnccessary 
general infromation on the sanctions instead of crtically discussing  the effect of them failed 
to offer crucial delibatraion on intrenational sanctions on Iranian oil sector15. Neverthless, 
this work will examine the impacts of pervious sanctions, as well as, analysing the effect of 
lifting the embargo in order to deteremine the needs to reach the ambitious plan of the 
country in boosting its production rate, thus, this work on the subject of Iranian model of 
buyback cannot be completed without critical consideration of these impacts which 
provides more clear image of the model from the both past and future perspective. 
Consequently, this work aims to comprehensively analyse the Iranian model of buyback 
from different angles to suggest practical reforms to modernise the model. Therefore, for 
the purpose of providing the full picture of the Iranian method of oil transactions, as well as 
ensuring the effectiveness of the proposed revisions, the historical, political, geo-political, 
legal and practical considerations of the model will be critically examined in the different 
chapters of this work. 
   
2.3 Description of gaps in research literature 
The successful negotiation of Iran with the five big powers plus Germany which resulted in 
the removal of nuclear sanctions increased the attention of issues related to Iran’s economy 
and particularly the Iranian oil industry. Nevertheless, the Iranian buyback has not been 
comprehensively examined, despite being the key element of the Iranian oil sector, as this 
                                                 
15 ibid 
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method is not broadly practical among the other petroleum producers around the world. 
Therefore, the issue with the Iranian model of buyback is that it is becoming academically 
more valuable, due to the fact that Iran is actively attempting to obtain its previous position 
in the market after lifting of the sanctions and this will be examined in this research.  
As the critical review of the similar researches16 in the last section demonstrated the 
existing gap in the studying of Iranian buyback is the lack of analytical consideration of the 
model from the historical and political views to show the origins of the model,17 offering the 
case studies, and proposing the applicable, effective and specific solutions to improve the 
model. Thus, this study will focus on providing such considerations to fill the gap via 
analysing the effective historical, political and geo-political events in the current practice, 
pervious cases and future development of the model, owing to the fact that without such 
considerations it is almost impossible to understand the core concept of the Iranian 
buyback, and more importantly to predict its future development with the aim of offering a 
more attractive version of the model. Moreover, offering such a critical examination will 
increase the effectiveness of the solutions that this study will propose in order to make the 
model more competitive. Noticeably, to avoid the descriptive feature of the history and 
politics, only relevant events that have legally influenced the Iranian model of buyback will 
be highlighted in order to grasp the framework of the model, point out the crucial concerns, 
and provide appropriate attention for critical factors within this research. In addition, such 
an analysis will be carried out in the light of both practical and academic literature to ensure 
the applicability of the proposed solutions.  Accordingly, the present study fills this gap with 
the aim of modernising the model by offering a greater level of understanding of the Iranian 
buyback, which will serve the interests of the domestic party in petroleum deals via 
absorbing more foreign investments and subsequently obtaining more income, whilst also 
enables the foreign contractors to predict the future changes of the Iran’s oil and gas legal 
framework. Both sides’ understanding will be increased via enjoying a critical research 
rather than works with unnecessary general and irrelevant information on this subject. 
Thus, this study attempts to reach these goals by critically examining the relevant issues of 
buyback from different perspectives to demonstrate the origins of Iranian buyback and to 
                                                 
16 Ule, C. and A. Brexendrorff, Investing in the Oil and Gas Industry 2005: Mena 
17 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf. 2016.  
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predict the future development of the model as a unique tactic with regard to consideration 
of this topic. Noticeably, lack of this tactic in considering the Iranian buyback will lead to 
ambiguity in some features of buyback deals including the rationale behind such a model, 
the direction that the Iran’s authorities’ legislation will move, and the applicability and 
efficiency of any proposed reforms. Hence, this work aims to enhance the understanding of 
foreign investors regarding the model and increase their foreseeability of new reforms 
within the framework of the model after the removal of the nuclear sanctions.  
 
2.4 Importance and contribution of the proposed research 
Whilst the issue of Iranian buyback agreements seems to be a legal topic at the first glance, 
this study asserts that law and regulation cannot exist independently from history and 
politics.18 This relation in the case of Iranian buyback is even more significant, as many 
historical and political events have had a heavy influence on the adaption of the model, the 
foundation of the basis of the mechanism and the creation of its provisions. Therefore, 
understanding the core concept of Iranian buyback is impossible without considering such 
factors. Thus, this has demonstrated the importance of providing a brief examination of the 
relevant historical, political and geo-political events of the Iran’s petroleum sector with the 
aim of identifying the root of Iranian buyback to grasp the issue from different angles. 
Moreover, social events on the Iranian model of buyback have had an undeniable effect on 
the future of the model by creating relevant disadvantages to the model which plays the 
main role in the selection of the future approach of the model19, as the effectiveness of 
potential reforms within the current framework of Iranian buyback is strongly dependent on 
those factors. Thus, a consideration of the core concept of the Iranian scheme of buyback 
and providing suggestions to improve it cannot be completed without an examination of 
these serious influences. Moreover, this study examines some previous buyback projects to 
show the adverse effects of unattractive provisions on the actual Iranian projects and to 
determine the efficiency of the reforms on the model in practice, such element will also 
enable the work to cover the model from both theoretical and practical views. Finally, this 
study in addition to drawing the general trend of the model, addresses the unattractive 
                                                 
18 Movahed, M.A., 'Nafte Ma va Masaele Hoghooghiye an', (Our Oil and its Related Legal Issues) Kharazmi, Tehran, 1353.p 67-74 
19 Farshadgohar, N., A Survey on Iran's Oil Agreements. 2002, Economic Research Institute, Tehran 
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features of the model to specifically provide applicable and effective reforms for each of 
them.  
Consequently, the above-mentioned analysis will enable this study to choose the applicable 
approach for improving the efficiency of the model via proposing the effective reforms that 
do not breach the historical and political barriers within Iranian society, which will result in a 
higher degree of certainty for the parties involved in buyback transactions, as they will be 
able to foresee the future development of buyback agreements.  
 
3. Research Outline 
Since the quality of a research's outcome undoubtedly correlates with the utilised process 
and the mechanism in the study, an accurate examination of these process and mechanisms 
is vital for the purpose of providing valid results20. This is especially important in those 
studies which are based on the qualitative method, as the researcher is intended to produce 
"decision rule”  through examining different ideas and information for the purpose of 
deciding which one optimally fits the facts at hand in the sense of efficiency and 
applicability21. This section will illuminate the procedure that such factor is adopted to the 
subject of Iranian model of buyback, and also to choose the most useful methodology, as 
there are various items which can effect on the social study’s conclusion. Therefore, this 
work will use different research method in time of examining the various effective factors to 
maximize the quality of different carried out analysis in order to propose the valid outcome. 
 
 
3.1 Research design and organisation  
The international decision to remove the nuclear sanctions on the Iranian oil industry and 
the oil price fluctuation highlighted the issue of the Iranian stance on the oil market, as Iran 
intended to relocate its position amid other oil producing countries via absorbing more 
foreign investment. Therefore, to offer a detailed analysis of Iranian buyback for the aim of 
                                                 
20 Robson, C. Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers. 2002, .Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford Pg.130 
21 Sarantakos, Sotirios, 'Social Research', the MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1994. p. 6-7 
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undersetting all of its angles to propose the applicable reforms for the future of the model, 
this research is designed to critically discuss the historical, political, geo-political and legal 
considerations of buyback that have influenced the current practice of the model22. Such a 
comprehensive examination of the Iranian buyback from different perspectives which will 
be completed by scrutinising the case study via analysing some important carried out 
projects, will enable this work to offer suggestions to modernise the current model, so as to 
compete with other commonly used methods of oil transactions. For this purpose, this work 
consults various researches with different view, national and the international, and also 
refers to massive information from different sides, both the host state and IOCs, moreover 
it follows the news related to the Ministry of Oil, journals in both languages to ensure a 
completed examination of this complicated subject. Accordingly, this work which consists of 
five chapters will discuss the five areas related to the issue of Iranian buyback including the 
historical, political, geo-political, legal, critical and case study analysis. To carry out such a 
comprehensive study, the first chapter is concerned with an examination of the effective 
historical elements in shaping the present mechanism of buyback with particular focus on 
the concessionary deals as the first method of oil transactions in the pre-nationalisation era, 
to highlight the historical roots and concerns of the buyback. The second chapter considers 
the political and geo-political analysis of Iranian buyback via reference to the Nationalisation 
event, in order to examine the impact of such a vital event on the adoption of the buyback 
as the key element of the Iranian oil industry. The critical analysis of the existing mechanism 
of Iranian buyback from the legal aspect is addressed in the third chapter, which 
investigates the legal anatomy of the model in order to point out the shortcomings of the 
model as well as its legal limitations regarding any future change. The fourth chapter’s 
emphasis is to review the criticisms of both international and domestic players, as well as a 
comparison of the Iranian model of buyback with other common mechanisms to highlight 
the deficiencies of the model and, more importantly, to employ the chosen approach in 
order to offer the applicable reforms to modernise the model with a consideration of 
historical, political, geo-political and legal concerns. The last chapter provides the dissection 
of Iranian buyback deals in practice by referring to some cases of contemporary Iranian oil 
transactions which allows the research to consider the buyback through the practical 
                                                 
22 Denzin, A. and Yvonna, S. Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials 2003, Sage Publishing, London 
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approach to examine the effectiveness of the chosen approach by this work, and 
accordingly to foresee the future development of the Iranian buyback agreements. Finally, 
the conclusion of the whole work will be drawn through reviewing the carried out analysis in 
the previous chapters for the purpose of answering the question of this research, which is to 
suggest the most applicable solution to make the Iranian model of buyback more attractive. 
3.2 Confidentiality and ethics 
The consideration of an ethical approval has been discussed with the ‘Ethical Approval’ 
Committee of the University of Portsmouth, and it was confirmed on 19th October 2015 that 
it was not required prior to, or as a part of, final submission. Therefore, no attempts have 
been made to collect any primary data without first obtaining a favourable ethical approval 
from the faculty ethics committee.  
 
3.3 Methods and choice of analysis 
Providing a valid conclusion is absolutely based on the process and the procedure that were 
applied in the research highlighting the importance of the examination of these procedural 
elements for the purpose of obtaining convincing conclusions. While it is unfeasible to list 
the different research methods in the structure of this research, this is vital to explain the 
general kinds of this study’s methodologies23.  
Generally, social issues are not mutually exclusive, in other words, the standard research 
needs a limitless method of study to ensure that the work is not confined to a rigid 
hypotheses or requirements which would restrict the scope of the research24. Following this 
guideline, this research is not aimed to reach a particular outcome via persuading the pre-
designed data, nevertheless, it will propose the outcome that will be reached through the 
analysis of all relevant data. Moreover, this guideline clarifies that reaching a 
comprehensive grasp of the issue is not completed, unless, a precise analysis of the concept 
has been carried out from different angles. Therefore, this point is implemented in this 
                                                 
23 Robson, C. Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner-researchers. 2002, .Blackwell 
Publishing, Oxford Pg.135 
24 Sarantakos, Sotirios, 'Social Research', the MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1994. p. 7-9 
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study by the presence of only relevant events on the history, politics and geo-politics 
background of buyback. In addition, the limitless feature of the method of study 
necessitates the concept of interactions. This concept specifies that the target of this work is 
to clarify the foundation of the model, and subsequently to foresee its future foundation. 
Therefore, this research’s focus, via following the guideline, is not only the historic or even 
the present form of the buyback, but also predicting the future development of the matter 
in question with an analysis of the historical and political events’ influences on buyback25 
and to offer solutions to improve the efficiency of the model. 
Social studies utilizes various methodologies in a single research, as social issues generally 
have various aspects which require utilising different types of research methods, in order to 
ensure that every element has been investigated by its most appropriate research method. 
Therefore, it is possible to use different research methods in a study including descriptive, 
analytical and theory creating method. However, it is notable that every research method in 
this study is used for a certain part of the paper and issue which, obviously, is not practical 
in other parts of the paper and issues. This mixed research method, quantitative, 
qualitative, analytical, and theory creating system is being called by Bryman as 'the mixed 
method approach'26. Nevertheless, most of this work enjoys the analytical system even in 
the chapters of historical and political analysis which are descriptive in nature, therefore, 
the major research method is interpretative to prevent the common mistake of research 
methods which put the main emphasis on the descriptive method which plays as parallel 
when the study reaches the analytical part, as the sections of historical and political analysis 
are strongly linked and closely interconnected to the analytical examination of the buyback 
in other chapters. Subsequently, although this research acknowledges the priority of the 
mixed methods research, the main methodology in this work is qualitative research which 
refers to interpretive, comparative and an analytical method of research.  
As alluded to above, the research will place emphasis on qualitative methods which will be 
conducted mainly through a documentary reviews and critical study of the Iranian buyback 
contracts. Applying a qualitative method in social researches has some advantages 
                                                 
25 Denzin, A. and Yvonna, S. Collecting and interpreting qualitative materials 2003, Sage Publishing, London 
26Bryman, A. Social research methods Oxford University Press, 2004 pg. 48 
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compared to the quantitative system such as research’s openness and linking to reality.27 
Accordingly, the issue in question will be abided to the qualitative method, thus, it will take 
into account the necessity of the recognition of buyback agreements in both different stage 
of current situation, as well as those evidences that are guiding to the future position of the 
scheme such as historical, political and geo-political influences on the final product. Overall, 
in this study all essential elements (in both English and Persian) are in an effort to analyse 
the various theories to create a "decision rule"28 by fulfilling the guidelines of the qualitative 
research method to examine all the effective historical, political and geo-political events in 
order to answer the question of this research.  
 
3.4 Process of attaining conclusion 
Following the consideration of the method of research chosen for the present study, it 
seems vital to discuss the mechanism that guides this research in proposing its outcome. In 
fact, the method of research is being employed to provide a definitive conclusion to the 
initial theoretical question of the work, however, the conclusion that this study arrived at 
may vary depending on the precise structure of the research method. Moreover, since the 
subject matter of this study is controversial, and accordingly can cause a serious 
disagreement between various parties, using a mechanism that demonstrates such contrast 
seems essential. As a result, this research utilizes the mechanism of examining of both 
parties’ complaints, as well as a side-by-side analysis of various contractual issues to ensure 
both sides’ concerns in the time of proposing the conclusion. In addition, showing the core 
concept of the issue that can guarantee objectivity, due to the analysis of two parties of the 
topic will be provided in this study, as this analysis offers improvements of the provisions if 
this seems vital to respond a party’s compliant. 
This study, via examining relevant information, will follow an approach that is consistent 
with the emphasis on contextual analysis which manifested itself in the decision to offer the 
chapters on the historical and political considerations of the model as the vital preliminary 
aspects which offers the conceptual analysis of present situation and future development of 
the model in the remainder of the work. Moreover, the inclusion of an initial and extensive 
                                                 
27 Sarantakos, Sotirios, 'Social Research', the MacMillan Press Ltd, London 1994. p. 6-7 
28  Dooley, D. 'Social Research Methods', Prentice-Hall Inc. Englewood CliftS, 1984,USA, pg. 9/ A decision rule is a procedure that the 
researcher uses to decide whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis which is about applying the radical shift or evolutionary 
approach towards the future of Iranian buyback. 
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analysis of historical and political considerations of buyback prevents this work to solely 
concentrate on examining current situation of the model and its future development. The 
rest of the work is designed in a way to process the relevant general information prior to 
detailed examination in order to provide related facts29 before beginning the contractual 
analysis. In addition, this study by ordering a logical structure in placing the related chapters 
and critical analysing and conducting a comparative examination of the model with other 
commonly used methods prior to employing the chosen approach regarding the future 
tendency of the model, attempts to point out the flaws of the current mechanism and more 
importantly, specifically provides the applicable reforms for them. Therefore, although this 
work does not focus on the chronological sequence, it seems logically appropriate to begin 
the work with a review of historical and political considerations of the issue before the study 
of flaws and possible alternatives for the future development of the model. Following such 
an analysis, the case study chapter for the aim of demonstrating the impact of historical, 
political, geo-political and legal items on the practice of Iranian model of buyback will 
provide cases of the provisions which are applied in past buyback projects to examine the 
efficiency of the proposed reforms. Finally, the conclusion of this work in the form of a short 
section will review the entire work for the purpose of offering the compromising solution to 
determine the future development of the Iranian buyback to provide the answer to the 
question of this research which is ‘what is the most effective and applicable solution 
amongst the evolutionary attitude and radical shift for Iranian buyback’.  
 
3.5 Expected Outcomes 
This research examines the Iranian model of buyback from various outlooks, historical, 
political, geo-political, and legal, to determine the matter of whether an amendment of its 
terms or a superseded system would be more appropriate with regard to the different 
existing prohibitions.30 Moreover, this work conducts the accurate consideration of the 
specific terms and conditions of buyback contracts from both domestic and international 
perspectives along with the comparison of the model with other mechanisms to analyse the 
                                                 
29 Bryman, A. Social research methods Oxford University Press, 2004 pg. 50 
30 Rabiee, F., 'Hoghoogh-e-Gharardadha' (Contract Law), Tehran, 1381.p 43-52 
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current practice of Iranian buyback with a focus on its flaws and criticisms. In addition, a 
review of various oil field projects can define the effect of the perceived deficiencies of the 
model in reality and more importantly will show the possible influence of any reforms on 
the model. The outcome of such an analysis demonstrates that the method of a buyback 
agreement in Iran is based on the unnecessary preventive provisions which stem from the 
nationally supportive nature of the model rather than owing to the system itself31. Hence, 
the low efficiency of the model in consequence of such a feature, removal of nuclear 
embargo and Iranian ambitious plan to boost the production rate to develop its economy, 
highlights the necessity of offering more balanced version of the Iranian buyback32. Thus, 
the Iranian government is actively attempting to offer more attractive contracts on the basis 
of the buyback. Accordingly, this study is based on facts and findings and draws a conclusion 
which leads to the application of the evolutionary rather than the revolutionary reform of 
the current model of the buyback with no rejection of the existing legal framework, neither 
breaches any historical, political, geo-political, and legal barrier within the present structure. 
This is because of the fact that any radical change within the model will confront such 
barriers which would create a considerably high expense for the country to adopt the new 
mechanism, as it requires a fundamental change in the entire system, therefore, no 
justification will remain to shift to another model particularly with a consideration of Iran’s 
time limit to return to the market. Moreover, despite the low efficiency of the model, it still 
has obtained some achievements during many years of its practice which demonstrates it 
has a capacity to be revised. Furthermore, the precedent in Iran in the introduction of four 
generations of buyback proves the applicability of the evolutionary approach, even though 
this study confirms the need to develop the scope of such reforms. Consequently, this work, 
in its conclusion will summarise the various areas that was analysed in different chapters of 
this study and highlights the fact that applying an evolutionary reform will make the model 
more attractive by addressing the related issues to national, as well as, international party, 
and also integrating the useful elements of other models without crossing the line drawn by 
historical, political and legal considerations.  
                                                 
31 Estelami, H. 'A Study of lran's Responses to US Economic Sanctions' Middle East Review of 
International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Volume 3, No.3, Sep. 1999 
32 Mobaser, D., 'Kalbodshekafi Sarmayegozarihaye Sanate Naft, Beyeh Moteghabel, (Autopsy of the Oil Contract "Buy-Back"), collection of 
articles by et at, 2000, pg. 21 
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Chapter 1: Examination of effective historical concerns on Iranian buyback: Iranian 
Establishment of the petroleum contractual system Prior to Nationalisation Event 
 
1.1 Introduction: The influence of economic mustiness of Iran and its challenge with 
dominant powers on formation of concessionary deals 
The country of Iran which was economically a progressive country historically has lost its 
strong position since the 19th century33. This is because Iran’s political authorities refused to 
modernise the country to decrease the economic gap between Iran and other developed 
countries. Thus, Iran was not able to economically compete with the developed European 
countries. In fact, the leadership of the country was reluctant to carry out any modification 
that possibly could lead to change the political regime, thus, there was a lack of any attempt 
to modernise the country in the sense of economy and trade which resulted in the 
economic weakness of Iran in the 19th century34. On the other hand, European economies, 
Britain and Russia, were in the middle of the Industrial Revolution which created a high level 
of competition between them, therefore, they needed more natural resources to develop 
their economy and win the competition35. As a result, Iran as a country with a huge capacity 
of natural resources, as well as, a strategic position faced the challenge with the two great 
powers, Britain and Russia, in the early 19th century, as these two dominant countries took 
the advantages of their political and economic power to utilise Iran for boosting their own 
economy, as well as expanding their geo-political influence in Asia, mostly in India and 
China. In other words, Iran seemed to be a backyard for foreign companies coming from 
these great powers to actively compete with each other with the support of their 
governments, in employing the Iranian natural reserves via obtaining economic benefit 
privileges36 in the form of concessions, as well as developing their geo-political influence in a 
strategic zone in the world. Therefore, Iran as a result of its oil and gas fields and its 
strategic position was crucially significant from the economic and the geo-political point of 
                                                 
33 The Circle of Ancient Iranian Studies "Kanoon-Pazhooheshhay-Iran-Bastan ", affiliated with the School of Oriental and African Studies. 
Entry on Turkmanchai Treaty [http://www-cais-soas.com/CAIS/lran/torkmanchai.htm] 
34 Muhlberger, op.cit., p.2 
35 F. KazemNia, “Story of Oil” [in Farsi], <http://www.tebyan.net/index.aspx? 
pid=10893> (January 18, 2010). 
36 Muhiberger:Steve',-History of Islamic civilization, Nipissing University 1999 
[http://www.nipissingu.ca/department/history/MUHLBERGER/2805/LEADUP .HTM] pg. 1 
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view of big powers, Britain and Russia, which resulted in their taking advantage of the 
economic weakness of the country and putting pressure on Iran to establish concessionary 
deals with unbalanced terms and an exploitative nature that created a negative historical 
experience towards foreign involvement in the oil sector and denied the national interest of 
Iran in petroleum deals.  Accordingly, the economic weakness of Iran in the 19th century, 
because of poor economic strategy of Iranian authorities provided the basis for the special 
advantage of the big powers to challenge the country by extending their pressure on Iran to 
exploit the country to develop their economic and geo-political influence in the world to 
overcome their rivals and win the competition. The effects of this competition for Iran was 
the breaking down of the national economy, limiting the sovereignty of the Iranian state 
and increasing the poverty of the Iranian people37, by granting unbalanced and exploitative 
concessions to foreign companies which denied the national interest of Iran in oil and gas 
deals. As will be discussed in this chapter the effects of the involvement of foreigners in the 
Iranian oil sector created the negative experience towards foreign participation in the 
Iranian oil industry and led to an ignoring of the national interest in petroleum deals which 
resulted in the introduction of the Iranian buyback with its extreme provisions. As a result, 
this chapter, which has been divided into two sub-chapters, aims to demonstrate the 
influence of historical events on the formation of the current model of buyback to show the 
reasons for the adoption of such a harsh model, and more importantly to highlight the 
historical concerns regarding the issue of buyback to ensure the applicability of reforms that 
will be proposed in the following chapters on the basis of the evolutionary approach to 
make the model more attractive after the removal of the nuclear sanctions without any 
clash with the historical, political and legal barriers in the current situation of Iran38. 
Therefore, the first sub-chapter will examine the overview of the concessionary deals with 
some examples to illustrate the process of the creation of the negative attitude among 
Iranians towards foreign participation in the oil sector as the main historical reason which 
led to the adoption of the buyback, and the second sub-chapter is designed to analyse the 
influence of foreign pressure to establish the unbalanced concessions which resulted in 
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ignoring the national interest of Iran in the petroleum deals which led to the nationally 
supportive features of the present buyback.  
Carrying out such an analysis is vital to understanding the reasons for the introduction of 
this particular model; moreover, proposing the applicable alternative for the future of 
Iranian buyback to increase its efficiency is not possible without a careful consideration of 
the historical roots for the formation of the model. This is because of the fact that this study 
is aimed at providing solutions that are applicable in the current situation of Iran after the 
removal of the nuclear sanctions which highlights the essence of considering the historical 
concerns of the model. More importantly, offering such a consideration distinguishes this 
study over other studies regarding the topic of Iranian buyback, as the lack of the historical 
analysis in examining the issue of Iranian buyback is a significant gap that makes the 
examination incomplete, as the issue in question has crucial historical roots and also 
influences the current and the future mechanism of the Iranian method of buyback.  
 
1.2 Overview of concessionary deals: Creation of negative historical experience of Iranians 
towards foreign involvement in oil industry  
The 19th century’s form of Iranian petroleum deals is an unpleasant memory in the history 
of Iranian petroleum agreements39. In other words, Iran was under financial pressure and 
the government had to obtain income through awarding exclusive rights to foreigners to 
enjoy exploitation of Iranian energy reserves which was defined as concessionary deals. 
Nevertheless, the unfair terms of these concessions in favour of foreign companies, which 
resulted in the frustrating of the domestic party’s rights to enter into any further 
commercial interaction, subsequently aggravated the feelings of resentment between 
Iranians towards foreigners. Accordingly, such concessions with unfair provisions and their 
exploitative nature which were granted as a result of the foreign force via Powerful 
countries (Britain and Russia) in consequence of Iran’s weak policy and economy played the 
main role in the creation of public discontent towards foreigners. Moreover, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, granting the unbalanced concessions led to the formation of 
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the nationalisation movement which nationalised Iranian natural resources and introduced 
the Iranian model of buyback with unfriendly provisions for investors and a nationally 
protective framework.  As a result, this sub-chapter will analyse some concessions granted 
to foreigners in four sections in order to firstly show the mechanism of the concessionary 
deals in the Iranian oil industry, secondly, to demonstrate the effect of such concessions on 
the introduction of buyback, and finally to provide the necessary facts to employ in the 
following chapters with the aim of offering applicable reforms which are not in contrary 
with the historical elements of Iran to make the buyback more attractive.  
a) The Reuter concession: The most "extraordinary surrender"40 concession 
The Reuter concession is the first petroleum agreement in the Middle East which was signed 
on 25 July 1872 amid the English businessman, Reuter, and Iranian King Nasir al-Din Shah. 
This concession, which was based on the proposal of cash for a concession is highlighted 
because of the extensive scope of exploitation of Iranian natural resources that was granted 
to the foreign party41. Thus, it is identified as the most extraordinary surrender. In fact, 
while the Reuter concession initially monopolized of the building of train and bus stations, it 
extended to the enjoy jungles and all uncultured farms. In fact, based on the provisions of 
this concession, Reuter’s agency was granted the exclusive right over all Iran’s mineral 
resources for long duration, with exclusion of expensive rock such as gold and silver42. 
Therefore, as a result of the extensive granted rights to the company, Lord Curzon43 pointed 
out that the deal as absolutely comprehensive and "extraordinary surrender"44 deal granted 
from Iran in favour of international benefits. Moreover, Lord asserted that "the concession 
is an absolute profitable deal that a country is able to award to foreigners through leaving of 
ownership of the natural resources.45’ The concession was terminated after 15 months, 
owing to great internal public pressure and Russian objections, even though it left a lasting 
negative experience for Iranians to associate the contract with a foreign party and also an 
alarm for the peril of foreign exploitation of Iran’s national resources. Accordingly, although 
the Reuter concession was prematurely terminated, it demonstrated the main elements of 
                                                 
40 Curzon, George N., Persia and Persian Question, London 1892, Vol 1 p. 480 
41 El well-Sutton, L.P, Persian Oil 1976 ed. 1955, London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, p. 11 
42 ibid 
43 George Curzon, the eldest son of Baron Curzon, was born on 11th January .He was appointed foreign secretary in 1919 and died on 20 th 
March 1925. 
44 Curzon, George N., Persia and Persian Question, London 1892, Vol 1 p. 480 
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the concessions, including the unfair and unbalanced terms of concession in the form of 
ownership of almost all Iranian natural resources in exchange for cash, and more 
importantly the extremely long duration of the deal, in this case seventy years, which 
highlighted the exploitative nature of the concessions46. Such features of the concessions 
resulted in the current provision of buyback regarding short contracts and a separation of 
granting the discovery rights from the development rights that will be considered by this 
work when offering the reforms on the basis of the evolutionary approach in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of the proposed revisions. 
 
b) The Imperial bank of Persia concession: Modified version of the Reuter concession 
 
Subsequent to the premature termination of the Reuter concession, the company had 
struggled for almost two decades to obtain another concessionary provision in order to 
enter the Iranian market. Accordingly, after a long negotiation between the parties to 
modify some of the terms and conditions of the Reuter Concession, this led to the 
foundation of the 'Imperial Bank of Persia'47 in order to reactivate the Reuter Concession in 
a new form. The new agreement obliged the Reuter Company to make a payment of a 
million Francs at an annual interest of 16%, as a loan to the Iranian Government. In return, 
the Iranian Government would provide the necessary starting capital for the establishment 
of the Imperial Bank. Noticeably, the concessionary provision was included in fourteen 
articles and provided a monopoly over minting banknotes and more importantly an 
exclusive right under Article 11 to exploit all Iranian minerals, including oil.  
 
Article 11 of the concession states that:  
Minerals 
“As the Imperial Bank declares that they are ready to exploit all of the natural minerals, 
everywhere in the country, immediately, the government will give a concession to this bank 
to exploit all minerals, including iron, copper, lead, coal, oil, and manganese; provided that 
the government had not granted this to others in the past. If the bank does not start to 
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exploit any particular resources within ten years from the time that the bank was 
established, the government would assume that they had abandoned their title to those 
minerals”48. 
Consequently, despite the long negotiations, after more than seventeen years, the Reuter 
Company could still compromise with the Iranian Government and resolve all conflicts over 
the concession in order to acquire new opportunities pertaining to the exploitation of Iran’s 
oil and gas resources49. Therefore, although the scope of the new agreement was more 
limited compared to the original version, the Reuter Concession, it still contains features of 
an exploitative nature through its long duration and unbalanced considerations. 
Accordingly, this concession was the second deal in Iran’s oil history that formed the basis of 
the current Iranian buyback such as the nationally protective element of the present model 
which created many unnecessary restrictive provisions that limit the attractiveness of 
Iranian buyback. 
 
c) The D'Arcy Concession: Inequality of parties’ considerations   
The D'Arcy concession which was granted by the Iranian king, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah, to the 
British businessman William D'Arcy in 1901 resulting in the Middle East's first huge oil field 
discovery. The concession required the foreign party to provide the value of £40,000 stocks 
to the King in exchange for obtaining the right to explore and develop vast areas in 
southwest Iran which led to the discovery of a huge oil reserve in the Masjid Soleiman 
region. In consequence of the high level of oil discovery in the field, the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company was established, 1908, later becoming Britain Petroleum Company (BP) in 1954 to 
continue the operation of the Masjid Soleiman project50. Thus, D’Arcy’s Company which 
owned all of the concession rights transferred them to the new APOC. The main elements of 
the D'Arcy concession, which point out its contradiction with the Iranian national interest by 
applying  an unbalanced consideration of the Parties’ interests, can be found in the first 
Article which states that: “The Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah grants to the 
concessionaire by these presents a special and exclusive privilege to search for, obtain, 
exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, Carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, 
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asphalt and ozokerite51 throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of 
sixty years as from the date of the signing”52.  
As it has been mentioned, this article granted the exclusive right53 to the foreign party to 
carry out a number of oil related activities such as exploration, production and export over a 
vast area of Iran’s southwest for the long length of sixty years in exchange for £50,000 
worth of fully-paid shares54 which resulted in to a vital limit for Iran over its sovereignty of 
natural resources. This article, in fact, highlights the inequality in the parties’ considerations, 
as whilst the foreign party could enjoy unlimited level of operations over the vast area for a 
period of 60 years, the Iranian side had limited rights, namely £50,000 in cash. Accordingly, 
the harshness of this concession’ provisions was similar to the Reuter Concession and led to 
the formation of some of the current mechanisms of buyback especially the terms regarding 
the granting of separate exploration and development rights, the NIOCs’ discretionary 
power to grant the development rights to every contractor that successfully finished the 
discovery stage, and the relatively short period of the contract. Therefore, this study, in 
dealing with the above-mentioned restrictive provisions for the purpose of proposing the 
proposed reforms will consider the cause of these provisions, and more importantly the 
special historical concerns regarding them. 
 
d) The 1933 concession: The first attempt to balance the terms of the concession  
Following the exploitative nature of the D'Arcy Concession, the Iranian government 
proposed some revisions in the concession in order to achieve more revenues from the deal 
by rendering a better balance between the parties’ interests. To prove the necessity of the 
modifications in the D'Arcy Concession the Iranian government required the company to 
provide a licensed expert to analyse the fiscal situation of AIPC and Iranian authority, due to 
the fact that the Company had breached important terms of the concession several times 
such as the secret deal between the Company and the British Admiralty to supply the fuel at 
a lower price. However, the Company refused to employ a chartered accountant, and 
subsequently denied any need to revise the concession. Therefore, the Iranian government 
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concluded that the Iranian rights were being undermined by the application of the 
provisions of the D'Arcy Concession and proposed a new set of negotiations to establish a 
new deal 55 . In the new set of negotiations the Iranian government proposed an 
arrangement containing possession of 20% of the Corporation's stocks, as well as owning 
75% of the original concession area and also achieving acknowledgement of the host 
country’s contractual privilege in entire activities of Corporation, and also in the case of the 
termination of concessional provision. However, the negotiations, as a result of the British 
governments’ pressure by sending several warships to the Persian Gulf, was not successful 
and subsequently the case passed to the Security Council which led to the granting of 
another concession under the effect of deceit and duress, on the basis of all the previous 
exploitative and unbalanced terms and conditions. This is because the new concession was 
similar to the previous deals and awarded the Company the special privilege inside the zone 
defined via the deal to discover oil reserves and produce or treat in any other way which 
was beneficial in the sense of the petroleum trade for the period of seventy years 56. 
Moreover, the Company was allowed to conduct numerous logistical operations such as 
purchasing all necessary imports to satisfy the vital requests the workers with no need of 
obtain any licence or pay any custom duty57. Therefore, under the new deal the foreign 
company enjoyed the exclusive right of a various range of activities including discovery, 
production and export over a vast area of Iran for a long period. Furthermore, this 
concession ignored the rights of Iran to require a licence and the payment of custom duties 
for the import of facilities to the country which led to a reduction in the revenue of the 
government58. Accordingly, despite all the efforts of the Iranian government to grant a 
concession with more balanced terms to obtain more profits, above mentioned deal was 
concluded because of pressure in favour of British Governments’ interests on the 
exploitative nature of the old concessions. Therefore, the Iranian government’s attempts 
failed. The influence of this exploitative nature of the concessions on the current Iranian 
buyback was the formation of a model based on hostility against foreign contractors and the 
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naturally supportive nature of the model for the government, which created an unfriendly 
environment for foreign investors in the Iranian oil industry59. 
Overall, analysing the four concessions in Iran’s oil history in this section shows that the 
foreign companies, by using their government’s support, took advantage of the lack of 
technology and investment in the Iranian oil sector as well as Iran’s economic difficulties in 
order to establish agreements with unbalanced provisions and an exploitative nature for a 
long period of time. Such concessions, with the above-mentioned elements, created a 
negative attitude in Iran towards international participation in energy sector which led to 
nationalisation event in Iranian history of oil that will be examined in the second chapter of 
this work, and subsequently resulted in the introduction of the buyback model as the main 
method of oil transactions in Iran. Furthermore, the influence of the concessions in the 
formation of some of the provisions of the current buyback has been discussed in this 
section and it has been demonstrated that the applicability of reforms that this study will 
propose according to the evolutionary approach in the third and the fourth chapter of this 
study to make the model more attractive is dependent on considering such a historical 
analysis. Following the consideration of the concessions and their impact on the current 
mechanism of buyback by creating a negative attitude among Iranians towards the 
involvement of foreigners in the Iranian oil industry, the next sub-chapter will examine the 
effect of foreign pressure on the formation of the present form of buyback to highlight, and 
more importantly, consider the historical concerns when offering effective revisions to 
increase the efficiency of the model. 
 
1.3 The influence of the foreign pressure on petroleum deals:  Ignoring the Iranian 
national interest in oil and gas agreements 
As has been demonstrated in the last sub-chapter, the exploitative nature of concessions 
resulting from the unbalanced terms of the deals created public discontent regarding 
foreign participation in the Iranian oil sector. The reason that the foreign parties imposed 
such unfair concessions on Iran was Iran’s valuable resources that they intended to obtain 
with a greater share of profit than Iran as the host country. However, the occurrence of the 
two great World-Wars increased the value of Iran for western countries, due to its 
                                                 
59 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf.(2016) p 156 
 
36 
 
geographical position located amid Russia and Turkey60, which resulted in the aim of 
employing Iran and its natural resources by the great powers in order to win the War. As a 
result, the period between the two great World-Wars, and more importantly the Second 
World War significantly influenced current Iranian petroleum framework by 
underestimating the national Iranian interest which led to the provisions of the present 
buyback. Therefore, this sub-chapter in three sections will concern the influence of 
significant historical events during the above-mentioned time period on the formation of 
the existing Iranian buyback, to highlight the reasons for introducing the current mechanism 
from a historical angle, and grasp the special historical concerns in Iranian society to ensure 
that the proposed reforms will not breach these historical concerns.  
 
a) Development of the Northern Provinces oil fields: Iran’s attempt to obtain more 
balanced deal by changing its concessionary party  
Following Iran’s failure to change the provisions of D'Arcy deal to acquire more beneficial 
contract with the British Company, as has been demonstrated in the last sub-chapter, the 
Iranian government under the influence of the Russian government decided to grant a 
concession to develop the oil fields located in the Northern Provinces of Iran. This 
concession, which was named the Khoshtaria concession61, was granted to a Georgian 
businessman in order to restrict the influence of the APOC in Iran’s energy sector. In fact, as 
the Iranian government was disappointed in not being able to acquire a more balanced deal 
with the British company, it decided to shift to the Russian side to chase its goal to establish 
more fair petroleum deal. However, foreign pressure from the British side forced the Iranian 
government to invalidate62 the Khoshtaria concession, and accordingly the Anglo-Persian Oil 
Company took this opportunity to purchase the rights granted under the Khoshtaria 
concession, which was similar to the D'Arcy Concession on March 1922 in return of 90,000 
English Pounds. Subsequently, NPOC was established as a branch of Anglo Persian Oil 
Company, with an initial capital of £3m and supervised by APOC directors to carry out the 
concession. Therefore, the attempts of the Iranian government to shift its concessionary 
party from Britain to Russia was not successful and, more importantly, Iran could not reach 
                                                 
60 Malek, M., History of Iran, Iran Chamber Society. p. 10 
61 Ghaffari, op.cit., p.45 "The full text of the concessions can be found in Foreign Relations, 1920, Vol. III, pp35l-352" 
62 ibid, p.45. 
 
37 
 
its aim to increase its revenue by enjoying a more balanced deal. As a result, the Iranian 
government began to negotiate with American oil companies, particularly the Standard Oil 
Company of New Jersey63 for the purpose of developing the northern areas of Iran based on 
a satisfactory agreement64. However, the main concern of the Standard Oil Company was 
the economic and financial influence of Britain on the Iranian oil industry, as the Anglo-
Persian Company had obtained exclusive rights through various concessions to develop vast 
areas of northern and southern parts of Iran. Nevertheless, the negotiations between the 
Iranian government and the Standard Oil Company reached an agreement by the end of 
1921, to replace65 AOPC with the Standard Oil Company in the Khoshtaria concession in 
return of financial credit from America which could permit Iran’s authority to stand out 
against Britain’s and Russians’ pressures66. In response to this agreement Britain intended to 
resist the Standard Oil Company to nullify the deal by restricting the process of exporting oil 
from Iran, due to the fact that the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had the exclusive privilege67of 
delivering oil throughout Iran, which forced the Standard Oil Company to cooperate with 
APOC in order to export its products to the global oil markets. Therefore, following the 
strategy to avoid conflicts amid corporations, the Standard Oil Company annulled the 
agreement under pressure from the British company which resulted again in the failure of 
the Iranian government to change its concessionaire party to obtain a better petroleum 
deal. Accordingly, as a result of the nullification of this concession under the pressure of a 
foreign country, and after again failing to achieve a more balanced deal, the Iranian 
Parliament approved the granting of a concession to another giant American company, 
Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation, based on a fulfilment of two requirements. The first 
condition was an assurance of a $10 million loan to Iran’s government by the Sinclair 
Consolidated Oil Corporation in exchange for a concession for the development of the 
Northern oil fields68, and the second condition concerned a prohibition to transfer or annul 
the concession.69 Noticeably, these requirements highlighted the Iranian governments’ 
intention to gain more revenues from oil concessions by the granting of more balanced 
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terms along with the exercise of a greater sovereign authority, as well as resisting against 
foreign pressure to impose unfair agreements. Although the Sinclair Consolidated Oil 
Corporation was not pleased with the new restrictive conditions, both the parties reached 
an agreement for operations in four of the five Northern provinces and the new concession 
proposal was then confirmed by the Iranian Parliament in June 1923. However, foreign 
pressure from the Russian side via forbiddance of oil transport70 from the fields to the 
international oil markets forced the Sinclair Consolidated Oil Corporation to reject the 
Northern concessions71.  
Accordingly, the Iranian government, in spite of its active attempts to obtain a more 
balanced concession by changing the concessionaire was unsuccessful as a result of the 
foreign pressure from the Great Powers, Britain and Russia, that prevented the Iranian 
government to reach its goal to increase its revenues from the concessions. Imposing such 
pressure, which resulted in undermining the interests of Iran in the petroleum deals, 
aggravated the negative attitude of Iranians towards foreign participation in the oil industry 
that resulted in the current framework of buyback through the formation of the idea of 
supporting the national interest of Iranians against the foreign party. This tendency, in the 
present mechanism of buyback, has been reflected in the provisions of the fixed rate of 
return, the cost estimation before the beginning of the project and insurance regulation. 
Applying such provisions are a direct consequence of foreign pressure that led to the 
inflexibility of the Iranian buyback and the subsequent unattractiveness of the model. This 
study, by considering the influence of the historical factors on the existing buyback will 
attempt to propose the necessary reforms based on the evolutionary approach that do not 
conflict with any historical concerns to ensure the applicability of the offered solutions to 
improve the model. 
 
 
b) The influence of World War II on the Iranian oil and gas industry: Absolute control of 
foreigners over Iranian oil sector 
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As has been mentioned in the last section, Iran possessed a vital position for foreign 
countries because of its geopolitical location, as well as its natural resources. The Great War 
Two occurrence significantly improved energy price, particularly oil and gas reserves for the 
Great Powers, as the Allies forces, operating in the Middle East and Europe, relied on Iranian 
oil fields to provide their needs to win the war. As a result, the Allies forces, the Soviet 
Union and Britain, captured all the Iranian oil-producing zones in 1941, for protecting 
petroleum reserves against Nazis troops. Thus, the Great Powers directly overcame the 
Iranian oil industry through military pressure. As a result of the Allied forces’ domination of 
the Iranian oil sector, the main part of Iran’s economy, a treaty was signed in 1942 between 
Iran and the Allies countries, Britain and the Soviet Union, promising military aid to fulfil the 
duty of defense, guaranteeing the respect to Iran's state independency, providing economic 
assistance and leaving Iran as soon as the Axis threat passed72. However, the Great Powers, 
Britain and the Soviet Union, did not leave Iran, as both Powers, through military pressure, 
intended to extend their occupation of the Iranian oil and gas resources by exaggerating the 
Axis threat73. Accordingly, the Iranian budget was significantly reduced, as the country did 
not have any control of its natural resources, many European and Mediterranean markets 
became inaccessible and shipping capacity drastically fell. Thus, the country with a huge 
amount of natural reserves faced a horrible economic situation which led to famine and the 
dying of many Iranian people, despite Iran’s neutrality in the War.  As a result, the impact of 
World War II on Iran was losing the control of its own natural resources and an ignoring of 
its sovereignty which led to creation of one of the worst events in Iranian contemporary 
history.  
 
c) The Effect of the Cold War on Iranian Oil sector: Applying the doctrine of the 'negative 
balance' in petroleum deals by Soviets and the 1947 Iranian Petroleum Act 
 
Following the finishing of the Great World War Two, which resulted in foreign absolute 
control of Iranian oil industry, the Cold War affected Iran’s oil sector. This is because of the 
importance of the oil industry’s position in the boosting the international economy and 
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finance prior and after war, as well as the raised oil consumption during the Cold War, Iran, 
with possession of a huge amount of oil and gas reserves, became an area of competing 
interests. In addition to British and Russian oil companies, American oil companies which 
used to have small shares in the region’s oil market began to play a more active role74 in the 
competition by investing, and subsequently obtaining oil concessions in the Iranian oil and 
gas industry. Therefore, the country’s situation, particularly removal of foreign army, Britain 
and Russia, appears as a significant issue for Americans. Although the 1943 Agreement, Iran, 
Britain and Russia, obliged all foreign army to leave the country within 180 days, and it 
being confirmed at the Tehran conference of 1943 that the Great Powers were to recognise 
Iran's integrity and independency, this provision was not fulfilled by either Russia or Britain. 
This is because of the fact that Iran was in an important location for the Allied countries.  
The Royal Dutch Shell proposed an agreement in 1943, to achieve a discovery right beyond 
the territory of Anglo Iranian Oil Company's operations. In 1944 Assistant People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs, requested oil concessions in the north of the country which 
were close to USSR. Furthermore, American oil companies with the support of Iran’s King, 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, were also pursuing concessions in order to compete with the 
Russians. In response to all these proposals, Iran’s Government insisted on avoiding granting 
any concessions during the Second World War in order to prevent any presumption that 
they were awarded under duress. In spite of this government policy, the domestic 
Communist Party in the Iranian Parliament claimed the concession in favor of the Soviet 
Union in northern parts to render a political balance with the oil concessions in the South of 
Iran which were granted to the British. However, this argument, 'negative balance’75, was 
rejected by Parliament, and Dr Mosaddegh in particular. To avoid the promotion of this 
argument, a punishment was enacted of up to 8 years in prison in solitary confinement, to 
prevent all government employees from debating any concession with foreigners.  
On the other hand, the Soviet Ambassador, who was in contact with Roosevelt and 
Churchill, suggested a concessions’ proposal to aid Iran’s economy, and expand the 
friendship between the two countries. Moreover, He promised to either terminate or revise 
the new petroleum law. In fact, this proposal was part of the Soviets' agenda to render a 
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balanced relationship between the Great Powers and also to utilise the north of Iran as a 
security zone against US and British influences. The request to counter balance the US and 
Britain with demands for concessions in northern Iran was insisted on by the Soviet Union 
when they informed the combination of Western powers against them. This presumption 
was perhaps importantly confirmed, due to the fact that Shell, the partially British-owned 
firm, with a number of US companies started to demand oil concessions in Iran. Accordingly, 
the Soviet reaction in this contest is, actually, against the Western powers, particularly US 
attempts, to gain an oil concession in north parts of Iran. Furthermore, Russian and 
American companies’ competition to engage in oil concessions in the northern provinces of 
Iran is highlighted by the British consul, Claremont Skrine: "the efforts of Standard Vacuum 
and Shell to secure oil prospecting rights that changed the Russians in Persia from hot-war 
allies into cold-war rivals."76  
As a result of the increasing political pressure of the Soviets on the Iranian government, the 
negotiations in respect to a concession on northern parts of Iran was begun in Moscow, 
despite Parliament’s prohibition to discuss any concession with foreigners. This negotiation 
resulted in an agreement with important concessions to the Soviet Union in 1946. 
Moreover, a combined oil corporation was founded to discover the blocks in northern 
provinces of Iran. The agreements’ length was twenty-five years which could be easily 
extended if both parties wished to do so. This agreement contained certain novel features, 
in contrast with former concessions. While the Soviet Union owned 51% shares for 25 years, 
Iran’s Government possessed 49% and more importantly incomes obtained from the oil 
projects were to be divided in accordance with the parties’ shares. Additionally, the royalty 
payments were not mentioned in this concession and both parties agreed on a share basis 
division. It is worthy to note that the area of exploration was extremely vast, comprising all 
three Iranian northern provinces from the Soviet Union border to the Miyanduab city which 
is close to Turkish border77.  
In contrast to the pressure from the Soviets regarding the concessions, the Americans, who 
were in competition with the Soviet Union over the northern concession, supported the 
Iranian Parliaments’ Act. The American Ambassador in Iran recognised and defended the 
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right of the Iranians to dispose of their own natural wealth78. However, the British 
Government was willing to accept the granting of the oil concession in the northern parts of 
Iran to the Soviet Union. This was because the British Government was concerned about the 
forces of nationalism in the parliament and that this might result in the challenging of the 
Anglo-Iranian concession in the south of Iran, if the Iranian Government and Parliament 
rejected the USSR request regarding mutual operation of oil blocks in north of the country. 
Subsequent to Parliament’s decision to not granting the concession to the Soviets, the 
British Ambassador in Iran, who was in favour of awarding the concession to the Soviets, 
suggested to the Prime Minster to deliberate the future prospect of negotiation with regard 
to granting of the concession to the Soviet Union79. He suggested that the Government 
revise the draft to provide fairer terms rather than rejecting the Soviets proposal on the 
concession. Following the encouragement of the British Ambassador in Iran to grant the 
concession to the Soviets, a renegotiation occurred between Iran’s Government and the 
Soviet Union.  
The Prime Minister in particular, by utilising a policy of "positive equilibrium" with Britain, in 
order to persuade the Parliament to permit the renegotiation of the "unjust" 1933 
Agreement with APOC, attempted to convince Parliament to grant a concession to the 
Soviet Union. However80a further Act, which was presented by the deputy of the Nationalist 
Party in Parliament, became a barrier to all his attempts. This Act, which was about 
preventing the government from issuing any further oil concessions to foreigners, was 
ratified on 22 October 1947. It contained important terms which will be highlighted in 
further details. Although this Bill nullified the former negotiations with the USSR regarding 
the oil concession in the northern provinces, it exempted the Prime Minster from the 
regulated punishment which was versus those officials that attempted to establish a 
petroleum deal wiht international company. The government was obliged to provide the 
facility to begin exploring the field in 60 months via its investment. However, this was 
permitted for employing international technician, in case of a lack of technical experts, only 
from "completely neutral countries".  
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Based on this Bill, the Government was allowed to negotiate with the USSR only in regards 
to the sale of discovered oil and only by informing Parliament, in the case of Iranian 
companies extracting oil. Accordingly, this Act absolutely banned the Iranian Government 
from awarding any concessions or any partnership privilege to foreign powers or oil 
companies. It was concluded in regards to oil concessions in the south of Iran and the 
regime pledged to start consultations with the British Government, as well as putting all its 
efforts to defend the rights of the Iranian nation in all circumstances where they had been 
violated81. Therefore, this Act had vital and also clear implications for the future of AIOC. 
The main consequence of this Act, further to the preventive effect of this bill with regard to 
finalizing petroleum deals with international companies, as well as involvement in those 
deals, was instructing the government to put its effort for guaranteeing Iranian national 
ownership over natural assets, when they were diminished. The Soviet Ambassador in Iran 
described this Act as an obvious prejudicial trend against the Soviet Union. Additionally, the 
Soviet Union via the ratification of this Act realized the Iranian regimes’ intention to 
completely govern the country’s petroleum assets. The revival of national feeling in Iran was 
the driving force behind the ratification of the Act in Parliament, as the people realised the 
feasibility of obtaining their own rights by standing up for their demands. Considering the 
Soviet Union’s failure to achieve the concession, they began to embargo the Iranian 
government by blocking the APOCs way to export oil to the global market, putting pressure 
on Iranian MPs and sending their army to Iran to defend their interests82.    
Accordingly, examining this part of Iran’s oil history in this sub-chapter showed that there 
was a foreign military pressure to overcome Iranian control over its natural resources and 
which ignored the national interest of Iranians in petroleum deals, aggravating the negative 
attitude of Iranians towards the involvement of foreigners in the Iranian oil industry83. Such 
foreign military pressure ignored the national interest of Iranians by overcoming their 
control and this resulted in the provision of the current method of buyback through 
forbiddance of any ownership or control of Iranian natural resources by foreigners, that 
have been mentioned in the Iranian Constitution. This principle, which is the main basis of 
the Iranian buyback, has been designed to protect the interests of Iran in petroleum 
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agreements against foreign contractors, and resulted in the practice of the buyback instead 
of any other model allowing the ownership of the oil product by foreigners such as the 
Production Sharing Agreement model. Although this historical concern has created 
inflexibility and, subsequently, unattractiveness within the framework of the buyback, it has 
stemmed from one of the worst parts of Iranian history and its influence cannot be 
underestimated in the present method. Therefore, this study, on the basis of the 
evolutionary approach to make the model more attractive by offering reforms will consider 
this crucial historical concern to ensure the applicability of its offered solutions. More 
importantly, this historical concern proves the accuracy of the evolutionary approach 
chosen by this study rather than revolutionary tactics, as any shift to another model which 
requires the foreign ownership of natural resources will face this historical consideration 
and public discontent, as well as the legal barrier in the form of the constitutional 
prohibition. Therefore, the most accurate way to offer a more attractive version of the 
Iranian buyback after the removal of the nuclear sanctions is by applying an evolutionary 
approach by carrying out applicable reforms that do not breach any historical, political and 
legal barriers.  
 
1.4 Conclusion: The impact of concessions and foreign pressure on current mechanism of 
buyback 
In summary, examining the Iran’s foundation of petroleum contractual system prior to 
event of Nationalization demonstrated that the economic weakness of Iran in the 19th 
century and the foreign powers’ interest in employing Iranian natural resources via 
controlling Iran because of its strategic position led to the Great Powers, Britain and Russia, 
to force Iran to grant unbalanced and exploitative concessions84. Such features of the 
concessions as have been mentioned in the first sub-chapter created the negative 
experience of Iranians regarding the involvement of foreigners in the Iranian oil industry85. 
Moreover, as has been discussed in the second sub-chapter, this negative historical 
experience has been aggravated by foreign pressure to refuse any attempt by the Iranian 
government to make the terms of concession more balanced and led to an absolute control 
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of Iran and its resources during the Second World War, which resulted in ignoring the 
national interest of Iran in petroleum deals. Therefore, as this chapter showed, the 
influence of the negative experiences of Iranians towards foreign involvement in the oil 
sector, as well as foreign pressure to preserve the concessions, were the two main historical 
reasons for adapting the harsh model of Iranian buyback which banned any kind of 
international possession of petroleum products. Furthermore, the conducted analysis of 
Iranian buyback background in this chapter pointed out the roots of many current restrictive 
provisions of the buyback stemming from the nationally supportive nature of the model 
which are, in fact, a response to the unbalanced terms and policies of concessions such as 
the short duration of contract, fixed rate of return, separation of discovery rights from 
development rights, cost estimation prior to the beginning of the project and more 
importantly banning any control or ownership of oil products by foreigners. Therefore, this 
study highlighted that the restrictive terms of the model arose from the historical concerns 
that will be examined and the applicable reforms will be proposed in the following chapters 
based on the evolutionary approach with no breach of any historical, political and legal 
prohibitions. Additionally, this chapter pointed out that the adverse effects of exploitative 
concessions created the special historical concern regarding the foreign ownership of 
Iranian natural resources. Therefore, adapting any model that contains permission of 
ownership of Iranian oil and gas fields will be confronted with this historical concern. As a 
result, this study by considering this historical concern will employ the evolutionary 
approach by utilising applicable reforms that do not breach the above-mentioned historical 
concerns. Accordingly, providing the historical analysis of the Iranian buyback covered an 
important gap which was present in other researches, offers a more completed image of the 
model via illustrating its historical roots and ensures the applicability of the reforms that this 
study will propose in the next chapters of this work. 
Following the examination of the historical elements of the Iranian buyback, which 
demonstrated the influence of concessions on the current mechanism of buyback by the 
creation of a negative attitude amongst Iranians towards foreigners working in the oil 
sector, the next chapter will show the public discontent resulting from the concessions and 
foreign pressure to the nationalisation of Iranian natural resources led to the introduction of 
the current buyback. In fact, this study will attempt to provide the political and geo-political 
examination of the Iranian buyback in order to scrutinise the Iranian petroleum legal 
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framework in the period after the nationalisation event for the purpose of highlighting the 
political and geo-political concerns of the Iranian buyback.  
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Chapter 2: Analysis of Political and Geo-political consideration of Iranian buyback: Iranian 
petroleum legal framework subsequent to the event of Nationalisation  
 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Nationalisation event, the pathway between the public discontent 
regarding foreign participation in Iranian oil sector and introduction of Iranian buyback 
 
As has been demonstrated in the last chapter, the unbalanced and exploitative nature of 
the concessions issued due to Iran’s economic flaw, as well as pressure of the Great Powers 
created a negative attitude amongst Iranians towards the involvement of foreigners in the 
oil industry. The direct result of such public discontent which begun from the concerns of 
the government regarding the inequality of the parties’ income led to the nationalisation of 
Iranian natural resources, which in turn led to the introduction of the Iranian buyback. The 
occurrence of the nationalisation event is heavily influenced by the former historical events 
that were examined in the last chapter, due to the fact that it was in essence a political 
rebellion against the economic and political situation of Iran after the Second World War, 
which was characterised by rampant poverty, financial inequalities and the incapability of 
the government to rule the country86. Therefore, the 1951 Nationalisation event is an 
essential element of Iranian petroleum background that stemmed from the economic and 
political dissatisfaction of Iranians towards the foreign companies operating in Iranian 
energy sector, leading to the rise of national opposition.  
Historically, the nationalist movement as will be discussed in this chapter in political and 
geo-political context, firstly obtained majority in Parliament, then formed a nationalist 
government in the 1950s and finally were removed via the 1953 British and American 
coup87. However, this foreign interference which has been carried out for the purpose of 
controlling the economy and political structure of Iran, as well as ensuring the geo-political 
aims of the western powers against the Soviet Unions aggravated the attitude of Iranians 
towards foreigners operating in the oil sector, and subsequently founded the economic root 
                                                 
86 Jerrold L. Walden, “The International Cartel in Iran: Private Power and the Public Interest,” 11 Journal of Public Law 69 (1962). 
87 Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1992). 
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of the 1979 Islamic Revolution which excluded foreigners from the Iranian oil industry by 
nullifying all petroleum deals and applying the current harsh model of buyback.  
The main influence of the nationalisation event on the current method of oil transactions is 
shifting the framework of the Iranian oil and gas industry from concessionary deals to the 
contractual framework in the form of production sharing agreements, and service 
contracts88. In other words, this is the first time in the entire history of Iran’s oil and gas 
industry that Iranians recognised the value of ownership of their natural resources and 
attempted to change the unfair terms of the concessions and to balance the provisions89. It 
is noteworthy that Iran, after the nationalisation of its oil industry in 1951, has experienced 
a number of methods of oil and gas agreements such as production sharing agreements and 
service contracts. However, the extensive disappointing experience of Iranians to equalise 
the unbalanced terms of concessions which always were confronted by  the political 
pressure of the Great Powers resulted in preferring the harsh mechanism of buyback over 
other models such as PSA, as the mechanism of buyback can ensure preserving the 
ownership of Iranian natural resources against  the Great Powers. Accordingly, the current 
Iranian method of oil transaction has been influenced by the event of the nationalisation as 
the pathway between the negative experience of Iranians regarding the international 
involvement within oil related operation, and also to introduce Iranian buyback following 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Thus, this milestone in the historical background of Iranian 
legal framework needs to be politically and geo-politically examined to ensure that this 
study provides the complete picture of the Iranian buyback, as well as offering the 
applicable reforms to increase the efficiency of the model on the basis of the evolutionary 
approach. For these aims, this chapter which has been divided into four sub-chapters, will 
offer the examination of the Iranian petroleum legal framework subsequent to the event of 
nationalisation to point out the political and geo-political concerns of buyback, and more 
importantly to highlight their impact on the formation of the present provisions of buyback 
to ensure the applicability of proposed reforms in the following chapters. The first sub-
chapter reviews the concern of the Iranian parliament regarding the inequality of the 
income of the parties in petroleum deals as the basis for the establishing of the nationalist 
                                                 
88 Nationalization Act, Iran National Parliament, (1951). 
89 Madani, Seyed Jalal Din, Tarikh Siyasi Moaser Iran, (Modern History of Politics of Iran) p. 299 
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movement, and it will show the roots of some of the existing provisions in the buyback such 
as the fixed rate of return. The second sub-chapter considers the nationalisation 
government in relation to the foreign pressure which led to the 1953 coup and the failure of 
Iran to enjoy the full ownership and control over their natural resources as the key element 
in the introduction of the buyback in 1979. The third sub-chapter is aimed at illustrating the 
impact of the nationalisation event on the experience of Iran in practicing the production 
sharing agreement model which will show the accuracy of applying the evolutionary 
approach that has been chosen by this work rather than a shift to any model consisting of 
the foreign ownership of oil products. The last sub-chapter will consider the effect of the 
nationalisation event on the formation of the 1979 Islamic Revolution as the first successful 
attempt in the entire history of the oil and gas industries in Iran that could stop foreign 
powers from exploiting the Iranian natural reserves by nullifying all previous petroleum 
deals and introducing the Iranian model of buyback, despite the high economic and financial 
costs for the country.  
Consequently, the study in this chapter will provide a full analysis of the political and geo-
political considerations of Iranian buyback. This is because of the fact that lack of such 
consideration is an important gap in similar researches and will deprive this study from 
demonstrating the roots of many present provisions of buyback. Thus, this analysis is 
crucially significant within grasping the model’s mechanism. Moreover, by not providing 
such political and geo-political considerations, this will lead this study to offer an incomplete 
picture of the Iranian buyback which cannot be reliable for the aim of this work to offer the 
applicable solutions for making the model commercially more efficient in the third and the 
fourth chapter. 
 
2.2 Iranian parliament’s concern regarding the inequality of parties’ income:  Failure to 
reach an agreement, as a result of foreign political influences 
As has been shown in the first chapter of this work, the exploitative nature and unbalanced 
terms of the concessions granted to foreigners are the main elements in the creation of the 
negative attitude amongst Iranians towards foreign involvement in the oil industry. Such 
features of the concessions resulted in a disagreement amid the Iran’s regime and foreign 
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party which resulted in a re-negotiation of the provisions of the oil transactions with foreign 
parties90. The main issue of the dispute was the inequality between revenues obtained by 
the national side and the foreign contractor from the oil project, owing to the fact that the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s’ income from the project was greater than the Iranian 
government’s royalty and tax income91. Moreover, from the international perspective the 
‘UN Resolution of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ which recognised the 
absolute freedom of countries freely for using the local assets and reserves in favour of local 
benefits supported the Iranian parliament in its attempt to obtain a more balanced deal. 
Article I of this movement declared that92: 
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-
being of the people of the State concerned93. 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of 
the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and 
conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with 
regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities94. 
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the earnings on that 
capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by 
international law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely agreed upon, 
in each case, between the investors and the recipient State, due care being taken to ensure 
that there is no impairment, for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its natural 
wealth and resources95. 
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of 
public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized as overriding purely 
individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the owner shall be 
paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State taking 
                                                 
90 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf.(2016) p 150 
91 Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power and Principle: Iran’s Oil Nationalization and its Aftermath (New 
York: Syracuse University Press, 1992). 
92 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/NaturalResources.aspx. General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 
1962, "Permanent sovereignty over natural resources", p 2. Access on July2016 
93 ibid 
94 ibid 
95 ibid 
 
51 
 
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In 
any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national 
jurisdiction of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon 
agreement by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute 
should be made through arbitration or international adjudication96. 
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their 
natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States based on their 
sovereign equality97. 
6. International co-operation for the economic development of developing countries, 
whether in the form of public or private capital investments, exchange of goods and 
services98, technical assistance, or exchange of scientific information, shall be such as to 
further their independent national development and shall be based upon respect for their 
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. 
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
hinders the development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace99. 
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign States shall 
be observed in good faith; States and international organizations shall strictly and 
conscientiously respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural wealth 
and resources in accordance with the Charter and the principles set forth in the present 
resolution100. 
Thus, this movement can be identified as the main international element effecting the 
Iranian Parliament’s decision to nationalise the Iranian natural resources, owning to the fact 
that the Parliament realised that the idea of nationalisation of oil and gas resources was 
internationally accepted, and more importantly, it could be defended.  Therefore, the 
Iranian Parliament in its first step of claiming fairer deals, enacted the rider of 22 October 
                                                 
96 http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/ga_1803/ga_1803.html General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources", p 2 July2016 
97 ibid 
98 ibid 
99 ibid 
100 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf. 2016. Page 152-154 
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1947, obliging Iran’s government to propose a re-negotiation with APOC in order to increase 
the income of the Iranian government. This rider expressed that: In situations when rights of 
Iranians with regard to local assets, either mineral or else, was weakened, epically regarding 
fields in south of Iran, regime must start defending, as well as to prepare to return such 
local rights, moreover, Parliament has to be informed regarding outcomes101. Subsequently, 
negotiations commenced in September 1948 amid Iran’s regime and Anglo Iranian Oil 
Company which resulted in a number of offers from the company including the increasing of 
the royalty payment to the government102, as well as promoting the Company’s tax 
payment to Iran’s government. Nevertheless, this round of negotiations, despite all 
proposed provisions, could not result in an agreement, due to the fact that the Parliament 
has been informed by the Supplemental Agreement Committee 103 , headed by Dr 
Mosaddeq, that a more favourable contract had been concluded amid Aramco and Saudi 
government104 with profits being split 50/50 between the parties. As a result, the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company with the support of the British government threatened to sanction the 
Iranian oil and to ban Iran from British technicians, and they left the negotiations in order to 
force Iran to conclude the agreement which created the dissatisfaction between the Iranian 
side, the government and the Parliament, due to their failure to achieve a more balanced 
term of the petroleum deals105.  
Accordingly, despite offering the altered provisions from AIOC regarding the payments to 
the Iranian government, the parties did not reach an agreement, and the proposed 
agreement was still biased towards the foreign party following a policy of exploitation of 
Iranian natural resources through political influence and pressure. Thus, Iranian government 
could not establish a fairer deal through negotiations. Such adverse foreign political 
influences, as will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, exploited the Iranian natural 
reserves and aggravated Iranians’ attitude towards involvement of foreigners. More 
importantly, the negative effect of this foreign political influence made the Iranian 
government determined in its position to remove foreigners from the oil industry by 
nationalising Iran’s natural assets and practicing the Iranian model of buyback with its harsh 
                                                 
101 International Court of Justice, op.cit., p. 273. 
102 Zoghi, op.cit., pg. 251-256 
103 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Annual Report and Accounts, 1949, pp. 11 ff. 
104 Zoghi, op.cit., pg. 231-236 
105 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf.(2016) p 170 
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provisions such as a fixed rate of return with the aim of protecting Iran’s national interests 
against all foreign parties in petroleum deals. 
 
 
 
2.3 The Nationalisation government in relation with interference of foreign powers: Main 
step to introduction of buyback 
It has been demonstrated in the last sub-chapter that the foreign political influences on Iran 
to preserve the unbalanced terms of deals for the purposes of exploiting the Iranian natural 
resources aggravated the Iranians’ attitude towards involvement of foreigners in the oil 
sector. Therefore, as the Iranian government’s attempts to modify the concessions via 
negotiations failed, the nationalist government in 1952 decided to nationalise the Iranian 
natural assets to obtain a   more balanced petroleum deal, and accordingly defend the 
national interest of Iranians. In fact, from a political point of view, the Nationalisation 
movement, and subsequently the Nationalist government can be identified as a powerful 
reaction towards the many years of unequal financial and legal relationships between Iran 
and the foreign parties. This reaction has been visualised in the framework of the Iranian 
model of buyback with its harsh provisions to protect the Iranian national interests against 
the foreign party’s intention to exploit the Iranian natural resources. Therefore, the negative 
domestic experience towards foreigners involved in the oil sector which has stemmed from 
the exploitative nature of concessions and has been aggravated by foreign powers 
interference in favour of foreign companies resulted in the nationalisation of the oil and gas 
reserves which was the main step in the introduction of the current Iranian buyback. As a 
result, the detailed political and geo-political examination of oil nationalisation in Iran as the 
vital event will be offered in this sub-chapter. In addition to this consideration, this sub-
chapter will attempt to point out the political and geo-political concerns in Iranian society 
towards any reform of the buyback in order to prevent any clash between the proposed 
alterations and those concerns.  
Following the nationalisation movement in 1947-1951, the nationalisation law was drafted 
by the Oil Committee in 1951 which stated that: For the happiness and prosperity of the 
Iranian nation and for the purpose of securing world peace, it is hereby resolved that the oil 
industry through all parts of the country, without exception, be nationalized, that is to say, 
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all operation of exploration, extraction and exploitation shall be carried out by the 
government106. Articles 2, 3 and 6 of this law can clarify the vital image of nationalisation 
law which are considered below107:  
 
Article 2 epitomised the legal basis of the nationalisation by requiring the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company to dispose and relocate its assets to the control of the Mixed Board which was 
constituted by both Iranians and British members. In fact, this article confirms the equality 
of the parties in the agreement which had been the aim of the country for many years. 
Article 3 appointed the National Iranian Oil Company as the main body in operation of the 
Iranian oil fields. This article is the key element for the current NIOCs’ role in petroleum 
deals as the sole authorised party to participate in oil contracts.Article 6 of this law concerns 
the steady replacement of British technicians by domestic technicians, and also requiring 
foreign training for Iranian experts108. This article has been reflected in the third generation 
of Iranian buyback via provisions related to the transfer of technology, as well as employing 
Iranian workers. 
On the other hand, the British government in support of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
sanctioned Iranian oil, blocked Iranian assets in the British currency and banned Iran from 
British technicians which resulted in dramatically diminishing Iran’s oil production and 
subsequently led to the suffering of the Iranian economy. Moreover, for the purposes of 
protecting the economic interests in the Iranian oil sector, the British Government sued Iran 
in the International Court of Justice by claiming the illegality of the nationalisation law, as 
this law destroy its contractual benefits. Hence, the International Court of Justice issued an 
order to secure both parties' respective rights by interim measures109. However, the Iranian 
Government rejected this order, as the Court's jurisdiction was not recognised in this action 
by the Government. In response to Iran’s refusal, the British government brought its claim 
to the United Nations to compel Iran, within the United Nations framework, to respect the 
International Court of Justice's previous order for interim measures, as issued in 1951. In 
                                                 
106 Iranian Embassy;-op.cit., p.2 
107 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf.(2016) p 171 
108 International Court of Justice, op.cit, pp. 279-280 
109 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., U.K. v. Iran, Judgment, 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22) 
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response, the Iranian government, represented by Dr Mosaddeq, argued that since the 
nationalisation of the Iranian oil and gas industry was a merely domestic matter, it was out 
of the International Court of Justice's jurisdiction, or that of any foreign state 110 . 
Subsequently, the Security Council ruled to review the claim only after the International 
Court of Justice's examination of the matter. Accordingly, the International Court of Justice 
commenced its session with regard to the Iran - United Kingdom disagreement in 1952 to 
deal with its jurisdiction and subsequently ruled that since the Court's jurisdiction was only 
limited to conventions and treaties, as was accepted by Iran in September 1932, and also 
that the 1933 Contract was a concessionary agreement to which the British Government 
was not a party to, it was accordingly held that the Court had no jurisdiction to enter into 
the matter referred to it by the British Government in 1951. Therefore, it concluded that the 
Court’s previous order, the interim measures, ceased to have effect111. Consequently, since 
the Iranian and the British government failed to reach a solution, the British Government 
blocked all Iranian payments in Sterling Pounds, and cancelled the permission for the 
exportation of vital materials to Iran for the operation of the oil industry in order to force 
the Iranian Government to change some of the terms of the nationalisation law. Such 
actions had a negative impact on the Iranian economy by decreasing the oil production, 
which was the basis of Iranian government’s budget, and subsequently led to the Iranian 
Government facing a financial crisis in 1952. Therefore, the Iranian Prime Minister 
requested £40 million from AIOC, claiming that this amount was owed by the Company to 
Iran. In response, Truman and Churchill, through AIOCs’ representatives, offered a proposal 
for dealing with the problem via providing access to Iranian oil to the global market, as well 
as granting $10 million in aid112 by the United States which was rejected by Iran on the 
grounds of inconsistency with the Nationalisation Law in 1947. As a result, the political 
relationship between Iran and the United Kingdom deteriorated. However, the US 
government was determined in resolving Iran’s financial crisis, as the US government did 
not want Iran to possibly begin renegotiations with the Soviet Union which could be a 
potential threat for the US. Therefore, following the geo-political American’s interests, the 
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D3-V0w_RMhQpFmARglqOA/  p 93-103/ Access on May 2016 
112 W. Levy, op. cit., p. 95 
 
56 
 
United states Ambassador in Tehran, on behalf of the British government, transmitted a 
final offer to the Iranian government for consideration. It was proposed that113:  
(a) The International Court of Justice would deal with the issue of Iran’s counter-claims and 
compensation for the Company on the ground of loss of business. 
(b) An American company would pay $50 million in advance in exchange of purchasing $122 
million discounted price of Petroleum from Iran. Moreover, an international firm would be 
established, as one of the AIOC members, with the authority to negotiate with the Iranian 
Government for the export of refined and crude oil. 
(c) Iran would be obliged to pay 24% of received petroleum revenues to the British 
government, before the settlement the compensation claim, and 24% via direct payments 
or petroleum transfers for a period of twenty years after resolving the compensation 
claim114.  
In response, the Iranian Government rejected the new offer, due to its contradiction with 
the nationalisation law with expression of that this offer principally is the same with earlier 
British-American shared offer. In response to this refusal, the US government dismissed the 
Iranian Governments’ appeal for financial aid. The US President, Eisenhower, stated that "so 
long as Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of its oil products if a 
reasonable agreement were reached it would be unfair if the money of the American 
taxpayers were to be spent in Iran"115. Accordingly, this contention regarding the proposals 
truly demonstrates the mutual distrust of both side towards each other which resulted in a 
strong resistance among Iranians towards the involvement of foreigners in the energy 
sector that impeded compromises between Iran on the one side and the UK and US on the 
other116.  
Following the failure of the nationalist government and the British government to reach an 
agreement, Britain planned a full-scale Coup d’état in order to undermine, and finally 
remove the nationalist government. Therefore, the British government attempted to gain 
support from Americans, as well as various conservative Iranian groups, such as officers in 
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the King’s army, senior police and newspaper editors.117 As a result, the CIA and MI6, with 
the knowledge and support of the Iranian King, put in place the joint efforts to remove the 
nationalist government by attacking the Prime Minster’s house (Dr.Mosaddeq), kidnapping 
several key officials and encouraging mobs to throw the country into disarray in order to 
weaken the government in 1953118. Subsequently, the Prime Minister (Dr.Mosaddeq) was 
arrested by the rebels and army, and the judicial system prisoned him in cell for 36 months, 
as well as house arrest for the remainder of his life. Accordingly, the British government, as 
a result of the 1953 Coup d’état, finally achieved its long term mission of removing the 
nationalist government which was a vital restraint for increasing British financial and 
political influence in Iran. In fact, the effect of the 1953 Coup d’état for the British 
government was removing the barrier which the nationalisation event created for foreign 
investment. Thus, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company could continue to obtain huge benefits by 
exploiting the Iranian natural resources by preserving the previous unbalanced concessions, 
and more importantly, the British government preserved Iranian natural resources from 
being used by the USSR. From other side, reason for Americans’ participation at 1953 Coup 
d’état was their fear of losing Iran in favor of USSR as a result of the country’s relation to 
USSR 119 . Therefore, this event ensured the geo-political interests of Americans by 
preventing the Soviet Union from promoting its power and influence over Iran. 
Overall, it can be determined from the events at the time, as well as immediately afterward 
nationalisation occurrence that primary reason for the Coup was control of Iranian oil. This 
event, the overthrowing of the first democratically elected government by the Coup d’état 
of 1953, has had a deep impact on the Country, people and government, and aggravated 
the negative tendency throughout the country towards foreign parties. Moreover, the 
removal of the nationalist government highlighted the significant influence of the oil 
industry in all aspects of society, politics, and the economic sphere of Iran. Accordingly, the 
present strict view of buyback which contains a nationally supportive nature as reflected in 
the restrictive provisions such as granting the discovery and production rights separately, 
and forbiddance of ownership of any oil product by foreigners can be fully comprehended in 
the light of the Great Powers, Britain and American, role in this coup. Such political and geo-
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political influences of the foreign countries on the current model of buyback confirm the 
existence of a mutually responsive relationship between Iran’s politics and geo-political 
concerns and the Iranian oil industry which remains true until recently. Therefore, the 
political and geo-political examination of the relevant issues, particularly the event of the 
nationalisation of oil, regarding the Iranian buyback is significant for the aim of this study to 
ensure the applicability of the proposed solutions to attract foreign investors, as well as to 
protect the national interests of Iran in the petroleum deals120.  
Furthermore, it has been demonstrated in this sub-chapter that the nationalist government 
suffered from economic difficulties which finally led to the collapse of the government with 
the support of foreign countries. Therefore, applying a new method of oil transaction 
relaxed the Iranian public feeling, however it also led the Iranian government to struggle 
amid global powers, which was an important reason for its collapse. Therefore, it can be 
pointed out that the mechanism of buyback should ensure both parties interests, otherwise, 
it cannot attract foreign investment or protect national interests. Accordingly, this study by 
employing the evolutionary approach will attempt to offer applicable solutions to make the 
model more attractive by rendering a fine balance between the interests of both national 
and international parties in the buyback. Following the collapse of the nationalist 
government, the King appointed a new government that chose a new approach regarding 
petroleum deals, known as the production sharing agreement. The effect of the 
nationalisation event on the new method of oil transactions, as well as the consequences of 
the practice of this new model, PSA, will be examined in the next-sub chapter.  
 
2.4 Effect of the nationalisation event on practice of Production Sharing Agreement 
model: Economic root of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and practice of buyback 
As has been discussed in the last sub-chapter of this work, the negative attitude of Iranians 
towards foreigners, resulting from their interference in Iran’s political and economic issues, 
motivated the Iranian people to support the nationalisation movement against foreign oil 
companies which led to the nationalisation of the Iranian petroleum sector. Nevertheless, 
nationalist government faced the financial difficulties stemming from their political views 
towards the involvement of foreigners in the oil industry, as well as the 1953 Coup d’état by 
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the CIA and MI6, with support of the Iranian King, resulted in the collapse of the first 
democratically elected government in Iran. Therefore, the King appointed a new Prime 
Minster, General Zahedi, to establish a new government which chose a new approach in 
relation to foreign oil companies by the formation of an international consortium with the 
cooperation of the NIOC based on the terms of the 1933 concession. However, the public 
and Parliaments’ protests against the new agreement confirmed that “the government” ... 
cannot not ignore public feeling by denying the Nationalisation Act. Furthermore, it would 
be impossible to return Anglo Iranian oil Company for exclusively producing, refining and 
marketing 121 ." Nevertheless, the Iranian Parliament, under the pressure from the 
government, passed the first Iranian oil bill which included the new participation formula to 
permit the involving of foreign investors to operate outside the consortium's defined area in 
return of sharing the ownership of the final product instead of sharing the revenues coming 
from selling the oil product in the buyback. This proposal was accepted by the major oil 
companies, as this offer seem well designed and suitable to guarantee the collaboration 
producing countries, due to the fact that foreign oil companies obtained more shares than 
NIOC and more importantly, the new method of payment minimised the risk of price 
fluctuations in the global oil market122. Therefore, the Iranian government began to practice 
the production sharing model in 1957, despite its contradiction to the idea of the 
nationalisation which resulted in increasing the revenue of the Iranian government, as well 
the adverse socio-economic impact on Iranian society. Accordingly, this sub-chapter aims at 
highlighting the influence of the nationalisation event on the experience of Iran in exercising 
the Production Sharing Agreement, to provide the basis for the comparison of PSA with the 
current buyback system in the fourth chapter, in order to grasp whether it can be an 
applicable alternative for the Iranian buyback. Moreover, this sub-chapter will discover the 
roots of some of the existing provisions in the buyback such as the fixed rate of return in 
order to identify the unnecessarily restrictive provisions which have to be revised to make 
the buyback more attractive. Finally, the present study in this sub-chapter, by offering the 
socio-economic analysis highlights the necessity of providing an economic plan for the 
Iranian government to minimise the adverse effect of boosting its petroleum revenues, 
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particularly at the present time, as the Iranian government is actively encouraging foreign 
investments in order to increase its revenues after the removal of the nuclear sanctions123.  
Following the reaction of the public and political parties to the return to the terms of the 
1933 concession, the Iranian Parliament enacted the 1957 Petroleum Law, which included 
the new formula which authorised the National Iranian Oil Company, on behalf of Iran’s 
government, to sign the miscellaneous contracts based on the sharing agreements. “... it 
was determined that whereas Iran’s regime could obtain half the revenue for revenue tariff, 
fifty percentage of revenues received by exploration will belong to National Iranian Oil 
Company as a party ,... in fact the model is based on the theory of equal income in the 
contract... therefore, the result was equivalent partnership with the foreign company124." 
Subsequently, in 1957, the first PSA was concluded amid National Iranian Oil Company and 
the Italian corporation, AGIP, which was a governmental company, to operate massive area 
, 23,000 kl, in southern part of the country for a period of 25 years which led to the 
establishment of a joint company. Based on the agreement, while the AGIP was obliged to 
pay $22 million as the capital for explorations’ activities, it enjoyed the compensation at 
10% of yearly extracted barrel, and also taking advantage of an exemption from royalty 
payments. The second significant production sharing agreement based on the 1957 
Petroleum Law was signed in June 1958 between NIOC and a subsidiary of Standard Oil of 
Indiana, the Pan American Petroleum Corporation, to operate the 18,600 kl in the south of 
Iran which resulted in establishment of Iranian Pan-American Oil company (IPAC) as a joint 
firm. This agreement obliged the IPAC to finance all exploration-related expenses in return 
for having 50 per cent of the final product125. Accordingly, the Iranian Parliament, in order 
to increase the revenue of Iran from oil production by making the terms of petroleum deals 
more balanced, allowed the exercise of the PSA model as the only period within the history 
of the oil industry in Iran which created a special legal framework. This new legal 
framework, unlike the concessionary agreements, taxed Profits at the rate of 50 per cent, 
divided the profits and board of directors equally between the two parties, and obliged the 
foreign companies to provide all financial support for the oil exploration until the oil 
discovery reached commercial quantities which resulted in an exceeding of the revenue of 
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the Iranian government by establishing more balanced contractual provisions. As a result, 
Iran could reach some of its aims within the movement of nationalisation of oil by shifting 
the concessions towards the more balanced contractual framework of PSA. However, 
ownership of the oil product by foreigners and the long duration of the contract, which are 
a part of the PSA model remained ignored political concerns. Consequently, the financial 
effect of the new legal framework for the Iranian government was a dramatic increase of its 
revenue from oilfield production, which in turn enabled the government to develop the 
country economically. Such a radical change in the methods of oil transactions, led to a 
boost in the income of the government, whilst also conflicting with the essence of the idea 
of nationalisation and socio-economically impacting on Iranian society via aggravating the 
inequality of wealth in the country. In fact, although the modernisation of the petroleum 
contractual framework of Iran increased the revenue of the Iranian government, the 
absence of an economic plan aggravated the imbalance of wealth within the society of 
Iran126. Moreover, the huge income obtained from the oil revenues led to high inflation, 
social movement, and increased crimes in different department of the regime127. More 
importantly, allowing the foreign oil companies to possess the oil product within the 
framework of PSA was protested by political parties in Parliament, as well as by Iranian 
people, due to its contradiction to the nationalisation law that forbid any kind of foreign 
ownership of the oil product. Hence, the obvious contradiction of PSA with the 
nationalisation law, as well as the widened gap between the industrial class and the 
traditional classes (bazaar) resulted in public discontent which ultimately culminated in the 
Islamic revolution of 1979128 and the subsequent re-introduction of the Iranian buyback. 
Accordingly, the radical move towards the production sharing agreement mechanism by 
applying a revolutionary approach which contradicted the essence of nationalisation 
created the economic roots to the Islamic Revolution that began the practice of the Iranian 
buyback.  
Overall, analysing the experience of the Production Sharing Agreement model in Iran in the 
present sub-chapter showed that although this model was an effective method in ensuring 
the interests of Iran via increasing the profits of the government, this study does not 
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recommend the shifting towards this model from the current buyback in the form of a 
revolutionary approach. This is because of the fact that the high price of such a shift, 
including the great changes in the Constitution, cannot justify the necessity of this action 
and more importantly the Iranian society from a political point of view will not tolerate such 
a radical change in favour of foreign oil companies. Moreover, the socioeconomic 
examination of this vital time in Iranian petroleum background demonstrates, particularly in 
this specific time that the government should bring the socio-economic effects of the 
increase in petroleum revenue after lifting of sanctions to its consideration. As has been 
showed in this sub-chapter, lack of such consideration will aggravate the economic 
inequality in Iranian society, which will create many social and economic difficulties for the 
society and the government. Therefore, disregarding the socioeconomic effect of boosting 
the country’s’ economy will aggravate the wealth gap between different parts of the society 
which was the main foundation of peoples discontent that resulted in the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and, subsequently, in the introduction of the buyback. The impact of such a 
great event in the history of Iran on the current model of buyback will be analysed in the 
next sub-chapter. The role of the Revolution on the creation of the existing provisions of 
buyback from the political and geo-political point of view, will be examined in order to 
ensure that the reforms that this study will propose on the basis of an evolutionary 
approach will not breach the political barriers in Iranian society. 
 
2.5 The 1979 Islamic Revolution: Applying the Iranian model of buyback through 
annulment of all previous deals with foreign oil companies   
As has been highlighted in the sub-chapter 2.4 ignoring the basis of the nationalisation law, 
the forbiddance of the ownership of oil products by foreigners, in practising the production 
sharing agreement model, as well as failings by the Iranian government in providing an 
economic plan for its increased income, created the political and economic roots of the 
1979 Islamic Revolution by aggravating the negative experience of Iranians towards foreign 
involvement in the Iranian oil industry. This sub-chapter will consider the political and geo-
political influence of the most recent event in the history of the oil industry in Iran, the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, on employing the current method of oil transaction in Iran to 
demonstrate the political concerns of the Iranian model of buyback which will be 
considered at the time of proposing the reforms to modernise the model.  
 
63 
 
The distrust amid Iranians towards any involvement of foreigners in Iran particularly in the 
oil industry reached its peak during the occurrence of the 1979 Islamic revolution. In fact, 
the revolution was a response to many years of foreign interference and pressure in the 
political and economic spheres of Iran to exploit the Iranian natural resources129.Therefore, 
by 1979 Revolution occurrence National Iranian Oil Company annulled all Iranian oil and gas 
deals that was included international party before the Revolution, on the legal basis of the 
decision of the Revolutionary Council on 7th January 1979, in relation to all Iranian contracts 
with foreign companies130. This annulment resulted in the costly litigation regarding 
cancellation damages, stopping all exploration-related activities, and subsequently led to a 
huge loss of income for the country which was the result of excluding foreigners from the oil 
industry for the purpose of stopping their exploitation of Iranian natural resources. The 
economic disruptive effect of this annulment has been notified by the previous National 
Iranian Oil Company  Manager, Seyed Mahdi Hoseyny:  
‘termination of any contract can be potentially costly for Iran, owing to the fact that oil 
agreements contain numerous complicated terms that can be issue of dispute in 
arbitrational panel, and subsequently will lead to a favourable solution for the international 
contractor, due to the fact that the judicial system might not be are not specialised in 
energy matters, therefore, they will adhere the side that seem to be wronged131. Hence, as 
the effect of the annulment of petroleum deals for the foreign oil companies was a huge 
loss in revenue, they sued Iran’s government to procure a legal verdict against Iran in order 
to cover their loss which resulted in the courts’ decision to oblige Iran to pay compensation 
to companies based on the very optimistic predictions of their potential profits by 
recognition of the companies rights only to above-ground oil rather than underground 
deposits132’. As a result, following the decision of the government to annual all previous oil 
deals, the Iranian version of the buyback became the key element of the Iranian petroleum 
legal framework. In fact, the most crucial influence of this annulment on the Iranian method 
of oil transactions was shifting the Iranian model of oil and gas contracts from the 
production sharing agreement model to the Iranian buyback with its harsher mechanisms 
                                                 
129 Moosavi - Amini , op.cit., p.60 
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which is more in compliance with the essence of the nationalisation event through its 
implementation of prohibiting any ownership of any oil products by foreigners. Accordingly, 
the decision of the new Iranian government to nullify all previous petroleum deals, and 
applying the Iranian buyback was the first time in the history of oil in Iran that an Iranian 
government could practice a model to fulfil the essence of the nationalisation idea for the 
aim of protecting the Iranian natural resources. However, such decision resulted in a high 
financial and economic loss for the country. 
Consequently, this sub-chapter illustrated that public discontent stemming from the 
nationalisation movement changed the model of oil transactions from the production 
sharing agreement to buyback, despite the expensive financial fines that early termination 
of the contracts brought on the country. In fact, ignoring the political concerns regarding the 
production sharing agreements was one of the vital items in creation of the economic roots 
of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which resulted in the annulment of all previous oil deals, and 
subsequently shifting from the PSA to the buyback model that ensured the aims of 
nationalisation.  Therefore, it is crucially important that this study considers the potential 
political and geo-political impacts of any reform before proposing such reform in order not 
to clash with any barriers in Iranian society, so as to ensure that the reform can be 
successfully applicable.  
 
2.6 Conclusion: The applicability of the evolutionary approach toward the future of 
buyback from the political and geo-political point of view 
With the aim of determining the accurate way to modernise the present model of buyback 
agreements in order to foresee the future development of the model, it seems essential to 
have a perception into the political and geo-political considerations of the model by 
analysing the Iranian petroleum legal framework subsequent to the event of nationalisation. 
This insight into the issue of buyback can comprehensively demonstrate the adverse effect 
of the political and economic pressure of the big powers on the formation of oil transaction 
in Iran133. Thus, an analysis of the political and geo-political considerations of buyback 
within absolutely significant petroleum relevant occasions of Iranian oil background, 1951 
nationalisation of oil and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, can provide the full picture of the 
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Iranian buyback. As a result, limiting the analysis of Iran’s buyback agreements to the 
present situation, which is the vital gap in similar researches, will result in missing such vital 
issues within the Iranian oil industry, and accordingly will decrease the applicability of the 
solutions that this study will propose with the aim of making the model more competitive in 
future.  
As the political and geo-political considerations of Iranian buyback demonstrated in this 
chapter, the nationalisation event is the key element in connecting the negative attitude of 
Iranians towards international participation with Iranian petroleum market and exercising 
Iranian model of buyback with its preventive provisions. Moreover, the nationalisation 
event is politically and geo-politically vital, as it changed the petroleum framework of Iran 
from concessionary deals to a contractual form which was a result of the Iranian people’s 
recognition regarding the value of their natural resources134. Although this event was a 
political rebellion to the many years of unbalanced and exploitative concessions and ended 
via foreign interference, it heavily influenced the establishment of the current buyback 
system following the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  
This chapter showed that the root of some provisions of the present buyback such as 
transfer of technology and obligation of foreign companies to employ Iranian workers in oil 
projects can be found in the political and geo-political influences of the nationalisation 
event, as a lack of technology and expertise failed the nationalist government in reaching its 
aim to nationalise the whole process of oil production, and more importantly led the foreign 
powers to successfully carry out the coup. Furthermore, it has been shown in this chapter 
that the main political concern regarding the oil contracts in Iran is the issue of ownership of 
natural resources that has been illustrated in the current constitutional provisions which 
ban the ownership of natural resources by foreigners. This vital concern which has been 
denied via the production sharing agreement model created the public discontent and 
economic roots of the 1979 Islamic Revolution that excluded all foreigners from the Iranian 
oil sector by nullifying the previous petroleum deals and applying the Iranian buyback with 
its harsh and restrictive provisions.  Accordingly, this study by providing the political and 
geo-political considerations of buyback demonstrated the applicability of the middle way 
between the current harsh model of buyback and the 19th century and early 20th 
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exploitative concessionary deals by reforming the unnecessarily restrictive provisions of 
buyback without granting the ownership rights to foreigners on the basis of the 
evolutionary approach that will be discussed in the third and the fourth chapters of this 
work. Employing such reforms are intended not to breach any historical, political and legal 
barriers and will protect the interests of both parties on buyback, and subsequently can 
absorb more foreign investment into Iranian oil sector at the present time after the removal 
of the nuclear sanctions. For this purpose, the following chapter will examine the legal 
anatomy of the Iranian buyback to highlight the deficiency of the model in order to propose 
the applicable reforms.  
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Chapter 3: The Legal Anatomy of the Iranian Buyback: Discovering the present practice of 
the model 
3.1 Introduction: The adoption of Iranian model of buyback 
As it has been shown in the last chapter nullifying all the previous petroleum deals following 
the 1979 revolution occurrence led to the foreigners’ exclusion from Iranian energy sector 
and subsequently led to the great disruption of Iran’s oil supply. Such actions to remove the 
foreign oil companies from the Iranian oil industry which stemmed from the event of 
nationalisation for the aim of nationalising the entire process of oil production to protect 
the national interest of Iranians caused replacing of Iranians’ oil by its traditional importers 
with other regional sources such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait135.  As a result, in order to 
increase the rate of oil production as the main source of income of the country and 
considering the prohibition of the Iranian Constitution regarding foreign ownership of the 
Iranian natural assets, the Iranian government adopted the buyback model as the 
compromising solution to attract the foreign investors to oil sector, as well as ensuring the 
Constitutional forbiddance of foreigners. In fact, the introduction of the buyback model was 
an effort for establishing a method of oil transaction that would attract foreign investment, 
even with low efficiency, while it preserves the state’s right to permanent sovereignty over 
Iran’s natural reserves through the prevention of the ownership of Iran’s mineral wealth by 
foreigners136.  In spite of the less attractiveness of buyback compared to the Production 
Sharing Agreement model, offering this model could attract many oil companies to the 
Iranian oil industry, as contractors desire an alteration in framework of the contract for the 
benefit of favour of international petroleum corporation, and also, they fear that another oil 
company may sign the contract instead of them and enjoy the aforementioned alteration in 
the structure. Therefore, from the legal point of view, the adoption of the model of buyback 
has stemmed from the existing prohibition Iran’s Constitution that avoids NIOC to conclude 
unbalanced deals in form of concessions to international petroleum corporation in order to 
protect the ownership of Iran’s oil resources. As a result, the buyback financing model 
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became the key element of the Iranian oil and gas transaction, due to the fact that the 
Iranian government recognised the buyback as an effective mechanism for protecting its 
sovereignty, as well as absorbing foreign investments.  
The first experience of the country in foreign investment in area of petroleum part after 
Islamic revolution in the form of buyback was related to the agreement between NIOC and 
Total for the operation of Syry fields137 . In 1999, IOCs showed more attention to 
involvement in Iran’s oil sector, NIOC offered 31 discovery and extraction schemes which 
were awarded to Statoil, OMV, Edison Gas, ONGC and Sinopec138.  Therefore, for the 
purpose of attracting more foreign investment Iran adopted numerous significant plans 
within time of the second and the third government in Iran for guaranteeing the safe 
petroleum contractual framework in favor of IOCs. The key alterations referred firstly to, 
passing legislation to enable IOCs to register a division within the territory of Iran, adaption 
of the new system of arbitrational settlement, and finally, an amendment to the law for 
permission to establish international financial institutes in determined area identified as FTZ 
in 1999. Nevertheless, the present practice of the Iranian buyback obliges the foreign 
contractor to provide necessary capital, structures, technology and services in exchange for 
the contractually pre-agreed rate, approximately 16-18 %, which is received through its 
worth to the equal amount of the product that was remained. Therefore, under the Iranian 
buyback agreement, the contractor is entitled to receive compensation from the National 
Iranian Oil Company through a share of the final product for the price of funding all 
investments. Thus, Iranian buyback agreements are categorised in a series of "risk service" 
contracts, as the foreign contractor bears the risk of financing the project, as well as the risk 
of the oil discovery.  
Accordingly, since deliberating the core concept of the Iranian buyback from a legal point of 
view is significantly essential for the purpose of analysing the current mechanism and also 
foreseeing the future development of the model, this chapter is aimed at examining the 
legal anatomy of Iranian buyback. This analysis focuses on the legal concern of the model to 
determine the most effective alternative for the current mechanism, and also to highlight its 
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shortcomings from a legal point of view in order to deal with the applicable reforms in the 
next chapter. Hence, this chapter is comprised of three sub-chapters which are all designed 
to examine the core concept of the Iranian buyback via the consideration of the present 
legal function of Iranian buyback. For this aim, the first sub-chapter considers the structure 
of the Iranian buyback to precisely show the legal function of the model and accordingly will 
demonstrate the nationally supportive feature of the Iranian buyback against the foreign 
party, which burdens the high financial risk on the international side. The second sub-
chapter deals with the different generation of buyback to evaluate the efforts that have 
been carried out to offer more balanced version of the model, and more importantly will 
prove the applicability of the evolutionary approach toward the future of the Iranian 
buyback which has been chosen by this study over the revolutionary approach to make the 
model more attractive. The issue of Iranian influential laws on buyback will be considered in 
the last sub-chapter for the purpose of analysing the effective laws on the current practice 
of Iranian buyback, in order to highlight the deficiency of the model from this perspective. 
Moreover, considering the influential laws of Iranian buyback enables this work to point out 
the legal concern of Iranian buyback which will be employed in the next chapter to suggest 
the applicable reforms. 
Noticeably, missing the examination of legal aspects of Iranian buyback would be a vital gap 
in this study, and renders the offering of the full picture of the Iranian buyback as 
incomplete, which impedes this study to predict the future tendency of the model for the 
purpose of answering the research question of this study. 
 
 
3.2 The Structure of the Iranian buyback:  Bias mechanism in favour of NIOC 
The reasons for adapting the buyback model in Iran, despite its harsh mechanism and less 
attractiveness compared to other models have been discussed in the second chapter of this 
study. It has been demonstrated in the previous two chapters that the negative historical 
experience of foreign involvement in the Iranian oil industry as a result of the unfair 
concessionary agreements led to the nationalisation of Iran’s national resources and 
subsequently all agreements with foreigners were nullified after the Islamic revolution in 
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1979139. Therefore, following the consideration of the roots of the introduction of the 
buyback this sub-chapter will attempt to examine the structure of the Iranian buyback in 
order to critically analyse the function of the model in question.  
The service contract depends on the nature and level of exploration and production is an agreement 
between private company and the host government in order to provide particular services for the exchange 
of the agreed payment140. Therefore, based on the service contract the international oil company is obliged 
to offer the host government the necessary facilities, services and information for the aim of developing the 
oil resources.  As a result, the international oil company in this type of oil transactions has been known as a 
contractor or hire hand working for wages141.  Accordingly, unlike the concessions, under the service 
contract the IOC is not the traditional concessionaire as he is a contractor for the host government that on 
his own risk performs the necessary activities for development of oil field when there is block discovery. Since 
based on the service contract the contractor is carrying out the activities on his own risk and will be rewarded 
only in the event of successful production, this model has been coldly accepted by IOCs.  This kind of 
agreement was practiced for the first time in Latin America, Brazil in 1953 and Argentina in 1958, as the 
concessionary deals came to the end, as a result of establishment of many national oil companies, as well 
nationalizing countries’ resources142. The service contract has been divided in to three categories: 143 
Pure Risk where the contractor is responsible for preparing the required information. 
Technical where the contractor has to provide technical facilities.  
Buyback where the contractor is enable to buy the final product with agreed discounted price.144  
 
Vitally, the Iranian buyback has been distinguished over other commonly used petroleum 
contractual systems, due to its particular provisions regarding the prohibition of direct 
ownership of the oil product by foreigners which is in line with the existing Iranian 
constitutional restrictions. Therefore, based on this constitutional prohibition, buyback is 
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the only method of direct investment in the energy industry in Iran for foreign persons or 
companies. In fact, the buyback is a viable vehicle to justify the involvement of international 
corporations in the energy sector which also complied with the existing prohibition of the 
Iranian constitution as  the previous president of Iran, Khatami, stated that ‘Buyback 
agreement is the finest choice with consideration of the restrictions that the government is 
bounded by them’. Hence, the most significant features of the structure of the Iranian 
buyback is that the foreign party will not share any part of the final product generated in the 
field, whereas, it is obliged to provide the necessary capital and technical support145. Hence, 
the structure of Iranian buyback is designed to protect the national interest of Iran in 
petroleum deals mainly through banning the foreign ownership of Iranian natural resources. 
Under the structure of this model the foreign party only acts as a contractor to conduct 
activities related to the engineering, procurement and construction of the project, and will 
not granted  the right to possess the petroleum blocks, while it will be compensated on the 
rate of pre-agreed income through the final product. The main structure of the Iranian 
buyback model is examined as follows146:  
a) While the NIOC is banned from transferring any form of right directly or indirectly such as 
equity, concession and license, it preserves the absolute sovereignty rights over the Iranian 
resources under any and all circumstances147. 
b) The IOC undertakes the responsibility of exploration and development activities in the 
allocated area to reach a rate of production contractually agreed by bearing the risk of no 
discovery in the field. 
c) The buyback contract consists of two sections: the first part is an agreement to conduct 
the discovery activities in certain oil fields and the latter is the production and oil sales 
agreement which are granted separately. 
d) The mutual accepted inspection agency will assess the quality of the materials and 
equipment used by the IOCs in their operation with binding effect on the parties. 
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e) NIOC shall compensate IOC in exchange for its investment and activities in the project in 
the form of crude oil or natural gas extracted from the same field when the project starts 
generating income148. 
f) At the final stage, the field will be hand over by the contractor to NIOC after concluding 
the production activities; however, the contractor is still in charge of providing technical 
assistance during the operation and production phases149. 
Therefore, based on the structure of the Iranian buyback agreement, although the 
contractors bear a variety of risks by signing the Iranian buyback agreement including 
discovery in exploration, inadequate products for the recovery purpose and overrunning the 
expenses beyond the budget limit150, they will be compensated in the fixed rate of return 
payable in the form of crude oil which burdens another risk on the contractors. As a result, 
the structure of the Iranian buyback is unfairly biased in favour of the NIOC which creates an 
unattractiveness feature of the Iranian buyback, and subsequently discourages foreign 
investors from engaging in the Iranian oil sector, which is against the national interests of 
Iranians. However, this study suggests that offering a more balanced structure of Iranian 
buyback and considering the current legal and political prohibition can generate more 
financial incentives to absorb more foreign investment following the removal of the nuclear 
sanctions.  
Consequently, this sub-chapter identified the main elements of the buyback’s structure 
model which can support this study for the purpose of highlighting the unattractive 
provisions of buyback which create the deficiencies voiced from both the national and 
international party from the framework of the model such as a fixed rate of return, the 
short duration of buyback and the separation of the discovery rights from the development 
rights. Such deficiencies, which resulted from the nationally supportive nature of buyback, 
will generate a unsafe commercial environment for IOCs operating in Iranian fields and 
subsequently make the model unable to compete with other commonly used methods in 
Iran’s neighbouring countries. Therefore, this work will employ this analysis to propose 
applicable reforms within the structure of the model in the next chapter to increase the 
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efficiency of the model by revising the terms to an unfixed rate of return, longer agreements 
and offering the discovery and production rights together to the contractor. Thus, as this 
study’s strategy is firstly to highlight the unattractive elements of buyback and subsequently 
provides applicable solutions to reform them in the future development of the model, the 
next sub-chapter will examine the features of different generations of Iranian buyback to 
demonstrate the efforts which have been carried out to improve the model, and more 
importantly to analyse the impact of such efforts on making the buyback more attractive for 
the purposes of introducing the most applicable alternative to improving the Iranian 
buyback 
 
3.3 Different generations of Iranian buyback: Inadequate attempts to improve the model 
As was mentioned in the last chapter, the Iranian method of transaction is not as attractive 
as other types of petroleum contractual systems, due to the lack of financial incentives, and 
also containing restrictive provisions which make the Iranian buyback unable to compete 
with other models in attracting foreign investment151. Therefore, since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, Iran has issued four generations of buyback contracts which demonstrate the 
Iranian government’s position to render the buyback more attractive for foreign investors, 
in order to develop the country’s economic situation. In fact, these generations have been 
introduced because Iran realised two vital facts: Firstly, the model is not as attractive as 
other commonly used mechanisms in Iran’s neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia, 
and secondly, the model has the potential to be revised in order to compete with other 
models in attracting investments. Therefore, there is no need to shift towards another 
model which has high historical, political and legal expenses. As a result, Iran during the past 
three decades, conservatively, has attempted to modify the model to respond to all 
grievances from both sides, as well as ensuring that the commercial environment will 
become continuously more beneficial to IOCs by proposing a different generation of the 
model. Therefore, this sub-chapter, following the examination of the structure of the Iranian 
buyback will analyse the different generations of the buyback to evaluate the progression of 
the model, and highlight other areas which need to be reformed to make the model more 
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attractive. Consequently, this sub-chapter will critically review the four different 
generations of the model in question and subsequently, points out the required trend of 
reforming in the future in order to accelerate such revisions and to improve the Iranian 
buyback.  
a) Table one: The First Generation of Iranian Buyback Agreement (1979-1989): Simple 
mechanism and low economic efficiency 
 
          Main Elements  
 
               Shortcomings 
 
Fixed Rate of Return 
Extremely short length of the 
contract 
 
Allocating the Exploration and 
Developments activities in 
separated Phases and Contacts  
 
Bearing all Risks on the 
Contractor 
 
Vague in Production stage 
 
Not attractive for IOCs 
 
 
As has been shown in table 1, the initial group of Iranian buyback agreements were 
uncomplicated buyback deals amid National Iranian Oil Company as well as an international 
corporation. This category of buyback was included a pre-agreed rate of return in exchange 
of provided services by IOC as a contractor. More importantly, there was no guarantee 
under this generation for IOCs to be the developer of the field, even if they would have 
found a commercial oil field, as the right to discovery and production activities would be 
rewarded separately152. This approach led to a great dissatisfaction amongst IOCs, due to 
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the uncertainty caused regarding the recovering of operation costs and capital investments 
during the project exploration phase153, as well as a lack of financial incentives for the 
contractor resulting from the short duration of the agreement154. Accordingly, the first 
generation of buyback agreements burdened all risks on the contractor and de-motivated 
them from participating in the Iranian oil industry which subsequently resulted in a loss of 
national interest in Iran, as the model was not successful with competing with other 
neighbouring producers regarding the absorbing of foreign investment155. As a result of such 
analysis the officials decided to carry out some reforms to increase the attractiveness of the 
model which led to the introduction of the second generation of the Iranian buyback 
contracts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153 Farshad Gohar, Naser, 'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',{ A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements) Tehran, 1381, pg 264 
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155 Farshad Gohar, Naser, 'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',{ A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements) Tehran, 1381, pg 264 
 
76 
 
b) Table two: The Second Generation of Iranian Buyback Agreement (1989-1995): Similar 
to the first Generation  
 
          Main Elements  
 
               Shortcomings 
 
Fixed Rate of Return 
 
Considerably short length of the 
contract 
 
Allocating the Exploration and 
Developments activities in 
separated contacts and phases 
 
Allowing the Contactor to start 
development phase in the case of 
successful exploration with 
discretionary power of NIOC 
 
Vague in Production stage 
 
Lack of financial incentivise 
 
Bearing all Risks on the 
Contractor 
 
 
Not attractive for IOCs 
 
 
The second table showed that the second generation of the Iranian buyback agreements 
preserved the main elements of the first generation of contracts including a fixed rate of 
return, short duration, and granting the discovery rights and production rights in separated 
legal documents156. However, the main difference between the first and the second 
generation stemmed from the fact that in the latter generation the contractors would be 
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granted the development phase if they successfully finished the exploration phase. 
However, the NIOC was granted the discretionary power to award the second contract, 
therefore, practically, the two different phases of the operation would not be granted in the 
same contract and the NIOC enjoyed the right to decide to grant the second contract to any 
of the contractors157. Hence, the contractor under the second generation was still under the 
risk of exclusion from the operation, even if the discovery had been successful. This 
provision, which has been reflected in the current model of the buyback, is one of the main 
sources of financial risk for the contractor. This study based on the evolutionary approach 
by reforming the provision of buyback without any clash with the present prohibition 
suggests amending provisions in order to remove the discretionary power of NIOC in 
granting the production phase, as well as obliging the NIOC to grant the rights of production 
and development to any contractor that successfully discovers the oil. Applying such 
reforms will change the restrictive provisions to a financial incentive that makes the shape 
of the model more attractive by removing the important risks in favour of the contractor 
with no clash with the barriers in the current legal atmosphere of Iran. 
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c) Table three: The Third Generation of Iranian Buyback Agreement (1995-2010): More 
contractual obligations for IOC 
 
          Main Elements  
 
               Shortcomings 
 
Fixed Rate of Return 
Extremely short length of the 
contract 
 
Conducting both Exploration and 
Developments activities in one 
contact at the same time 
 
Obligation on providing the cost 
estimation before the beginning of 
the operation 
 
Including the technology transfer 
Provision   
 
Lack of clearness in Production 
stage 
 
Lack of financial incentivise 
 
Bearing all Risks on the 
contractor 
 
Less attractive for IOCs 
compared to offered contracts in 
neighbouring  countries  
 
 
 
 
 
This group of the buyback agreements, table 3, had some dissimilar features the previous 
generations, as it contained two important legal obligations for IOCs158. The first one was 
providing the cost estimation at the beginning of the project which burdens a significant 
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financial risk on the IOC159, due to the fact that the expenses of the project may be changed 
during the operation, and accordingly will not be covered based on this provision. This 
obligation which has existed in the present model of buyback created a high level of risk for 
IOCs; however, this study on the basis of the evolutionary approach proposes that the cost 
estimation can be carried out as the project is running160. This reform will remove a 
significant risk for IOCs and subsequently will improve the efficiency of the model in 
attracting foreign investment which is the aim of Iran after the removal of the sanctions. 
The latter new obligation in this generation is a transfer of technology which is in line with 
the main tendency in the Iranian buyback regarding achieving an absolute independency in 
oil and gas related activities. This tendency, which has been demonstrated in the second 
chapter of this work, stemmed from the nationalisation of Iranian natural resources and was 
subsequently reflected in this obligation. This study suggests the revision of this provision in 
order to change this legal provision with a financial incentive by awarding a tax reduction to 
any contractor that employs more Iranian workers and engages more with Iranian 
companies. This revision will ensure the goal of Iran in achieving the absolute independency 
in the oil industry via the transfer of technology, as well as not burdening any formal 
obligation on IOCs. Accordingly, the third generation does not only cover the shortcomings 
of the previous buyback models but also obliged the contractor to provide the cost 
estimation before the start of the project and transfer the technology. As a result, this 
generation of the Iranian buyback agreement, in line with the former generations, was not 
successful in competing with common contracts offered by Iran’s neighbours in the field of 
petroleum in that time, due to the fact that it did not provide any financial incentives for 
IOCs. 
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d) Table four: Fourth Iranian Buyback Agreement Generation (2010-2015): Limited 
reforms  
 
          Main Elements  
 
               Shortcomings 
 
Fixed rate of return 
 
Longer duration of contract 
through series of successive 
agreements 
 
Conducting the Exploration and 
Developments activities in 
separated contacts  
 
Priority  of  explorer contactor in 
granting the sales contracts with 
discretionary power of NIOC 
 
 
Bureaucracy   
Lack of enough financial 
incentivises 
 
Bearing most Risks on the 
Contractor 
 
Vague in Production stage 
 
Less attractive for IOCs 
compared to offered contracts in 
neighbouring  countries  
 
 
 
Following the short duration of the last three generations of the buyback model, the most 
recent generation, the fourth one, attempted to solve this shortcoming of buyback by 
offering a series of successive agreements which can be roughly 20 years161. This reform, 
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which has been applied in this version of buyback, might address this deficiency; however, it 
will aggravate the problem of long negotiations and bureaucracy which is a common 
complaint among the foreign contractors 162 . Therefore, this study, following the 
evolutionary approach towards buyback proposes the determination of the length of 
contract subsequent to carrying out the analysis of the volume of the field and the 
necessary operations to maximise the exploitation of the field. As a result, this solution 
which does not breach any prohibition, nor will not aggravate the problem of long 
negotiations and bureaucracy will ensure the benefit of both parties, as it motivates IOCs to 
employ its highest technology to maximise the exploitation of the field from the national 
side, and it will remove the risk of uncompensated expenses from the perspective of IOCs. 
However, under the most recent generation, as was the same as the prior contracts, the 
contractor is still under the risk of a fixed rate of return, separation of the discovery contract 
from the production contract and providing the cost estimation before the beginning of the 
project. Moreover, the fourth generation attempted to address the deficiency of the 
provision that grants the discretionary power to NIOC to award the development contract 
to another contractor as opposed to the contractor that successfully carries out the 
exploration project, which results in the creation of ambiguity and subsequently discourages 
the IOC in participating in the Iranian oil industry. However, this attempt, compared to the 
shortcomings of the buyback was considerably insufficient, as most of the shortcomings of 
the model have not been addressed in this version and this therefore requires more effort 
to improve the model. 
Overall, this sub-chapter examined all the different generations of the Iranian buyback to 
evaluate the progression of the model and more importantly to assess the efficiency of the 
changes which have been applied to them. It has been demonstrated that the changes 
which have been carried out within the buyback is not sufficient to offer a more attractive 
version of the model. Therefore, the Iranian buyback needs more attempts to be improved 
in order to compete with other models in attracting foreign investments. The limited 
reforms that have been applied in different versions of the buyback cannot make the model 
more attractive, and subsequently Iran would not be able to reach its ambitious goal, 
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particularly after the lifting of the nuclear sanctions. As a result, Iran is in dire need to 
conduct more serious reforms within the buyback based on the attitude of the country in 
the introduction of four versions of buyback which confirms the applicability of the 
evolutionary approach rather than a revolutionary attitude which potentially breaches 
historical, political and legal barriers in the current atmosphere of Iran after the removal of 
the sanctions. Following the consideration of the different generations of buyback and 
highlighting the Iranian official’s strategy in revising the provisions of buyback rather than 
shifting to another model, the next sub-chapter will examine the effective Iranian laws on 
buyback in order to point out the shortcomings of the model from the legal point of view 
and proposes applicable solutions to continue the process of the buyback improvement 
considered in this sub-chapter. 
3.4 The influential Iranian laws regarding buyback transactions: The need to provide clear 
and certain laws 
The second chapter of this work demonstrated that following the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
the new government nullified all petroleum contracts with foreigners and subsequently 
replaced the production sharing agreement method by the Iranian model of buyback, as the 
new constitution banned any ownership of natural resources by foreigners. Thus, 
considering the prohibitions of the constitution regarding the possession of foreigners in the 
oil industry, as well as Iran’s need for investment to develop its fields and its economy, the 
buyback model appeared to be the only compromising model to employ. Further to the 
existing prohibition of the constitution, different sets of regulations have been enacted by 
Parliament relating to the different issues of buyback which have influenced the current 
mechanism of the buyback. Therefore, it seems essential to examine the effective laws and 
their impacts on the model as the aim of this sub-chapter is to highlight the shortcomings of 
buyback stemming from the relevant laws and, more importantly, to propose applicable 
reforms to cover the deficiencies, and subsequently increase the efficiency of the model.  
a) Iranian Constitution: Prohibition of foreign possession of local reserves 
The Iranian Constitution is main legislation regarding the buyback topic which plays the 
main role in preserving the buyback as a key element of the Iranian oil industry by banning 
any type of foreign ownership of Iranian natural resources. This provision as has been 
explained in the last chapter and is a direct reaction to the many years of the exploitative 
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nature of the concessionary deals in Iran. Article 43 of the Constitution163 in this regard 
expressed that the economy164 of the revolutionary government will be according to 
following principles:  
‘1. Preventing the supremacy of any foreign power regarding Iranian economic position.  
2. Highlighting the growth of farming, as well as technological manufactures.  
3. Minimising the dependency on foreign imports’165. 
 
In addition, under paragraph 2 of Article 44166, the state sector of the economy encompass 
all large-scale "mother" industries and Iran's most economically significant minerals. 
Obviously, oil deposits are accurate examples of economically significant minerals which are 
controlled by the government. Article 45 more explicitly grants the authority of managing 
national public assets and reserves such as minerals to the government. This article states 
that: ‘Public wealth and property, such as mineral deposits, seas, oil and gas resources lakes, 
rivers ..., property of undetermined ownership…, shall be at the disposal of the Islamic 
government. Therefore, oil deposits belong to the nation, thus, any private possession of 
them including long exploiting of the energy sources has been prevented via such 
requirement’. This prohibition of the Iranian Constitution that forbids the energy sources to 
be possessed by non-Iranians, is an absolute prohibitive Article regarding energy law in the 
Iranian constitution. In fact, the existing prohibition in this article justifies the practice of 
buyback as a means of ensuring the sovereignty of the host state. It declares that conferring 
concessions to foreigners for the purpose of a company’s establishment dealing with trade, 
manufacturing, farming, technologies or petroleum field operation, is absolutely 
prohibited167.  
In summary, Iranian Constitution has had the most significant influence on the current type 
of Iranian buyback by forbidding any ownership, and control of Iranian natural assets and 
energy sources by non-Iranians which has led to the introduction of the Iranian buyback. 
Although such a Constitutional prevention has adverse effects on attracting foreign 
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gCPkWFaVhMLFcGadOZ_Yg/ p 13-14/ Access on March 2016 
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165 Nima Mersadi Tabari, Lex Petrolea and International Investment Law: Law and Practice in the Persian Gulf.(2016) p 177 
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investment into the Iranian oil industry, this study does not suggest any change in this 
provision because such a change would require a fundamental alteration in the 
Constitution. Moreover, the analysis carried out in the last chapters demonstrated the 
strong link between this restriction, and the historical, political, and geo-political 
considerations of the model which showed that the current political and legal atmosphere 
of Iran is not flexible enough to tolerate such a radical shift to another model. Therefore, 
choosing a revolutionary reform will have high expenses for the country which is not 
recommended by this work, particularly considering the time limit of Iran to return to the 
global oil market. As a result, the alternative that this study offers is based on the current 
situation of Iran for the future development of the model via applying the evolutionary 
approach by reforming the restrictive provisions of the model, as well as improving the 
model via integrating the advantageous provisions of other methods. 
 
b) Iranian Petroleum Laws 1987.1997: Bureaucratic provisions of finalising a contractual 
deal   
The second relevant law to the Iranian buyback is the Iranian Petroleum Law of 1987 and 
1997. This law and its updated version in line with the idea of the buyback model which is 
explained in the Constitution, are ratified to manage the powers of NIOC and the 
government in concluding petroleum deals with foreign contractors.  
Based on this legislation, the Iranian authority is responsible for observing entire petroleum 
connected activities such as exploration, production and drawing the foundation and 
responsibilities of the Petroleum Department within the government. As a result, the 
government has an absolute power over the oil industry in Iran. The updated Iranian 
Petroleum Law of 1997 permits the Petroleum Department or NIOC to form agreements 
with "local and foreign natural persons and legal entities". Therefore, to enter to Iranian oil 
market, a foreign company should partner up with an Iranian company, and also attain the 
endorsement of Iranian Ministry of Economy. The second term in this Legislation declares 
the ownership of entire energy resources by Iran’s authority, as well as being controlled by 
the government and administered by the Ministry of Oil168. Consequently, with regard to 
the prohibition of foreign ownership of natural resources, the international petroleum 
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corporations will merely perform as suppliers of the projects, instead of main leaders. The 
part 5 of this legislation requires Ministry of Oil to achieve endorsement of Ministries’ 
Assembly regarding all significant contracts to have legal effect169. The Article declares that 
significant deal’s outcome amid the petroleum department, and international petroleum 
corporations needs the confirmation of Ministries’ Assembly on the basis of petroleum 
department application. More importantly, this article highlighted the legal limitations 
imposed by the Constitution; it proclaims that the any agreements settled amid petroleum 
department of Iran and another government sectors must be entirely in compliance with 
77th principle of the Iranian Revolutionary Constitution. Accordingly, based on these 
provisions, the process of signing a buyback will take a long time, as a result of the 
unnecessary bureaucratic structure of the Iranian petroleum laws which will lead to a loss of 
commercial profits for both parties, and the wasting of time and energy170. Therefore, this 
study, on the basis of the evolutionary approach highlights the need for an updated version 
of petroleum laws, with less bureaucratic provisions in order to accelerate the process of 
finalising buybacks, as well as ensuring the interests of Iranians by preventing a loss of 
commercial benefits.  
 
c) The Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act (FIPPA): Ambiguity regarding the 
protection of foreign investment in buyback projects 
As has been mentioned in the last sub-chapter, the Iranian buyback is a compromising 
solution to develop the Iranian oil industry by attracting foreign investment to the oil sector 
which is the main economic goal of Iran. Therefore, for the purpose of absorbing the 
international investors to the Iranian oil industry the issue of providing sufficient legal 
protection for foreign investment involved in Iranian buyback projects seems vital. Thus, this 
section aims to examine the existing legal protections for foreign investment in the legal 
framework of buyback.  
Basically, FIPPA influenced via 1957 LAPFI that followed the same target to absorb and 
protecting international investments. The FIPPA that is the ruling legislation to international 
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investments (FIPPA) including buyback contracts, was approved in 2002 by Parliament171, 
and is an improved form of the previous foreign investment law, owing to the fact that its 
definition of 'investment' has been extended, so as to contain a variety of different kind of 
investments including buyback, which were not represented within LAPFI172. As a result, the 
FIPPA widens the scope of the legal protection to, almost, all sorts of outside investments in 
Iran.173 Therefore, many areas which were absent in the LAPFI, such as buyback deals and 
BOT arrangements can now enjoy legal protection based on the FIPPA.  
 
FIPPA recognised the following relevant categories as foreign investments and accordingly, 
entitled to enjoy legal protection174: 
• Foreign currency 
• Assets of a technological nature 
• Equipment and extra portions 
• Financial achievement presented to project funding  
Per FIPPA the following benefits of being registered as an investor can be highlighted:  
• Nationalizing would be only allowed in the time of chasing a local benefit, on the basis of 
based on lawful arrangements with no discrimination manner, while reasonable 
reimbursement in the time of before nationalizing has to be guaranteed for instruction’s 
actual price. 
• Regulations, including any benefits and exceptions, would affect foreign investors just the 
same as local participants.  
• The local laws of Iran concerning travel of foreign employees would not apply for foreign 
investors. 
• The investor is allowed to select a jurisdiction other than Iran for arbitration; in addition, 
disagreements between investors and the government are to be settled based on the terms 
agreed by the parties. 
• Foreigner investors are allowed to annually remove their earnings in foreign currency or 
related goods175. 
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Although the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Act is an improved form of the 
previous foreign investment law, it still suffers from a great vagueness in relation to the 
existing constitutional limitations regarding the involvement of a public authority in the 
arbitration process. This vagueness stems from the fact that the Iranian Constitution ruled 
that any involvement of a public authority in arbitration requires approval from the 
Parliament. As a result, based on this provision, the foreign contractor is only able to apply 
the provisions of the contract's arbitration if the participation of the public entity has 
already been confirmed by Parliament. Despite granting dispute-resolution procedures, 
FIIPPA gives significant discretion to Parliament, and subsequently this lead to greater 
doubts for foreign contractors concerning the security of their investments. Therefore, 
under the provision of the FIPPA, it is not clear that the right of the foreign contractor in a 
buyback project to access arbitration in the event of a dispute has been protected which 
accordingly creates a high level of confusion and, more importantly, a disincentive for the 
foreign party. The solution that this study suggests, based on the evolutionary approach 
towards the issue of buyback, is to cover this deficiency by applying a flexible interpretation 
of the constitutional provision to remove the discretionary power of Parliament and to 
change the approval requirement to the advisory view of the NIOC. Carrying out this reform, 
which does not breach any legal provision, will provide a strong protection for foreign 
contractors and subsequently will attract them to participate in the Iranian oil industry by 
removing the above mentioned ambiguity176.  
Further to the above-mentioned obscurity of FIPPA, this act has not clarified whether the 
direct investment in upstream oil projects are protected by this provision, even though 
FIPPA177 provides a broad range of protection for foreign investments compared to the last 
foreign investment law (LAPFI). Article 2(d) of FIPPA178 requires protection to be expanded 
into "Crude oil and natural gas” projects as in theses projects international investors might 
not directly fund the projects179. Therefore, although downstream oil projects are under the 
scope of above mentioned shield because of circumstances of upstream projects that are 
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entirely different, as such projects require direct investment for oil exploring and findings 
which, accordingly, would lead to uncertainty in the foreign contract in this regard180. 
Accordingly, the FIPPA provides legal protection for a certain limit of direct foreign 
investment into exploration181. However, it is still vague as to how FIPPA would protect 
upstream buyback projects, as the related provisions specifically reference downstream 
projects within this context182. The reform that this study proposes makes the model more 
attractive by removing this shortcoming and providing a more clear and precise legal 
provision of the FIPPA via including the upstream projects in this act in order to assure the 
foreign contractors that their investment is fully under the legal protection of the Iranian 
FIIPPA legislation. Such a reform, in accordance to evolutionary approach, does not breach 
any legal barriers in Iran and will motivate foreign investors to engage with the Iranian oil 
sector by offering a more attractive version of the buyback from a legal point of view183. 
 
d) Bilateral Investment Treaties:  Vague process of dispute settlement body 
In addition to FIPPA, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have effects on foreign investment 
in Iran, as according to the information on the OIETAI’s website184, Iran is presently member 
of fifty eight Bilateral Investment Treaties185. The Bilateral Investment Treaties follow a 
number of goals such as motivating the trend of funds in different states186, generating and 
upholding ‘favourable circumstances to financial fund of a project in a state other than 
investors’ country, as well as intensifying ‘economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of’ 
contracting parties. The legal provision of ‘Fork in road clause’187 is the main benefit of these 
agreements, which allows the claimant investor to select the place of judicial system in 
event of dispute. Therefore, investors are able to decide under which judicial system 
disagreement will be heared, which is crucial for outside investors in Iran because of the 
constitutional restrictions. However, Article 139 of the Constitution requires the 
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confirmation of both the Ministries’ Assembly, and Parliament for the involvement of all 
governmental bodies in any dispute resolution. As a result, there is a great confusion for 
foreign investors operating in the Iranian oil sector regarding choosing the forum for dispute 
resolution which creates an unattractive feature of the model188. This study proposes a 
flexible interpretation to solve this confusion. As the BITs are confirmed by the Guardian 
Council of the Constitution, there is no need to apply Article 139 of the Constitution. 
Consequently, there is no need for any separate approval when disputes arises between 
NIOC and the foreign contractors. Thus, foreign investors can enjoy the flexibility to select a 
dispute settlement body189. 
Overall, this sub-chapter examined the impact of influential laws on the current mechanism 
of Iranian buyback, and accordingly demonstrated that the most applicable alternative for 
the future development of the model considering the current Constitutional prohibitions 
are employing the evolutionary approach rather than any shift to another model which 
allows the ownership of oil products by foreigners190. More importantly, analysing the 
Petroleum Laws, FIPPA and BITs highlights the shortcomings of the Iranian governing law of 
buyback which stems from the vagueness of the Act, and also points out the applicability of 
the evolutionary approach to remove such deficiencies within the model that demotivate 
foreign investors, whereas clear and certain laws can attract foreign contractors. As such, 
laws provide an advantage to foreign contractors in order to understand the function of 
laws and to anticipate the methods by which the laws will protect their investment191. 
Moreover, enacting more clear and less vague laws will minimise the risk of investing in 
Iran’s oil industry which is an important concern for foreign investors, as the contractor can 
estimate all probable legal situations during the operation of a project. Accordingly, for the 
sake of making the buyback more attractive Iran needs to enact, and revise the related laws, 
and the investment laws in particular, to provide more certainty and clearness, so that 
contractors can rely on those provisions and consider investing in Iran over other oil 
producing countries. In other words, Iran must guarantee the protection of international 
investors’ capital operating within petroleum market enacting clear and specific provisions. 
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This is the solution that this study proposes, in line with the evolutionary approach, in order 
to make the Iranian buyback more competitive, especially in times of price falls and when 
there is high competition amongst producers. 
 
3.5 Conclusion:  Inaccuracy of radical shift in future development of the model   
 
Analysing the legal anatomy of the Iranian buyback in this chapter demonstrated the 
constitutional prohibitions regarding foreign possession of Iranian energy sources, as well as 
set out reasons for the adoption of the Iranian buyback via relevant laws’ perspective. This 
model, which has stemmed from the idea of nationalising Iranian energy sources was in 
accordance with national interest protection application against foreign parties in 
petroleum deals. Such a nature in this chapter has been recognised as the root of many 
unnecessarily restrictive provisions in the current buyback, including a fixed rate of return, 
which created a significant financial risk for foreign contractors. Furthermore, examining the 
four generations of Iranian buyback proves the necessity of revising the model, an 
insufficiency of efforts that have been carried out for the aim of modernising the model, and 
more importantly the applicability of employing the evolutionary approach with a legal 
consideration of the buyback, and based on political realities to increase the efficiency of 
the model. Moreover, although a consideration of the effective laws on Iranian buyback 
illustrated that applying the revolutionary approach to shift towards any model that 
contains foreign ownership of oil products will be confronted by the constitutional 
prohibitions, there is a necessity to provide less ambiguous and more certain provisions in 
the related laws of Iranian buyback to minimise the legal risk for foreign contractors 
operating in Iranian oil fields. Hence, considering the legal anatomy of the buyback 
demonstrated the applicability of evolutionary reforms towards the future tendency of the 
model rather than any shift to another method. Consequently, this chapter by examining 
the Iranian buyback from a legal perspective showed the applicability and efficiency of 
choosing evolutionary reforms to revise the unattractive legal elements of the model, and 
accordingly make the model more competitive. Therefore, the fourth chapter of this study 
will utilise the analysed functions of the Iranian buyback to offer applicable reforms on the 
basis of the evolutionary approach that do not clash with any historical, political and legal 
concerns which have been considered in the first three chapters of this work. 
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Chapter 4: The Critical Dissection of Iranian Buyback: Employing the evolutionary 
approach  
 
4.1 Introduction: The necessity of improving the Iranian buyback 
A reduced worldwide economic growth, especially in China, an increase in the number of oil 
producers, such as the US and Brazil, and the failure of OPEC members to agree on a 
deduction of the rate of production resulted in an oversupply of oil in the global markets 
and subsequently resulted in declining the global price of petroleum production, as well 
creating a high level of competition amongst producers in the past five years. Moreover, the 
imposed EU, US and UN sanctions on Iran’s oil industry, in order to restrict the nuclear 
programme of Iran, significantly lessened the rate of Iranian oil production as the main 
source of the Iranian budget, due to the fact that investing in the Iranian oil industry on the 
basis of an unattractive model of buyback would not have any business visibility for foreign 
oil companies after the sanctions192. Accordingly, during the past five years Iran’s economy, 
and more particularly the Iranian oil industry, has suffered greatly, as a result of the above-
mentioned facts which made the Iranian government determined to actively attempt to 
attract foreign investment to the oil industry by offering a more attractive version of the 
buyback following the successful lifting of the nuclear sanctions. Furthermore, the necessity 
of offering a more attractive model of the buyback even before the imposition of the 
nuclear sanctions has been proved in the last chapter via an analysis of the four generations 
of buyback193, and more importantly the ineffectiveness of the employed reforms have 
been clarified, even though, such an analysis in the last chapter confirms the applicability of 
the evolutionary approach which has been chosen by this study regarding the future of the 
Iranian buyback.  
As a result, considering the massive need for Iran to improve the efficiency of its methods of 
oil transaction194 this chapter, following the recognition of the historical, political, geo-
political and legal concerns of buyback in the last three chapters of this study, highlights the 
evolutionary reforms as the applicable alternative for the future development of the model 
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193 M. Bunter, The Iranian Buy Back Agreement, OGEL Journal, Dundee Vol. 3 - issue 1, March 2005, P 6-8 
194 Alexander Brexendorff et al., ‘The Iranian Buy-Back Approach’ (2009) 7 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence (OGEL), P 9 
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and it will attempt to employ such an approach in order to provide the applicable reforms 
within the framework of the Iranian buyback to improve the function of the Iranian 
buyback. This is the gap in many similar researches on the issue of Iranian buyback, as they 
only examine the current mechanism of buyback including its shortcomings, while this study 
recognises the consideration of the models’ future tendencies as the final outcome of this 
work by offering a vast analysis of Iranian buyback. Therefore, this chapter, which is divided 
into eight sub-chapters, will highlight the deficiencies of the model from the perspective of 
both parties’ criticisms in the first sub-chapter and more importantly will offer applicable 
reforms on the basis of the evolutionary approach to cover their concerns, and accordingly 
make the model more competitive. The second, third and fourth sub-chapters will highlight 
the shortcomings of the model by carrying out a critical comparison of the Iranian buyback 
with production sharing agreements, service contracts and the international scheme of 
buyback respectively. Moreover, these three sub-chapters are designed to integrate the 
advantageous provisions of the above-mentioned models to the Iranian buyback that do not 
breach historical, political and legal barriers in Iran’s current situation to revise the 
unattractive provisions of the Iranian buyback. The fifth sub-chapter deals with the proposal 
of applying production sharing agreements for the northern oil fields of Iran to examine the 
applicability of this model in the current political and legal environment of Iran, and will 
clarify that any shift to another oil transaction method even regarding  a specific 
geographical area will confront serious barriers in Iran. Thus, such a revolutionary approach 
will not be applicable, particularly considering the time constraints for Iran to return to a 
strong position in the global oil markets. The influence of international sanctions on the 
Iranian oil industry will be dealt with in the sixth sub-chapter, and the dire need to remedy 
the adverse effects of such sanctions by utilising the evolutionary approach will be 
discussed. The influence of the recent nuclear deal which led to the lifting of the sanctions 
on the Iranian oil industry will be reviewed in the seventh sub-chapter, and it will be shown 
that Iran cannot reach its ambitious plans to increase its oil production, unless serious 
reforms have been done within the current framework of the model. The sub-chapter eight 
offers the comparison of the present buyback with a new version and will highlight the 
efficiency of the carried out changes. The last sub-chapter will deal with the issue of 
asymmetric data with regard to the shift of NIOCs customers from the EU to India and 
China, and confirms the crucial need of Iran to establish a research institute within NIOC to 
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organise and analyse the information with the aim of accelerating the process of oil 
production. 
 
 
4.2 Deficiencies of the Iranian Buyback Agreement: Criticisms of buyback from national 
and International party’s perspective 
The core concept of the Iranian buyback with its mechanism has been discussed in the last 
chapter of this work which demonstrated that the Iranian buyback’s mechanism could not 
compete with other common models in the region. This is because of the fact that the 
production rate of Iran did not increase in competition with its neighbors such as Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq which led to Iran’s position in OPEC as the third producer being replaced by 
Iraq195. Therefore, the Iranian buyback is not as attractive as other commonly used methods 
amongst oil producing countries which comprises the main question of this study, namely to 
discover effective alternatives for the present model. It should be noted that the long period 
in which the buyback has operated in Iran as the key element within the Iranian oil 
contractual legal framework has brought plenty of criticisms from both sides, which can be 
examined as a relevant source in order to highlight the deficiencies of the model and to 
analyse in order to increase the efficiency of the model. As a result, for the purpose of 
focusing on the issue of improving the nature, and subsequently enhancing the efficiency of 
the Iranian buyback in attracting foreign investments, it is essential to devote special 
attention to the criticisms voiced by international oil companies, as well as domestic parties, 
especially in this significant period after the lifting of sanctions, and when Iran is in dire need 
of attracting foreign investments to successfully return to the global oil market196 .  
Accordingly, this sub-chapter will consider the criticisms received by both parties in three 
distinct sections, named as the criticisms stemming from the contractual framework of 
buyback, the political considerations and the incomplete provisions of the model in order to 
highlight the shortcomings of the model, and more importantly to propose applicable 
solutions based on the evolutionary approach in order to respond to their complaints and 
making the model more attractive. 
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4.2.1 Contractual framework of buyback: Unnecessary restrictive provisions 
As has been analysed in the second chapter of this work, the exploitative nature of the 
concessions resulted in public discontent, nationalisation of the Iranian natural resources 
and subsequently the introduction of the buyback model which includes a harsh framework 
with restrictive provisions. In fact, the main tendency in the framework of the buyback is to 
support the national party against the foreign contractor which has been reflected in 
different provisions including the length of the contract, the cost estimation, fixed rate of 
return, distribution of the exploration and production stage, the registration of foreign 
companies in Iran, the regulation of insurance and employment and business preference 
regulations which all will be examined in this section. Therefore, this section will examine 
the deficiencies of the Iranian buyback in ten sub-sections to highlight the criticisms of both 
parties regarding the structure of buyback, and more importantly to offer applicable 
solutions to make the model more competitive by responding to the complaints of the 
parties. 
 
a) Length of contract:  Further risk for both parties’ interests 
As has been shown in the first chapter of this work, the long duration of the concessions 
which was in line with the exploitative nature of the concessions has played the main role in 
the short duration of the current buyback. Since the domestic party in the buyback contract 
intends to restrict its ownership responsibilities, the contract’s length would be shorter than 
the scope of the required effort which is only about seven to ten years, including extra 60 
months for the time of cover of fund. The risk to the limitation of the duration for IOCs is 
that the amount of extracted oil agreed on the contract may be broken in the event of an oil 
price fluctuation, before the IOC is fully compensated. Therefore, the short length of the 
contract has an important commercial risk for the international contractor of not being fully 
compensated for operating in Iranian oil fields197. 
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95 
 
On the other hand, from the NIOC’s perspective the short duration of buyback will raise the 
issue of the partial transferring of capital and technology for the proposed project, as the 
time limitation prevents NIOC from obtaining as much "new-tech" from the foreign partner 
as it should. In addition, the application of the "new tech" could have its greatest benefit for 
NOIC within time of declining stage operation which foreign partner had left the project198.   
More importantly, the short length of the contract cannot offer any incentive to either NIOC 
or IOC for operating the high performance of the field as Statoil’s Representative expressed 
that "some incentives are needed in buyback. If you do a good job you should be awarded 
and if you do a bad job there should be no more cooperation199." Accordingly, the short 
duration of the buyback is one of the unnecessary restrictive provisions of buyback which 
acts against the interests of both the national and international party, and subsequently has 
been criticised from the perspective of both the domestic and foreign party, as they both 
intend to maximally exploit Iran's natural resources through selling product when the 
project is under maximum operation of the contractor. The solution which has been 
suggested by some researches to cover the shortcoming of the duration in buyback, and 
ensure that the contractor is fully compensated is by applying the term of ‘carry over’ which 
allow oil contractors to obtain more amount of product when the provisional quantity is not 
sufficient200.However, this solution will require extra negotiations in order to ensure that 
such provisions' existed in the contract which will increase the bureaucracy of establishing 
the buyback. Establishing a couple of following agreements for enabling IOCs for using the 
previous project assets for purpose of financing the latter contract is another solution to 
cover the limitation of the contractual duration, and create a financial incentive for both 
parties. However, this study by following the evolutionary approach claims that this 
component of buyback essentially needs to be revised, due to the fact that the principle of 
deals easiness is applicable for decreasing expenses, as well as required period of finalizing a 
petroleum deal. Consequently, the solution which present study offers in accordance to the 
evolutionary approach is increasing the duration of the buyback based on the carried out 
mutual geological studies of the field capacity, precise estimation of the required operation 
of the field, the reasonable time to maximizing the production rate and fully transferring of 
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technology besides the contractor’s proposal regarding the length of contract to determine 
the appropriate duration of each buyback agreement. Such scheme will motivate the 
contractor to utilise its highest technology and efforts to exceed the rate of production, as 
well as enable the national side to enjoy the complete transfer of technology. Noticeably, 
this reform, which will respond to the significant deficiency of the buyback by providing the 
required response for parties’ criticism, will make the buyback more attractive with no clash 
with any current legal prohibitions in the political, legal and historical atmosphere of the 
country; moreover, it supports the interest of NIOC by providing adequate time for the aim 
of transferring the technology.  
 
b) Cost estimation: No Financial vision 
The basis of the buyback contracts requires the IOC to precisely document all costs and 
possible returns from the certain field, which will be subsequently utilised as the main 
source of evaluation of compensation201. This provision which has been showed in the first 
two chapters of this work stemmed from the unbalanced terms of the concessions 
particularly regarding the income of the parties which results in a further unnecessary risk 
for the IOC. This is because of the fact that it is difficult for IOC to precisely predict a number 
of factors such as the required time for production, the extent of oil reserves, production 
expenses and productivity rates. Moreover, an additional risk will occur when the project 
costs are greater compared to original estimation which make petroleum corporations 
responsible for covering differences. Furthermore, events outside petroleum corporations’ 
estimation including radical changes in oil prices may lead to the creation of serious 
difficulties for IOCs, as they are obliged to use a limited amount of oil in order to cover the 
expenditures and agreed return202. Therefore, since the Iranian buyback contract did not 
take such commercial contingencies to the concern, it failed to apply the consistent 
arbitrational settlement that can motivate overseas participation. As a result, the provision 
regarding the necessity of the cost estimation before the beginning of the production 
activities burdens another risk on the contractor in the buyback agreement. In fact, the 
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strategy of the current buyback is regarding the cost estimation issue is applying closed 
capex which can be a great risk for contractors in the event of increasing the prices. 
However, this study for the purpose of removing such risk proposes the idea of open capex 
in order to allow the contractor to provide the cost estimation for every step of the 
production activity. Hence, the unnecessarily restrictive provisions of pre-cost estimation, 
which does not have any commercial point will be changed to a continuous cost estimation 
that can remove the risk in favour of the foreign contractor, as well as provide a more 
precise and realistic estimation for the NIOC with no breach of any legal prohibitions. 
 
c) Fixed rate of return: Vulnerability of parties in the event of the oil price fluctuation 
A fixed rate of return is an adverse policy in upstream operations from both parties’ 
perspective, as it cannot contain the change of oil price which forces another risk on parties. 
This provision, similar to the provision of the cost estimation which has been shown in the 
second chapter, stems from the concern of Iranians to an unbalance in the profit of the 
parties in the concessionary deals which now creates a bias term against the foreign 
contractor. In fact, the result of applying this provision is that the IOCs may not use their 
highest techniques in facilitating further discoveries to improve the performance of the total 
returns from the field203, as the rate of return is the same at the end of the production 
activities. Moreover, the IOC argued that the negative movement of the oil market means 
that the fixed quantity of explored oil may not be adequate for repaying project costs and 
the agreed return rate204 which is the vital financial risk for the operator. However, unlike 
the IOC’s claim, the NIOC asserts that there is no actual price risk on IOCs which discourages 
IOCs to improve the efficiency of the operation, owing to the fact that the NIOC's liability for 
price reduction will be drastic in the event of these radical changes occur, as the National 
Iranian Oil Company has to offer a higher quantity of oil to accomplish the reimbursement 
provision205. In fact, the fixed rate of return also creates a risk for the NIOC, particularly in 
the situation of the price fluctuation, as it has to compensate the contractor, even if it could 
not generate the income.  
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The solution of the present study for this unattractive provision is enacting a flexible rate of 
return based on the potential production rate of the field, cost estimation of the contractor 
and the price of oil in the global market which can be integrated from the PSA model. In this 
scenario the flexible rate of return will be a more attractive provision for the foreign 
contractor, as well as ensuring the national interest of the NIOC by minimising the above-
mentioned risks without breaching any legal, political and historical concerns.  
 
d) Distribution of exploration and production stages: Lack of financial incentive 
The exploration rights under the buyback depends on the commercial discovery. As has 
been mentioned in the third chapter, the legal framework of the Iranian buyback has been 
framed in favour of the national interest. Therefore, the exploration rights have been 
divided from the production rights in order to grant more bargaining power to the NIOC to 
select different contractors with more favourable conditions for different phases of the 
project. On the contrary, this provision includes a damaging effect for the Iranian side, as it 
creates longer negotiations and a higher level of bureaucracy for different phases with 
different contractors which will lead to a long delay in conducting the production activities 
which will result in a loss of benefits for both parties in the buyback. Although the priority of 
the contractor of the discovered block to conduct the development activities is recognised 
under the buyback, NIOC is able to reject the terms of the proposed offer, as it is not 
obliged to accept the IOC’s request on the basis of its granted discretionary powers. The 
effect of this provision is demotivating foreign investors from participating in the Iranian oil 
industry, due to the fact that they are informed that they might be excluded from the 
project after the discovery phases. In fact, IOCs are not guaranteed any other further rights 
which acts to discourage IOCs from investing in the Iranian fields.206 The reform that this 
study suggests, based on the evolutionary approach, is changing this provision to oblige the 
NIOC to offer the production stage to any contractor that has made a larger discovery in the 
quickest time. Such a change does not breach any legal prohibitions, and will shift the 
unattractive term of the buyback to a financial incentive which serves the benefit of both 
parties in the contract, as the production activities will begin quicker.  
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e) Registration of foreign companies in Iran: Bureaucratic processes  
As has been mentioned in the second chapter of this work the main tendency in the 
formation of the Iranian buyback provision is defending the national interest of Iranians in 
petroleum deals which is the direct result of the exploitative concessions. Therefore, the 
Constitutional principle of Iran which deals with operation, as well as foreign business’s 
registration has207 banned the registering, and conducting of foreign businesses inside the 
Iranian territory. This Article states that the establishment of companies or institutions for 
the purpose of trade, manufacturing, farming, technologies or energy sources discovery 
inside Iran by foreigners is absolutely forbidden. Therefore, the solution of non-Iranian 
businesses willing for operation within Iranian oil industry is to establish the firm beyond 
the country of Iran in order to consequently nominate an authorized branch inside Iranian 
borders for the only aim to conduct concluded deal with Iranian partner. However, a careful 
consideration of this constitutional prohibition demonstrates that the proposed solution to 
establish the firm beyond the Iranian territory for nominating an authorized branch inside 
Iranian borders will increase level of bureaucracy for any legal actions which is one of the 
undesired features of the Iranian buyback that results in a loss of commercial benefits for 
both parties in the buyback agreement, as it burdens unnecessary expenses on the parties, 
and also creates delays in the development of the project.  
The reform that this study proposes is based on the evolutionary approach towards buyback 
and allows the foreign company to establish a branch in Iran, while it requires the foreign 
company to devote a certain percentage of the company’s equity to the Iranian 
Government in return of enjoying the tax reduction. This is because of the fact that such 
flexible interpretation of the Constitution can be applied if the government has equity in the 
company, so that, the company will not be considered as a foreign entity. This solution does 
not clash with the above-mentioned Constitutional prohibitions, moreover, the government 
can observe the functions of the foreign company for the purpose of protecting the 
interests of Iranians, and more importantly, the level of bureaucracy in buyback projects will 
be significantly decreased, which is in the favour of both parties’ interests.  
 
                                                 
207 http://www.oefre.unibe.cMaw/icl/irOOt_.html access on 2013 
 
100 
 
f) Regulation of insurance: Unfair obligation for foreign contractor 
Basically, the high value of the structures and machinery being employed in oil and gas 
projects requires significant insurance protections in order to prevent uncompensated 
damage to the bundle of risks208. The Iranian buyback, regarding the issue of insurance 
focuses on local solutions provided under the wing of NIOC rather than foreign parties. This 
position which has been shown in the second chapter of this study stemmed from the 
nationalisation event that aimed to obtain the full independence of all oil and gas related 
activities via nationalising the entire process of oil exports. Article 12 of the Iranian buyback 
defines a general obligation for the contractor to preserve insurance coverage or, if it is 
easier, for NIOC to offer insurance coverage at the contractor's cost by stating that the 
contractor shall uphold insurance coverage in amounts needed, and NIOC can use choice of 
offering such coverage on IOC’s expenses which will not be higher compared to price of 
market elsewhere209.  
Accordingly, this provision is in line with the essence of the Iranian buyback which aims to 
serve the interest of Iranian insurance companies, and subsequently the national Iranian 
interest which can be in contrast with the benefits of foreign companies, as they might find 
a better deal offered by non-Iranian companies. In fact, such a bias provision towards the 
favor of NIOC makes the shape of the model unattractive to foreign contractors by 
burdening unfair obligations on them which creates a financial risk for the foreign party. The 
reform that this study suggests, according to the evolutionary approach is shifting this unfair 
obligation to a financial incentive such as offering tax reductions to any foreign contractor 
that signs the insurance contracts with Iranian insurers. As a result, applying this reform 
which does not breach any current legal prohibitions in Iran, can ensure the Iranian 
government’s objective of supporting the national insurance companies; as well as changing 
this unattractive provision of the buyback to an attractive provision by removing the 
mentioned obligation and offering some financial incentives.  
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g) Employment and business preference regulation: Forcing the foreign contractor to 
employ Iranian workers  
The lack of expertise and technology as has been discussed in the second chapter of this 
work were the two main reasons which resulted in the collapse of the Nationalist 
Government. Moreover, economy situation of the country are deeply related to global price 
of petroleum product, as well as government's capability of exporting them. Such oil 
domination negatively impacts on the country's economy, as development of other 
industries other than petroleum for the purpose of commercial weakness reduction is also 
dependent on the oil industry210. Therefore, the issue of local content, and in particular 
providing sufficient expertise, has been reflected in the current mechanism of buyback by 
provisions regarding transferring the technical expertise from the foreign contractor to the 
Iranian workers. As a result, NIOC mandates particular employment ratios and preferences 
in order to conduct the transfer of technical expertise by 'on the job' training of Iranians 
together with foreign specialists. Article 13 of the Iranian buyback contract draft establishes 
a preference for the employment of Iranian nationals by foreign companies in projects 
related to the buyback contract which is aimed at benefiting Iranian workers, and 
subsequently the Iranian economy by reducing unemployment rates, and generating 
income for the country.  Article 13.1 expresses that the IOCs must priorities the local 
workers to engage to the operation of projects, and also limiting non Iranian employment 
rate for jobs that experienced local workers do not existed211. Moreover, for employing 
foreign personnel in Iranian fields, the foreign company is obliged to show that a foreign 
worker contains special knowledge which do not existed within Iranian workers. As a result, 
the final goal of the article is ultimately substituting foreign personnel by Iranian employees. 
Further to the above mentioned provisions which are focused on employing Iranian people 
by foreign contractors, Article 24 relates to the business involvement of foreign parties with 
Iranian companies, especially regarding purchasing equipment by expressing that the 
contractor shall employ the service of Iranian companies in line with terms of highest 
utilisation of national products during operation activities regarding Iranian law212.  
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Accordingly, these above-mentioned provisions are intended to protect the national interest 
of Iranians in the concept of local content by employing Iranian workers, creating skilled 
technicians and engaging the national companies with foreign contractors. However, 
passing such legislation which favours the Iranian side in buyback contracts will not support 
the Iranian governments’ objectives of developing the national economy, as this legislation 
will act to discourage the foreign contractors from investing in the Iranian oil industry by 
forcing them to fulfil such requirements213. Therefore, the forcing nature of these provisions 
which is in contrary to the principle of party autonomy as the essence of any agreement, is 
an unattractive element of the Iranian buyback. This study offers to apply an evolutionary 
reform in this regard by awarding financial rewards for any contractor that employs Iranian 
people or carries out business with Iranian companies. This reform will remove the biased 
obligation of foreign contractors as a financial risk, and subsequently revise the unattractive 
feature of the above-mentioned provisions. Moreover, from the Iranian perspective, this 
reform will support the position of the Iranian government in its attempt to provide expert 
workers, boost the Iranian companies’ businesses and subsequently develop the national 
economy via absorbing more foreign investment into the country. 214Consequently, fulfilling 
such a change can make the model more competitive with other mechanisms in attracting 
investors by shifting the bias obligation to a financial incentive with no need to either shift 
towards another method or by breaching any legal and political prohibition. 
 
h) Taxation of foreign entities: High level of confusion as a result of bureaucratic processes 
Considering the buyback model as a method of financial transaction to develop a certain oil 
field shows the importance of examining the issue of taxation of foreign oil contractors in 
Iran. This is because of the fact that the topic of taxation is in the heart of every fiscal 
system which can determine the commercial viability of the contract. Thus, the high cost of 
oil production activities, as well as the IOC’s intention to boost their revenue demonstrates 
the necessity of analysing the Iranian regime of taxation regarding foreign oil companies 
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which influences on the attractiveness of the Iranian buyback. Providing clear laws which 
include financial incentives for foreign contractors can make the model more attractive. 
The main Iranian legislation which deals with the issue of taxation of foreign companies is 
the Iranian version of buyback. This legislation essentially stems from the Rules of Direct 
Taxation of 1989 as a major law to govern the process of taxation of all companies, 
partnership and legal entities. Generally, the Iranian tax regime will apply to the entire 
income of companies registered inside the country, as well as foreign companies' income if 
it is received from Iran or earned in Iran215. However, for the aim of absorbing international 
investors to certain areas, including development of oil and gas fields, the Iranian taxation 
system provides some tax privileges such as exemption and deductions for foreign 
investments in mining, and other related activities which are mentioned in the relevant 
articles of the Iranian version of buyback. 
Article 8.1 of the Iranian version of the buyback model explained that: All national company 
revenue tax and payment for Community Safety shall be paid via a Foreign Investors too; 
however, NIOC shall compensate a foreign contractor with an amount representing such 
charges216.  
Although compensating the contractor for losses imposed, as a result of local taxation, can 
act as a financial incentive for foreign contractors to invest in Iran’s oil industry, it seems 
that the main reason for establishing such a mechanism is preventing public dissatisfaction 
with the foreigners’ tax free regime, due to the fact that based on this mechanism, the 
government can propose that taxes are payable by the foreign company as well as domestic 
companies, while their eventual compensation will be difficult to notice. In fact, this article 
sets an unnecessarily long mechanism to deal with the issue of taxation which results in 
creating confusion for foreign contractors, and also increases the level of bureaucracy in the 
buyback. Moreover, this article undermines the national interest by exempting all foreign 
contractors working in the oil industry from taxation which is against the objectives of the 
Iranian government to boost its economy. Although the government should ensure some 
financial incentives in the fiscal system of the buyback, it does not necessarily mean that it 
should deny its primary task in regard to the nation. Therefore, this article which was 
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intended to offer financial incentives to foreign investors by fully exempting them from 
paying tax caused some commercially unattractive result for both parties. 
Article 8.2217 placed limitations on the level of compensation to ensure that tax returns on 
activities conducted outside the country which did not have commercial benefits for Iran is 
not included in the compensation payable by NIOC. The article expresses that contractors 
are not allowed to cover tax charges, energy expenses, payments and charges on the 
revenue obtained beyond the country that have to be compensated via NIOC218. This article 
has to be considered in line with the previous provision, as it is attempting to limit the 
general extent of the previous article’s mechanism which is the result of the lack of a clear 
and specific law regarding foreign companies’ taxation. Setting such provisions decrease the 
level of legal clarity which makes the model unattractive for foreign investors, as it causes 
confusion amongst them.  
Article 25 of Iranian version of buyback rules that for the purpose of not bearing the 
contractor undue burden NIOC will pay for any custom duties on the import. Article 25.1 
expresses that: Tools and stuff that do not existed inside the country can be delivered on 
the behalf of NIOC, and all import taxes duties that are conducted via the supplier should be 
compensated by NIOC as non-capital expenses. This principle, similar to article 8.1, provides 
an unnecessary mechanism to deal with custom duty. This mechanism, as has been 
mentioned above, is bureaucratic and vague which will disappoint foreign investors. 
Moreover, providing the privilege of custom duty exemption for foreign contractors, it 
seems completely in favour of the foreign party, while the government can wisely use it as a 
financial incentive for any company that deserves to enjoy this right219. 
Overall, the issue of taxation of foreign oil companies operating in Iranian fields seems to 
need more concern to reform, as the third oil producer country in OPEC suffers from lack of 
a clear, certain and specific law regarding the taxation of foreign entities working in its oil 
industry. Having analysed the relevant articles clarify the vague bureaucratic mechanism 
that has been created in conjunction with old civil law which certainly cannot respond the 
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need of the country to boost the economy through encouraging the foreign investors to 
invest in Iran’s fields220. As a result, the solution which this study offers, in line with the 
evolutionary approach is abolishing the taxing of foreign companies working in Iranian oil 
industry, due to the fact that it is fully paid back, thus, there is no point to tax them, and in 
addition, such abolishment will remove the bureaucratic procure of receiving and paying 
back the tax. Moreover, this work proves that it is possible to make a fine balance between 
the aims of Iran’s government’s, boosting the economy, and increasing the attractiveness of 
the model by removing the tax, and accordingly providing a financial incentive as has been 
discussed in the previous section. 
  
i) Legal concerns regarding land and resources: Lack of any environmental concerns  
Assuring the success of the development of the oil fields requires the interaction with the 
land being used in the operation. In other words, as the relevant activities to produce oil has 
to be carried out on the land via drilling wells, it seems essential to consider the governing 
law of buyback regarding the land which will be used in the operation.  Noticeably, the more 
precise provisions in this regard can diminish the legal difficulty of foreign contractors for 
the operation of the field which subsequently will make the model more attractive221. 
Article 5 of the Iranian version of the buyback model222 deals with such rights which are 
exercisable by NIOC to ensure that there is no limit for NIOC in using the land while the 
contract is in force. This right has been fully granted to NIOC, as all natural resources are 
nationalised. Thus, private ownership of them is illegal and NIOC is the only authorised 
entity that can manage the operation of the fields. The article states that ‘NIOC should 
conduct all essential observation, administration, and use absolute rights for employing the 
contractual terms excluding those action which will stop or delay the conducting of the 
progress of the project’. Therefore, NIOC which has been granted the full right to use the 
land for the purpose of the operation of the field will authorise the foreign contractor by 
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signing the buyback agreement to employ the land in order to develop the project223. This 
article by granting full permission to NIOC in using the land for the operation denies any 
concern to limit this right in the case of misusing the right such as damaging the land. 
Presumably, this article could limit or even deprive the NIOC’s rights if any harmful activities 
happened with regard to the land. In fact, this article does not consider any environmental 
concerns relating to the employing of the land in operating the field such as constructing 
the instalments which can potentially have a harmful effect for the environment.  
Article 6 of the Iranian version of buyback in an attempt to minimise the high risks of the 
foreign party allows them to make requests for aid from NIOC, and also obliges NIOC to fulfil 
them. Article 6.1 expresses that: ‘Land and water that sensibly are essential for IOCs to 
develop the project should be supplied via NIOC, and placed at the disposal of the 
contractor. The purchase prices shall be either remunerated by NIOC or encompassed in the 
petroleum costs if paid by the contractor’224.Nevertheless, this article creates an ambiguous 
criteria of 'reasonability' in obligation to NIOC to provide aid for foreign contractors. This 
criteria is vague, as it may potentially be interpreted by NIOC to deny assistance if it is 
recognised as inconvenient. Therefore, this Article may only be seen as window-dressing in 
most instances, especially where helping would be expensive, even though the article 
explicitly defines NIOC's responsibilities for supplying supplementary resources in the form 
of land and water to the foreign investors. 
The two articles illustrating the legal concerns about the land and necessary resources to 
operate the field are confusingly general and ambiguous which will lead to bureaucratic 
process, and subsequently disappoint the foreign investors. As a result, the features of 
these provisions are part of the unattractive elements of the Iranian buyback that has to be 
reformed for the purpose of encouraging the foreign investors after the lifting of the 
sanctions.  
The solution for these unattractive elements of the model in compliance with the approach 
chosen in this study is providing the provisions with a higher level of clarity and novelty to 
respond to the increasing need of the model to have specific, certain and clear governing 
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laws. Regarding article 5, it should be changed to determine the limits of NIOC’s right in 
using the land, and more importantly to consider the environmental concerns about the 
operation of the field.  Moreover, removing the criteria of reasonability can make the 
provision more certain, as the intention of the article is to oblige NIOC to provide necessary 
aid for contractors to operate in the field.  
 
j) Administration of field operation: Ambiguous process of substituting the chairman 
 
Basically, bureaucracy is one of the undesired features of the Iranian buyback, practically 
with regard to managing the project. This feature which absorbs many criticisms from both 
sides can result into a loss of commercial benefits for both parties in the buyback 
agreement, as it burdens unnecessary expenses for parties and delays in developing the 
project. Therefore, providing clear, certain and precise governing laws can eliminate this 
deficiency, and encourage the investors to work in Iranian fields225. 
Nevertheless, the solution offered by the Iranian version of buyback to minimise the effects 
of the bureaucracy, as well as avoiding conflicts is the creation of an overseeing body. Such 
an overseeing body which is created based on Article 17 is supposed to govern the 
arrangement of the Joint Management Committee which observes the development of 
projects. Article 17.1 expresses that the JMC includes 5 nominates from both sides, whereby 
NIOC shall perform as the head of Joint Management Committee for the first 12 months, 
afterwards, the head of Joint Management Committee should substitute yearly amid others. 
Accordingly, based on the above Article, NIOC is granted the supplementary bargaining 
power, as well as control of the project in the first year, however, as the chairmanship will 
substitute between participants, it encourages both participants to preserve the current 
environment of mutual cooperation.  
Although this article was intended to deal with the undesired bureaucratic mechanism of 
the buyback in managing the project, it seems that the provisions failed to solve the 
problem, as the article is not clear about the process of substituting the chairman which can 
result into further disagreement between parties, and subsequently creates more 
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bureaucracy. This flaw stems from a lack of clarity in this process that needs to be revised 
through the evolutionary approach to enact clear, specific and certain governing laws which 
can make the model more attractive by minimising the effect of bureaucracy226. It is 
noteworthy that achieving the major aim of the new Iranian government to attract 
investment to develop its petroleum industry is not possible in the lack of a clear, fair and 
neutral legal provisions which are the foundation of every business model looking for 
investments. Therefore, Iran is in dire need to revise its governing law of buyback to make 
the model more attractive, as the country is under pressure of a price fall in oil, as well as 
high competition from oil producers in both the sense of economy and politics.  
 
k) Issue of flexibility in the Iranian model of buyback: non-modernised legal framework as 
a result of the pre-arranged version of buyback  
 
Flexibility is the main financial tool for generating an improved system which is intended to 
reconcile the conflicting interests of both the host government and the foreign investor by 
establishing and maintaining a long term plan agreement. Moreover, flexibility as a key 
element for stabilisation of the fiscal regime consists of a process of adapting the changes, 
as well as adjusting possible fluctuations in the system.227 Therefore, adaptability and 
capability of an adjustment in the regime is the criteria to assess its flexible mechanism. As a 
result, from the early concession periods, host governments and IOCs have been offering 
flexible mechanisms in petroleum contracts to avoid parties from the rigidity of 
renegotiating the terms and conditions of the contracts because of the inevitable changes in 
circumstances such as rising or falling unit costs, product prices and economic rent. The 
approaches applied by countries to adjust the fiscal regime in order to adapt to changing 
circumstances vary from a contractual system to another one based on the sort of model in 
operation, such as a concessionary mechanism, production sharing agreement, or service 
contract regime. However, regardless of the differences involved in regimes, all of them are 
following the same goal which is increasing the possibility of the profitability of the fields to 
convince IOCs at the exploration stage to apply a high performance that can result in a 
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commercially viable discovery. Therefore, financial incentives particularly in fiscal packages 
may guarantee additional bargaining power for the host government.  Accordingly, the main 
feature of a stable fiscal regime is the capability of the regime to survive what is known as 
flexibility in fiscal policy228. The Iranian buyback model, in particular, from the perspective of 
IOCs is considered one of the toughest oil and gas arrangements in the petroleum industry. 
This outcome is the direct result of applying the out of date provisions which are based on 
the historical views of Iranians towards the issue of oil deals. Such provisions as offered as 
part of the fixed draft to govern the relationship of NIOC and the contractors are not 
flexible, create restrictions for IOCs and subsequently demotivate them from participating in 
the Iranian oil sector. Offering the pre-arranged and solid model of buyback to all IOCs 
operating in different fields of the Iranian oil sector is the main element of inflexibility of the 
Iranian buyback which results in discouraging the IOCs, as the proposed contract might not 
ensure their interests in petroleum deals and it can lead to the bureaucratic process of 
negotiation and arbitration which also results in a loss of the national party’s interest 
because of the delay in the beginning of the field operation, even though offering the pre-
arranged draft aims to protect the national interest of Iranians in petroleum deals229. 
Therefore, this study, in order to evaluate the level of the buyback’s attraction, proposes 
that the terms of every buyback should be mutually arranged on the basis of a pre-study of 
the field capacity, the contractor’s technical and financial situation, and the required 
activities to maximise the level of the production. This suggestion will ensure the flexibility 
of the model framework, minimise the potential future disputes, and subsequently offer the 
most attractive form of Iranian buyback which can compete with other used forms of 
petroleum agreements230. 
Overall, this section considered the criticisms arising with regard to the contractual 
framework of buyback from both the domestic and international view. It has been clarified 
that although the above-mentioned provision’s goal were protecting national side benefits, 
they act against the interests of the foreign party and also have an adverse influence on the 
Iranian side, as they all are unnecessarily restrictive which impede the aim of encouraging 
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foreign investment into the country. Therefore, to protect the national interest of Iran in 
petroleum deals, as well as to reach the goal of Iran in increasing its rate of production after 
the lifting of the sanctions by attracting foreign investments, it is vital to modernise the 
buyback by reforming its provisions to make it more attractive. For the sake of this aim, this 
study has employed the evolutionary approach in order to revise the required terms of 
buyback that have been criticised from both sides in order to increase the efficiency of the 
model by responding to the criticisms. Further to the criticisms resulting from the 
contractual framework of buyback, the political considerations in Iran’s political 
environment have created some shortcomings for the buyback that have resulted in a 
decrease of the level of international companies’ participation in the Iranian oil industry 
which will be analysed in the following section of this sub-chapter. 
 
 
4.2.2 The unstable political considerations: Lack of legal certainty 
As has been clarified in the second chapter of this work the Iranian buyback is the product 
of the nationalisation movement which stemmed from political considerations.  Therefore, 
it is defenseless regarding changes in politics’ atmosphere which led to low rate of 
foreseeability in comparison with other petroleum models231. The vulnerability of the 
Iranian buyback contracts has been created as a result of rapid changes in government 
policies, and legislation passed by Parliament which degrades the level of protection for 
IOC's legal and financial stance as has been analysed in the last chapter regarding the 
deficiencies of the FIPPA232.  
An example for adverse effect of rapid political changes on the buyback in the 
contemporary history of Iran is the shifting of power from the Reformists to the 
Conservatives which led to a great changes in the strategy of the country regarding the oil 
industry. While the Reformists supported foreign involvement in the oil industry, and 
subsequently many oil projects including South Pars were granted to international oil 
companies, the Conservatives limited the participation of foreigners in the oil industry, and 
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consequently many oil projects were granted to domestic oil companies233. Accordingly, 
these inconsistent strategies regarding the oil industry have been created by different 
political considerations, and impose the burden of legal uncertainty regarding the buyback 
on international oil companies operating in the Iranian fields, as they are not able to either 
rely on the legal strategy of the Iranian government or foresee the tendency of the Iranian 
governing laws of buyback enacted by the Parliament. Moreover, this legal uncertainty 
resulting from the change in the political environment of Iran creates a great confusion for 
the contractual parties which necessitates extra negotiations that result in a loss of both 
parties’ interests by delaying the operation of the project. Hence, this study on the basis of 
the evolutionary approach, and in order to prevent these adverse political effects on the 
model suggests that Iranian officials need to define the obligatory strategy to develop Iran’s 
petroleum sector independent from political parties which includes the precise regulations 
regarding the Iranian buyback, and more importantly cannot be changed by different 
political parties in regards to their fundamentals. Applying this reform will remove a great 
deficiency of the model, respond to the criticisms of IOCs, and allow IOCs to rely on the 
Iranian petroleum legal system which will make the model more attractive. The last section 
of this sub-chapter will examine the adverse influence of the unclear legal obligations of the 
Iranian buyback on its efficiency, and will attempt to respond to this complaint by 
recommending a revision of the model. 
 
 
4.2.3 Unclear legal obligations of buyback contact: Separate negotiations and more 
complicated bureaucracy 
It has been demonstrated in the third chapter that the Iranian governing law of buyback 
suffers from a lack of certainty and clarity which burdens an important legal risk on the 
foreign contractor. In addition to the above-mentioned adverse effects of uncertain and 
unclear laws, they require conducting separate negotiations, due to several necessary 
provisions such as the protection provisions for IOCs, and the bidding process requirements 
do not existed within the default system of the buyback agreement. These issues which 
require additional negotiations will result in more bureaucracy, and slower progress in 
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regards to NIOC which is against the interests of the parties, as some of these decisions 
must be made in a speedy manner234. Therefore, as the terms of the buyback are inflexible, 
and subsequently cannot be changed based on the different circumstances, both parties 
have to predict change of circumstances which requires additional negotiations. 235 
Accordingly, the effect of the unclear legal provisions of buyback will be extensive 
negotiations, and a high level of bureaucracy which would result in a loss in the speed of 
finalising the deal, beginning the field operations, and subsequently overall economic 
efficiency. In particular, the Bangistan proposal via BP led to different offers including 16-25 
years operation of the field instead of determined length of 60 months buyback draft. As a 
result, most oil companies in Iran agreed on the fact that "We would definitely prefer things 
to happen more quickly" however "Iran is a country with a complicated political and social 
structure with a lot of checks and balances236." This comment is a product of the redundant 
bureaucratic system which has been created by both NIOC and the Ministry of Oil, as they 
duplicate each other’s work without the necessary responsibility and transparency. 
Consequently, this section highlights the importance of providing a comprehensive 
governing law to legally manage the parties’ rights and obligations. However, as the Iranian 
governing law in this regard is incomplete and unclear, the attractiveness of the model 
decreases. This is because the unclear legal provisions prevent the foreign contractor from 
relying on the governing law, and subsequently forces both parties to conduct separate 
negotiations. This delay which is created by unnecessary negotiations and bureaucracy is 
harmful for the interests of both the national and international party, as it postpones the 
production of the field. The reform that this study advises after the lifting of the sanctions is 
to attract foreign investments in the oil industry by establishing a special institute which 
offers legal consultancy to NIOC in order to prepare clear, comprehensive and precise 
provisions to govern the buyback. Otherwise, the return of Iran to the global oil market with 
its current governing laws of the buyback will not be in the near future with especially 
because of the current high competition amongst oil producers. 
In summary, this sub-chapter dealt with the criticisms of the Iranian buyback from both the 
national and international perspectives, and showed that they stemmed from the 
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contractual framework of the model, political considerations and the incomplete legal 
provisions of the model. Moreover, the consideration of the three sections of this sub-
chapter demonstrated that although, as mentioned in the second chapter of this work, the 
buyback model has been designed to protect the interests of Iran, the existing criticisms 
from the national party proves the economic inefficiency of the model which requires 
necessary revisions of the Iranian buyback237. Further to analysing the deficiencies of the 
buyback, this sub-chapter offered solutions for the criticisms examining the effectiveness of 
the evolutionary approach in revising the existing method of transaction. In fact, this study 
proves the applicability and efficiency of the evolutionary approach as the future alternative 
in modernising the Iranian buyback without any clash with the current obstacles. Following 
the consideration of the parties’ criticisms, and providing solutions for them, the critical 
comparison of the Iranian buyback with the Production Sharing Agreement mechanism 
which is offered in the next sub-chapter will complete the process of highlighting and 
reforming the shortcomings of the buyback with the aim of introducing a more attractive 
version of the buyback subsequent to the lifting of the sanctions. 
 
4.3 Iranian Buyback in comparison with Production Sharing Agreement: No Commercial 
Viability but in compliance with the essence of nationalisation event  
As the second chapter of this work discussed, the public discontent towards the 
concessionary contracts led to the nationalisation of Iranian natural recourses, and 
subsequently the introduction of the current model of the Iranian buyback. Although the 
production sharing agreement model could cover the national interests of Iran in petroleum 
deals, during its short period of operation in the history of Iran’s oil industry238, the strong 
public feeling against the ownership of the oil product by foreigners, which led to the 
nationalisation event, as well as the aggravation of the economic inequality between 
Iranians, which led to the 1979 Islamic Revolution, fundamentally changed the petroleum 
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contractual scheme of the Iranian oil industry to the buyback239. Accordingly, as the Iranian 
buyback has been analysed from both parties’ perspective in the last sub-chapter, and the 
necessary reforms have been prescribed, this sub-chapter will attempt to highlight the 
deficiencies of the model stemming from the critical comparison between the Iranian 
buyback and the Production Sharing Agreement mechanism in four sections in order to 
adopting the advantageous provisions of the PSA with the aim of making the Iranian 
buyback more attractive.  
The production sharing agreement model and the Iranian buyback contract are clearly 
similar in certain aspects. In both types of legal arrangements, whilst the IOC is the 
contractor in charge of performing the operations according to the agreed terms of the 
contract, the host country conducts the management control of the project. Moreover, the 
host government maintains the entire possession to the discovery inside land during 
condition of operation. Nevertheless, it provides the IOC with a method for remunerated 
hydrocarbons as proven oil reserves. Under both sorts of arrangements the contractor is 
required to supply all necessary capital, equipment, technology and skills, as well as bearing 
the risk of discovery, as well as operation for each approved work program. Nevertheless, 
critical comparison of the two models also illustrates the differences between the Iranian 
buyback and the Production Sharing Agreement which are highlighted below:  
 
 
a) Duration of contract: Inadequate period to maximise the operation of the field under 
buyback 
As has been mentioned in the last sub-chapter the short duration of the Iranian buyback is a 
response to the long length of the concessions previously granted, and is designed to 
protect the national interests of Iran in petroleum deals240. This relatively short length which 
is about 5-8 years is not an adequate period within the international energy contractual 
framework, particularly regarding the operation of NG. However, the PSA by offering a long 
term agreement which is about 20-25 years provides more motivations to international oil 
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companies for preparing for maximizing the field’s lifetime241. As has been demonstrated in 
the last sub-chapter, this restrictive provision of the Iranian buyback which is against the 
benefits of both parties can be reformed by increasing the length of the contract based on 
the pre study of the field and the estimated size of the discovered block. The reform that 
this study proposes, in accordance with the evolutionary approach, will present a more 
attractive form of the Iranian buyback to international oil companies.  
 
b) Transfer of technological skills: High limitation for NIOC to achieve the latest 
technology  
It was mentioned in the third chapter that the Iranian governments’ position in regards to 
the buyback was the nationalisation of the whole process of field operations. As a result, the 
issue of transferring the technology in buyback agreements is crucially significant for Iran in 
its attempt to obtain absolute independency from foreign contractors, as the second 
chapter showed that the lack of technology after nationalisation in Iran was the main 
bargaining power of the foreign contractor to burden their conditions on Iran. On the 
contrary, to the great importance of such provisions from the Iranian view, the transfer of 
technology is subjected to a high limitation in Iranian buyback contracts. This limitation 
stems from the short duration of the buyback, as the length of the buyback is too short for 
the NIOC to achieve the latest technology of the foreign contractor. However, with a long 
duration of contract, the host country can enjoy the latest technology, management skills 
and immense expertise on the PSA agreements242. Accordingly, increasing the duration of 
buyback does not only  not damage the interests of Iran in the buyback, but also will provide 
more commercial benefits for the country by enabling the NIOC to obtain the technology 
from the foreign party, and make the model more attractive for the foreign investor. 
Moreover, this advantageous provision of the PSA that this study proposes to integrate 
within the terms of the current buyback is not in contradiction with any legal, political and 
historical concerns in Iranian society. 
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c) Granting the right of discovery and production activities: Lack of financial incentives in 
buyback 
This has been discussed in the last sub-chapter that the idea of separation of the exploration 
and production stages in the Iranian buyback is aimed to protect the national interests of 
Iran, while this provision only produces extra negotiation and bureaucracy with no 
commercial benefit for the Iranian side243. Moreover, this provision creates a high level of 
risk for the contractor under the Iranian buyback deal which results from the fact that the 
cost of discovery activities is relatively higher than production activities, and more 
importantly, the main profit of the oil and gas business is generated from the production 
phase, while the contractor in the Iranian buyback is only granted the exploration rights. In 
fact, while the contractor in Iranian buyback agreements are not guaranteed the 
development rights on discovered blocks, even though a preferential right for the field 
development is recognised for the contractor of the discovery phase, the original terms of 
PSA allows the discovery contractor to enjoy the rights to develop the discovered fields. 
Accordingly, the provisions of the Iranian buyback increase the level of risk posed on the 
contractor which leads to discouraging foreign investors from participating in the Iranian oil 
industry. Shifting this restrictive provision of the Iranian buyback to the PSA’ strategy of 
granting both phases of exploration and production to the contractor that discovers the oil 
block is the applicable solution that this study suggests based on the evolutionary 
approach244. By applying this reform, Iran can change the restrictive provision to a financial 
incentive in order to motivate foreign contractors to employ its highest technologies and 
expertise in the discovery phase to explore the oil block. Moreover, such a reform will 
definitely make the scheme of the Iranian buyback more prepared to attract foreign 
investments. 
 
d) Method of payment: Financial risk for both parties in buyback 
As has been precisely examined in the last sub-chapter, the method of payment in the 
Iranian model of buyback is based on unchanged level revenue. Such payment method 
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payment discourages IOCs for increasing total returns from the block by discovering 
additional reserves, optimising production targets, and employing enhanced oil recovery, as 
its revenue has been fixed from the beginning of the project. Moreover, this method, 
regardless of bringing the global price of oil into its consideration, obliges the NIOC to 
compensate the contractor which is obviously against the interests of NIOC and 
subsequently the national interest of Iran, in the event of price fluctuation. In contradiction 
with the Iranian buyback, the unfixed rate of return in PSA which is based on quantity of the 
production provides a high incentive for the contractor to reach the highest performance of 
the project, as well as reducing the risk of price fluctuation for NIOC. Therefore, to cover this 
shortcoming of the Iranian buyback this study offers applying an unfixed rate of return 
which does not clash with any constraints in Iranian legal, political, and historical 
considerations, and more importantly will remove an important risk in favour of the NIOC. 
Furthermore, this reform, which has been proposed on the basis of the evolutionary 
approach by integrating advantageous provisions of other models will make the buyback 
more attractive. 
 
e) Field ownership rights and dynamic profit maximization policy: Main restriction for 
Iranian buyback 
The main reasons of choosing the buyback have been discussed in the last chapter, and it 
has been shown that the ownership of the discovered field is a significant concern in the 
Iranian oil history and legal framework245. This is because of the fact that the main support 
for the adoption of service contracts is the country’s concern of preserving the sovereignty 
of natural resources, as service contracts allows countries to uphold field ownership, as well 
as produce crude ownership in most cases. Thus, countries choose service contracts as it 
permits them to employ the expertise of the IOC whilst they relinquish less control over the 
fields and the produced crude to the IOC. However, sovereignty concerns arise under 
production sharing agreements due to the fact that the IOCs are granted decision-making 
power in the operation of the exploration and development and the right to share the 
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produced crude ownership with the host country246. The effect of giving up the host’s right 
regarding its own local sources would be less power for the host government for observing 
IOS’s operation which is occurred through regulative laws, and supervisory activities. On the 
other hand, although service contract may ensure sovereignty considerations, the structure 
is leading to massive potential losses in profit, particularly in case of Iranian model of 
buyback, as well as Iraqi technical service contract. Lack of flexible method to maximize the 
income resulted in loss for NOCs in Iranian system, as well as Iraqi model that results led to 
inadequate economic impact of service contract. Hence, the adoption of such measure can 
rise the commercial proficiency of the agreements which would be generally 
recommendable in Iranian, as well as Iraqi method of transaction.247. Nevertheless, it seems 
that the service contract fundamentally is tending to lose massive possible revenue even in 
the case of applying a flexible method to maximize the income of, due to the fact that 
exercising this strategy is not an adequate solution for shifting upshots efficient of the 
service agreement framework, albeit Ghandy and Linee in 2012 and Ghandy and Linee in 
2014 demonstrated this resolution as an enough means for achieving more economically 
efficient consequences. This uncertainty regarding the proposed solution rose from the idea 
of maximizing the income through flexible method, as it involves continues ideal choices 
which requires the operators to update their choices according to ideal amount of oil, as 
well as the ideal scheme of extracting according to reserves estimation, necessary capital 
and operation cost and oil market price predictions. Yet, the existing service contract does 
not have the essential means of adopting the dynamic profit maximization objectives, owing 
to; the fixed IOCs’ compensation regarding to extracted quantity within the agreement248. 
Specifically, under Iranian buyback contract, the international oil companies’ compensation 
is depending on subsequent fixed scheme in contract during a certain period, thus, 
departing agreed production rate in the deal would be impossible under such requirements, 
albeit IOCs discover the ideal. The Iraqi system rules that compensation of international oil 
companies would count on the basis of attaining the manufacture goal within the 
manufacture structure with no function for choosing ideal manufacture rate. In contrast, 
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the IOC in production sharing agreement applies flexible method of maximizing the income 
in association with the state-owned oil companies, as IOC is granted decision making power 
and rights to ownership of the generated crude under production sharing agreement. 
However, considering the forbiddance of ownership of oil product by foreigners, this study 
based on the evolutionary approach proposes the application of the dynamic profit 
maximization policy through shifting from pre-fixed remuneration to unfixed rate of 
compensation in order to preserve the essence of buyback, the ownership of oil field by 
Iran, as well as avoiding the great loss of Iran through buyback249. This solution which does 
not breach any barriers in Iranian petroleum law shows that there is no need to choose the 
radical change towards the production sharing agreement model, while it is possible to 
integrate the advantageous provisions of other models to the Iranian buyback. 
Overall, this sub-chapter offered the critical comparison of Iranian buyback contract and 
production sharing agreement with focus on their differences. This comparative analysis of 
these two models highlighted five advantageous provisions that can be integrated to the 
Iranian buyback’s terms to cover the deficiencies of the model without breaching any legal, 
historical or political restrictions250. This is the result of applying the evolutionary approach 
that this study has chosen, due to the fact that the radical change in the contractual 
framework of Iranian oil industry through shifting towards another model on the basis of 
revolutionary approach is not possible in the current political, legal and historical 
atmosphere of Iran, moreover, such a radical change has an expensive price for the country 
which needs more time to be prepared. Subsequent to improving reforms proposed in this 
sub-chapter regarding the problematic features of Iranian buyback through integrating the 
advantageous terms of PSA, the next sub-chapter will provide the comparison of Iranian 
buyback with other common service contracts in different countries in order to more 
precisely improve the scheme of the model through reforming the restrictive provisions of 
Iranian buyback to make it more demanding from the perspective of foreign investors, as 
well as more beneficial for national party. 
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4.4 Iranian buyback in comparison with service contracts: More restrictive provisions of 
Iranian buyback than other service contracts 
As it has been clarified in the last chapter, the Iranian buyback is a type of service contract 
that foreign contractor is in charge of development of the field through providing necessary 
capital and technology, while the NIOC’s responsibility is to observe the progression of 
operation and subsequently compensate the contractor. However, as the Iranian buyback is 
independent of service contract model as the commonly used kind of petroleum legal 
framework251, the comparison of these three models which will be carried out in this sub-
chapter in three sections can precisely point out the shortcomings of the model compared 
to Iraqi as well as Venezuelan service agreements. This analysis will provide the essential 
materials for this study to prepare the applicable solutions that can make the buyback more 
efficient. 
The table categorised service contracts in Iran, Venezuela and Iraq based on the following 
three different elements252: Ownership right regarding the produced crude oil, capital cost 
regulation and operation rights of the developed fields. 
Table 5: Iranian buyback in comparison with other service contracts 
Iran First Generation 
of Buyback 
signed in 1995 
Second 
Generation of 
Buyback signed 
in 2004 
Third Generation 
of Buyback 
signed in 2009 
Iran’s 
announcement for 
new plan for 
offering more 
attractive model in 
2016 
Venezuela First round of 
Operational 
Service 
Agreements in 
1991 
Second Round of 
Operational 
Service 
Agreements  
Third Round of 
Operational 
Service 
Agreements in 
1997 
Shifting the Service 
Agreement to joint 
company 
framework in 2006-
7 
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Iraq Producing Field 
Technical Service 
Contract in 2009 
Development 
and Production 
Technical Service 
Contract in 2009 
Third Round of 
Technical Service 
Contract in 2010 
Fourth Round of 
Technical Service 
Contract in 2012 
 
 
 
a) Ownership right regarding the produced crude oil: Harsh position of Iranian buyback 
As the second chapter of this work demonstrated the essence of nationalisation of Iranian 
oil was the idea of forbiddance of any foreign ownership on Iranian natural resources. This 
principle has been reflected in the Constitution of Islamic revolution and more importantly 
formatted the basis of Iranian model of buyback.  While Iran and Iraq banned the foreign 
ownership of any petroleum product which is the main similarity between Iranian buyback 
and service contract mechanism, the service contract of Venezuela recognised IOCs right to 
share from product which can be known as the exclusive element in third round of 
Venezuela service agreement. As this position of Venezuelan service contract is more 
flexible than Iranian strategy, it is more attractive for foreign contractor. Moreover, this will 
remove the risk for NIOC in the event of price fluctuation. However, this study with 
consideration of the current legal, political and historical situation of Iran, and its time limit 
to return to its previous position in the international oil market, does not suggest such a 
radical change as the alternative for the future of the model. This is because of the fact that 
to apply such radical change, the provision of the Constitution needs to be amended, as well 
as the political atmosphere and public feelings need to be prepared to adopt such 
fundamental reform. As a result, this study based on its strategy to propose the applicable 
solution to modernise the buyback, focuses on the reforms with no clash with the existing 
barriers. 
b) Capital cost estimation regulation: Unrealistic legal obligation on contractor operating 
in Iranian field  
It has been discussed in the first sub-chapter of the present chapter that Iranian buyback 
following the conservative method in consequence of negative experience of foreign 
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involvement in oil industry burden an unrealistic legal obligation on contractor with no 
commercial viability which is the cost estimation before the beginning of the project. While 
this provision poses extra risk on international contractor, it is also against the national 
interest of Iranians, as this provision will postpone the beginning of operation, production 
activities, and subsequently will lead to loss of both parties’ benefits. On the contrary to this 
term of Iranian buyback, the service contract method in both Iraq and Venezuela provide 
the flexibility for contractor to amend its cost estimation253 which results in to minimise the 
risk on IOC in this regard254. 
The amendment that this study offers on the basis of evolutionary attitude is integrating 
this element of Iraqi and Venezuelan model to permit contractor to provide the cost 
estimation as the project is running which does not breach any constraints. Applying this 
reform will minimise the risk on contractor, increase the accuracy of the cost estimation for 
NIOC, accelerate the start of project, and consequently remove this unattractive provision 
of model in favour of foreign investor. 
c) Operation rights of developed field: Monopolised right for NIOC’s subsidiaries 
Iranian buyback in line with its legal framework as it has been discussed in the third chapter 
is aimed to protect the national interest of Iranians against foreign contractors. On this 
basis, the Iranian buyback denied the rights of foreign contractor with regard to operation 
of the developed fields which is an important source of income for IOCs, whereas, under 
service contracts in Iraq and Venezuela the contractor is granted the right to operate the 
developed fields255 which is the financial incentive for foreign investors to participate in oil 
industry of Iraq and Venezuela. On the contrary, the Iranian model by monopolising this 
right to NIOC’s subsidiaries creates a loss of an advantage for the contractor, as well as 
stabilises the monopoly market instead of competitive one which can be against the 
national interest of Iranians. As a result, in to remove this unnecessary risk to and make the 
model more competitive, this element of can be integrated to Iranian buyback to motivate 
the foreign investment to engage with Iranian oil industry, as well as to award any 
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contractor that quicker reaches to the phase of production by utilising its highest 
technology256. Therefore, this reform that is not in contradiction with any prohibition in Iran 
towards modernising the buyback will change the shape of the model to more attractive 
version which is the ultimate aim of this study from analysing the Iranian buyback. 
Overall, this sub-chapter offered the critical comparison of Iranian buyback with the service 
contract mechanism in Iraq and Venezuela through considering the three vital elements of 
three models. The comparative study of the service contracts in these two countries with 
Iranian model of buyback demonstrated that although service contract model in general is 
less attractive for foreign contractors than production sharing agreement, the Iranian model 
of buyback is considerably more restrictive that other two service contracts in Iraq and 
Venezuela. 
This sub-chapter highlighted the shortcomings of Iranian buyback which resulted in to 
unattractiveness of the model. More importantly, this sub-chapter attempted to propose 
the applicable reforms through integrating the advantageous provisions of the service 
contracts in those two countries that do not breach any prohibition in the current situation 
of Iran for the aim of making the Iranian buyback more attractive. Based on this strategy, 
the next sub-chapter will deliberate the comparison of two method of buyback in Iran and 
in the world to more precisely, and in greater details consider the necessary reforms of 
Iranian buyback on the evolutionary reforms to increase its economic efficiency to 
encourage International investors. 
4.5 Comparative analysis of the Iranian buyback agreement in the light of International 
model of buyback: Low economic efficiency of the Iranian buyback  
Legal analysis of Iranian buyback in the last chapter has been clarified that the Iranian model 
of buyback has been formatted through employing some provisions of international 
buyback scheme for the aim of protecting the national interest of Iranians, as well as 
attracting foreign investment to the country257. However, the differences between the 
Iranian buyback model and International buyback stemmed from the fact that Iran's 
interpretation of buyback contract is established according to the specific legal, political and 
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historical atmosphere of the country which does not always conform entirely to the 
international schemes of the buyback. Therefore, subsequent to provide a broader 
comparative analysis of Iranian buyback model with other mechanisms such as PSA,  as well 
as Service Agreements, it seems essential for conducting critical comparison amid Iranian 
buyback and international buyback scheme in order to highlight the weaknesses of the 
current method of oil transition in Iran which has created the unattractiveness features of 
the Iranian buyback, and more importantly to offer the applicable reforms to make the 
model more attractive for foreign investors258. 
Noticeably, the contracts used for this comparison represent the general framework of such 
agreements. While the 1999 Paydar West Field Asmari and Bangestan Reservoirs licensing 
agreement259 with the South Fields section within NIOC is chosen as a sample of Iran’s 
model, its international equivalent is the International Model Rules of Buyback Contracts 
drafted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe260. Accordingly, this sub-
chapter will attempt to point out the deficiencies of Iranian buyback trough considering the 
differences of two models in nine sections to offer the solutions for the aim of offering more 
attractive shape of Iranian buyback via adopting the more developed terms of the 
international scheme that are not in contrary with prohibitions in Iran. 
 
a) Delimitation of services and responsibilities: Not applicability of Iranian buyback’s 
approach in offering the specific terms of rights and obligations for all contractors  
   
The first element of any contract is delimitation of services and obligations which outline 
the duties that each party is expected to carry out in the agreement. Therefore, the 
definition of the scope of each party's obligations is the heart of any agreement. Thus, it is 
essential to firstly deal with the examination of both the domestic and the International 
buyback provisions with regard to their delimitation of duties between the parties. Basically, 
contractual rights and obligation of parties in the primary agreement are clarified in the 
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‘whereas clause’ of the international model of buyback. Thus, according to such clauses the 
parties agree to establish the buyback contract, and also a series of terms in the form of 
articles follows: Article 1.1 provides a course of dealing between parties by expressing that 
the seller will consent to buyer or initiate another party's offer, as per the contractual 
provisions, of the buyer's output resulting from the utilisation of the technology provided by 
the seller, as well as to accept the output upon delivery. Therefore, Article 1 defines the key 
element of the agreement which is establishing a valid condition for each party subject to 
following articles, thus, the condition of the seller is a pledge to buy products while the 
condition of the buyer is a pledge to sell goods. Moreover, identifying relating terms to 
description of quantity and quality of the products, and also creating rules during time of 
delivery in a contract is significantly vital for the purpose of illustrating parties’ rights and 
obligations. As a result, since the number of goods and services with regard to buyback is 
countless, the International contract deliberately remains it unclear in this area to provide 
maximum latitude for the parties in agreement to decide regarding the scope of obligations 
and services.   
On the other hand, Article 2 of the Iranian buyback by offering a more specific list of rights 
and obligations such as risks of not finding oil in the drilled field the assignment of profits 
and the expanses restricted the choice of parties in negotiation to clarify the rights and 
obligations of each party261. Article 2 stated that: "Contractor responsible to NIOC for 
operations and is to provide all capital, technology and skills necessary for the conduct of 
Development Operations for this Contract, and shall bear the Petroleum Costs required in 
carrying out Development Operations, and to recover such costs as provided in Clause 22 
hereof, and bear the risks that sufficient production additional production of Crude Oil, and 
or Natural Gas may not be produced from the Contract Area in order to recover all such 
Petroleum Costs."262 Although the specific division of duties in agreement might seem 
effective to reduce the potentiality of arbitration, however, considering the vast area of 
petroleum contractual framework it is a serious restriction on the party’s choice which can 
create the dispute. This is because of the fact that the terms of buyback agreement need to 
be changed on the basis of different fields of operation, risks and situation of the 
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contractors, thus, offering the specific division of duties and rights for all contractors 
operating in different fields with different situations seems not to be commercially and 
technically acceptable which will create disagreements, and subsequently unattractiveness 
for foreign investors. On this basis, this study suggests the integration of this attitude from 
the international mechanism to the Iranian version for the aim of increasing the efficiency of 
the model, and subsequently making the model more attractive with no clash with any 
barriers.  
b) Provisions concerning the remuneration: The nationally supportive future of Iranian 
buyback 
The last chapter showed that the Iranian buyback in consequence of the exploitative nature 
of concessions has been founded on the basis of protecting the interests of Iranians in 
petroleum agreements. Therefore, the main tendency in enacting the Iranian buyback’s 
provisions is to be in favor of NIOC’s benefits as the representative of Iranians in oil and gas 
contractual deals. The most important portion of an agreement is remuneration provisions, 
as they clarify the distribution of revenues and expenses, thus, a specific and clear set of 
provisions in this respect can impede disputes. 
International scheme in essence is based on a doctrine of fair regarding contract which 
avoids the parties from unfairly possessing the advantage of the each other, due to 
potential situation which may lead to a grossly disproportionate level of bargaining power. 
This duty to deal fairly stemmed from the Convention of the United Nations regarding 
Contracts to the International Sale of Goods (CISG), particularly based on Article 55 CISG 
which obeys a general idea of good faith, and explicitly noted by Article 7(1) CISG263.  
The main article in the international model of buyback regarding the remuneration issue is 
article five which declares the prices of the relevant product to the contract as follows: 
(1) The value of the output will be evaluated at the end of the sub-contracts for by 
considering the commercial context in the relevant area of commerce at the time when the 
transaction happens264. 
(2) The price of the on the general market and under competitive terms of distribution and 
compensation. 
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(3) The comparable cost of items which depends on the extent of similarity dictated by the 
level of quality and other qualities, within the relevant area. 
(4) The agreed commodity exchange rate when the sub-contract is finished. 
Accordingly, the strategy of International scheme regarding the remunerations’ provision 
prescribes the precise theme of fair and balanced dealing arrangements through the 
sovereignty of Article 5. 
On the other hand, the position of the Iranian model is significantly different compared to 
the international agreement, due to the unique historical background of oil deals which led 
to dissimilar procedures from the sale of goods as planned in the International scheme. 
Article 18.1 is the key provision of Iranian model regarding remunerations’ issues which 
governs the Master Development Plan and Budget. Article 18.1 expresses that MDP should 
contain the operation structure, project chargers and main expenses to operate the field.265. 
As it has been mentioned in the first sub-chapter this article burden a significant commercial 
risk on the contractors by obliging them to provide the cost estimation before the beginning 
of the project which is serious complaints of IOCs, as they are liable for any inaccurate 
estimation.  
Further important provision concerning the issue of remuneration in Iranian buyback is 
Article 22 which governs the cost recovery, remuneration fee, and ruled the fixed rate of 
return for the contractor. This issue which has been also analysed in the first sub-chapter is 
financially damaging for both parties, as the fixed rate of return is demotivating for 
contractor, and will lead to loss of benefit for NIOC in the event of fall of price of oil.  
Accordingly, the Iranian version of the buyback arrangement in contrast to the international 
scheme of buyback chose the bias strategy on the issue of remuneration to defend the 
Iranian interests on petroleum deals which cannot ensure a fair balance between parities. 
The unattractiveness feature of Iranian buyback has stemmed from such provisions which 
damage the benefit of both parties in buyback, as they discourage foreign contractor to 
participate in the Iranian oil industry that results in to losing of Iran in competition with 
other oil producers in absorbing the foreign investment. However, as it has been discussed 
in the previous sub-chapters, this study based on the evolutionary approach proposes the 
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reform in the regulation of cost estimation as the project is running, as well as applying an 
unfixed rate of return according to consideration of the capacity of the field, the price of oil 
and the expenses of contractor266. Integrating such terms will make the Iranian buyback 
more balanced on the issue of remuneration which will lead to the more attractive version 
of Iranian buyback with no clash with the current briers as the aim of this study. 
 
c) Arbitration and dispute procedure: Limitation on party autonomy in Iranian buyback’s 
provision of arbitration 
Following to the analysis of legal anatomy of Iranian buyback which carried out in the third 
chapter of this work, it has been clarified that the Iranian oil contractual legal framework 
suffers from the lack of certainty and clarity which resulted in to discouraging foreign 
investor, as they are not able to rely on such framework, neither foresee its future 
development. Moreover, the lack of certainty and clarity in provisions of Iranian buyback 
creates the confusion for parties, and subsequently requires extra negotiations leading to 
delay the project that is in loss of both parties in Iranian buyback. In particular, arbitration 
provisions are vital component of all legal frameworks, as they ensure the stability of the 
commercial relationship between contractual parties, as well as preventing the minor 
disputes to become the full-fledged disagreement. Nevertheless, even in the event of 
serious disagreement arbitration plays the main role in establishing a compromise between 
the conflicting participants rather than leading to nullification of agreement, due to the fact 
that resolving the dispute in an environment of cooperation rather than in an 
argumentative atmosphere of court will result into reduce of friction between sides.  
The International arrangement in this respect broadly clarifies the principles of arbitration 
through the special procedures including the finality of decisions. Article 19 of the 
international model demonstrates this general approach by outlining the mechanism for 
parties for the purpose of settling any potential disputes. Based on article 19.1, any disputes 
arising from the contract which cannot be resolved through informal negotiation will be 
considered under arbitration procedure in accordance with an agreed number of arbitrators 
and rules upon by the parties to the contract. Therefore, the International model on the 
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issue of arbitration focused on the intention of contractual participants rather than forcing 
on any certain arrangement by a higher authority or by the agreement itself. As a result, the 
means of dispute resolution, the identity and numbers of arbitrators, and the place of 
arbitration are all discretionary267. 
In contrast to the International arrangements’ position regarding arbitration which is so 
broad, the Iranian buyback is different with such general guidelines through specifying 
certain rules of arbitration. Article 32 of Iranian scheme concerns the dispute settlement, 
and arbitration by stating that all disagreements, debates and arguments resulting from the 
agreement or finishing or annulment must ultimately be solved via arbitration, beforehand 
three arbitrators. All decision of them are compulsory for both sides. More precisely, the 
Appendix D deals with details of arbitration course in the Iranian buyback. 
Section 3 of Appendix D of this work expressed that the place of arbitration is negotiable via 
both sides involved in disagreement. If an arbitration panel could not reach the agreement 
upon the determining of last arbitrator, afterwards arbitrational panel will be settled in 
Tehran, Iran, for solving the disagreement.  
Section 4 concerns the vital subject of the identity of the arbitrators, as objectivity is 
challenging to find those belonging to the same country as the disputed parties. Section 4 
states that each side will have the power of appointment for a single individual with the first 
two appointees then finding a third member to chair the group who shall not originate in 
either of the participants' states268. 
Therefore, the Iranian model of arbitration procedure in buyback is aimed to resolve a 
dispute by concerning the details of the arbitration course which is in contrast with the 
perspective of International model of buyback. Although applying such policy will create the 
more structural course of arbitration, it results in to a high limitation on the party autonomy 
as the most important element of every contract which leads to generate the unnecessary 
restrictive provisions, and subsequently demotivates foreign contractor to engage Iranian oil 
industry269. The reform that this study proposes on the basis of evolutionary approach is 
integrating the provision of arbitration from the international model to the Iranian buyback 
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model to ensure the freedom of choice of parties in buyback to agree on the details of 
arbitration course, and more importantly to award any contractor that chooses Iran, and 
Iranian law in the arbitration course as a financial incentive to ensure the interest of Iranians 
in arbitration course. Applying such reforms will change this legally binding provision to 
financially incentive term which does not only breach any barrier but also modernises the 
Iranian model of buyback. 
d) The applicable law of contract: Little space for party’s choice of law 
A further significant issue related to dispute with regard to the terms of buyback is the 
governing law, as different jurisdictions have different sets of rules for considering the 
remedial subjects, assessing the validity of contract and interpreting of the contractual 
terms. 
While Under Article 18 of the international model the guiding jurisdiction is the one defined 
within the contract, the Iranian version of the model explicitly clarified the set of rules to 
govern the agreement, and accordingly leaves little space to exploitative interpretation. For 
the purpose of falling the contractor's activities within the jurisdiction of domestic judicial 
system, Iranian buyback, in Article 7.2, prescribes that ’a branch of foreign company shall be 
restarted in Iran to ensure such legal coverage. In line with establishing judicial jurisdiction 
by registration of a branch of company the Article 3.1 clearly expresses the legal system by 
which the contract should be performed. Article 3.1 declares that agreement will be ruled 
and conducted based on the Iranian law’, therefore, it defines the Iran’s law as main 
governor of agreement, and subsequently eliminates any problems that may arise from 
issues of jurisdiction270.  
Consequently, whereas the international model in the issue of governing law grants the full 
discretionary power to parties by relying on the related terms of contract to determine the 
choice of law, Iranian buyback through the registration of company’s branch in Iran forces 
parties to follow the domestic law, even though, it provides legal certainty, as well as 
resolving any dispute over indicating the choice of law, nevertheless, it limit parties’ 
autonomy in the contract. Imposing such a limit on the parties’ choice of law decreases the 
attractiveness of the model, as a result, this work suggests to apply the related provision of 
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international buyback, as well as, providing financial incentives such as tax reduction for 
those foreign contractors which choose Iranian law of buyback as the choice of law. This 
solution will remove the above-mentioned restriction to absorb more investments, and also 
will motivate foreigners to choose Iranian buyback law. 
 
e) Termination of the agreement: Lack of relevant provision in Iranian buyback 
As it has been pointed it out in the last chapter the legal framework of Iranian buyback 
needs to include more provisions to govern the related issues to the buyback. This is 
because of the fact that non-existence of the relevant legal issues to buyback will require 
extra negotiations which results in to postpone the beginning of the project as one of the 
foreign party’s’ complaint, and subsequently leads to loss of both parties’ benefit. The issue 
of termination of an agreement as the last resort solution, subsequent to the failure of 
other choices including negotiation, and preliminary arbitration is a significant subject that 
has been ignored in the Iranian version of buyback271. Thus, containing of such provisions 
seems essential in order to ensure legal certainty in the contingency that termination does 
become necessary.  
While the International model concerns this issue in deep, there is no such provisions are 
existed in the Iranian equivalent. Article 16.1 of the international model rules that if the 
original contract is terminated before any changes in the technological, and logistics 
material, the contract will be nullified. Moreover, Article 16.2 stated that within this 
agreement, the seller's responsibilities will:  
(A) Be considered as finished even in cases where one of the sub-contracts is subsequently 
terminated, as long as such an event occurs not as the result of the seller's actions.  
(B) Will not be considered as satisfactorily concluded if any sub-contract is subsequently 
terminated, no matter the reasons. In such situation the seller is obliged to conclude 
additional sub-contracts which would be equivalent to the value of the original contracts 
that have been terminated. Therefore, Article 16.2 elucidates what will occur in respect to 
the seller's other duties, if the buyback contract or part thereof be terminated, moreover, it 
                                                 
271 Mohammad Reza Saber, Buyback Contracts in Upstream oil and gas sector and its legal effects, International commercial law PHD 
dissertation, Azad University, International Postgraduate Centre, 2007, Tehran. P 12 
 
132 
 
ensures that both sides know their positions if the contract be terminated by either side272. 
As a result, the position under the International agreement regarding the topic of 
termination of the contract is clear and precise which results in less legal confusion of 
parties, and more certainty of the governing law of the contact that makes the model more 
favorable for both parties from the legal point of view, as they can legally foresee their 
contractual actions.  
In contrast to the international scheme, the Iranian model does not include specific 
provisions regarding termination of contract, thus, the dispute is supposed to be resolved by 
arbitration, with the extent of compensation or loss of assets according on the stage of 
operation. Nevertheless, the lack of such provisions may create significant level of 
confusion, legal action and untrustworthy for future business relationships in the case that 
termination is seeking by one of the parties, due to changed circumstances. Accordingly, it is 
a crucial shortcoming of the Iranian form of buyback that no contingency scenarios are 
expected for cases where termination is seeking, whereas this issue has been illustrated 
specifically in the International version. This deficiency which led to create confusion, long 
negotiation and bureaucracy will act to make the Iranian buyback unattractive through 
burdening a legal risk on contractor, due to the fact that IOC cannot rely on the framework 
of the model in the event of dispute273. The reform that this study proposes based on 
above-mentioned comparison is applying the evolutionary approach through establishing 
the special institute inside NIOC to provide the legal consultancy in order to update, and 
improve the provision of the governing law of Iranian buyback274. Applying such reform will 
offer a more reliable legal framework to foreign contractor, and subsequently will 
encourage the foreign investors to participate the Iranian oil industry through removing the 
above-mentioned risk, moreover, this reform from the national view will increase the 
quality, and reputation of Iranian legal framework amid other oil producers countries with 
no clash with any existing barriers in Iran. 
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f) Issue of time schedules for operation activities:  Non-existence of relevant provision, as 
a result of overruling the issue of contractual duration   
 
Since responsibilities and remuneration are related to the performance of obligations within 
certain time frames, issues of time schedules appears significantly crucial in a highly 
structured contractual atmosphere. Such issue is even more important in the concept of 
buyback product-oriented origin of the model which requires more attention to the time 
frames within which such goods supposed to be manufactured.  
Article 10 of the International model rules the vital issue of the schedules for carrying out 
the obligations under the contract. Noteworthy, failure to follow the time schedules for 
contractual responsibilities may result in to penalties against the breaching party through 
remedies clarified on Article 14. Article 10.2 defines the practicing a detailed time plan by 
clarifying the completion of number of commitments at different time frames and stages. 
Article 10.5 expressed that adequate Implementing Agreements to cover the whole of the 
seller's buyback responsibility as agreed under paragraph 4.1 above, shall be established via 
a fixed date negotiated between the parties. Moreover, Article 9 emphasises that the 
conditions for the supply of the product including the time scale and the location shall be 
negotiated in each distinct phase of the operation. Accordingly, based on mentioned 
articles, international model place the main emphasis on timely deliveries of the goods 
concerned, as well as the consequences of late delivery, thus, the issue of length of the 
actual contract is less being focused. In contrast to the international version of buyback, 
Iranian model put all its focus on the duration of contracts, as it is discussed from the view 
of criticisms of buyback and the sight of comparison of the Production Sharing Agreements 
model in the first and second sub-chapter respectively, and accordingly does not pay 
attention to the issue of time schedules for operation activities, even though this is a vital 
issue in the contract that can lead to many ambiguity and commercial loss of parties. 
Consequently, lack of such attention in Iranian buyback demonstrates the difference 
between Iranian oil contracts and the International model, due to specific concerns of 
dealing in oil275.  
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This study in line with the evolutionary approach suggests that the issue of schedules for 
operation activities needs to be included in Iranian governing law of buyback based on 
considering the length of contract, estimated capacity of the field and the necessary 
operation to reach the highest production rate. Such provision can increase the clarity of 
Iranian buyback model, ensures the benefit of both parties in contract by avoiding any extra 
negotiation which will lead to create a more attractive version of Iranian buyback  
 
g) Assignment Clauses: discretionary power in favour of NICO  
The assignment clause is a significant clause which decides whether to allow the parties to 
assign their contractual rights or commitments either wholly or partially to another party 
other than existing. Existence such rules are vital as lack of assignment provisions may 
create confusion and administrative delays. Both the International and the Iranian scheme 
are included certain provisions to determine the situation of transferring the role of a party 
to an alternative commercial entity.  
Such clauses are drawn in Article A 6.1 of international contract which expresses that the 
seller shall not have the right to assign his rights and responsibilities without obtaining 
consent from the buyer in the form of a clear agreement in writing, while, such accord shall 
not be unreasonably suspended. Therefore, the seller is able to assign his contractual 
responsibilities to another party if he first informs the buyer regarding his purposes, while 
the buyer can only refuse where the seller's performance would be unreasonable, in 
particular where the assignment would adversely affect the other party's interests. 
In contrast to international model, the subject of assignment the Iranian scheme includes 
only sparse attention which led to leaving less opportunities and protections for assignment 
to the buyer. Article 27.1 of Iranian buyback expresses that all task via supplier requires 
previous agreement with NIOC which would be accepted or rejected during one month after 
receiving via NIOC of notice that such a plan is intended. Noticeably, the NIOC has full 
discretionary power to either accept or reject the assignment without any requirement of 
the decision being 'reasonable', as is the case with the International scheme. Accordingly, 
this Article moves the balance in favour of the NIOC which does not seem fair, due to there 
is no restriction placed on the exercise of this power, moreover, it is doubtful that even 
applying arbitration could resolve the issue, as any refusal would be within the framework 
of the contract. Such granted discretionary power will generate unnecessary restriction for 
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forging contractor with no commercial benefit got the national party276. Therefore, this 
study for the aim of increasing the commercial efficiency proposes the integration of this 
provision from international model which is not in contrary to any barrier in Iranian law. 
This integration can motivate foreign investors to join the Iranian oil sector, as they have the 
right to apply assignment clauses if they need to do so.  
 
h) Re-Sale destinations: Exorbitant liberal view of Iranian buyback 
The resale of output to a third party is an additional way of achieving revenue through 
buyback transaction; however, political or commercial concerns may result into parties 
decision to restrict the destination of such transactions which is provided in Article 7 of 
International contract 277 . Article 7.1 expresses that the seller or any other legally 
empowered party obtains the right to resell the product within the territory defined by 
clause 7.2 below:  
(A) 7.2 the region will include all nations. 
(B) 7.2 the region will contain all nations indicated within the appendix for the certain types 
of goods. 
(C) 7.2 the area shall comprise the seller-land.  
Based on Article 7.3 the product cannot be resold anywhere but inside the defined area 
without divided contract from the buyer.  
Article 7.4 prescribes that the parties will follow the commitments above without seeking to 
actively market the products anywhere but within the authorised regions.  
Accordingly, this clause will affect the value of the contract, as if the seller intends to resell 
the products , he may be restricted by Article7, while the wider the seller's discretion on 
whom he can sell to, the greater profit in the contract and, therefore, the contract itself will 
be more valuable. Nevertheless, apart from the existing exception in Article (A) 7.2, the 
seller is not permitted to offer outputs in the market beyond the agreed territory, unless the 
written accord from the buyer is obtained, thus, this clause grants the buyer the power to 
have control over the seller's potential income in a market other than agreed one. 
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In contrast to the limiting rules on the issue of reselling the output generated through 
buyback in the International model, the Iranian version follows an entirely liberal position by 
not restricting the target of resale. Therefore, such liberal approach may provide 
opportunities for generating income from the oil sale beyond the original territory of 
contract. Although this provision is attractive for foreign investor, such exorbitant liberal 
view is in contrast with the essence of the mechanism to protect the national interest of 
Iranians in petroleum deals, as it is possible that the country in some circumstances may 
need to ban the reselling of product. Therefore, this work on the basis of evolutionary 
approach prescribes that the Iranian governing law of buyback should integrate the 
International provision of reselling the oil product in order to make the balance between the 
preserving the national interest and absorbing foreign investments. 
 
i) The conformity of final product under the contract: Lack of any criteria in Iranian 
buyback 
Since buyback model can be used to conduct oil extraction, as well as variety of other 
production processes, the issue of conformity of final product under the deal becomes 
significant, even though the main obligation of the contactor in buyback agreement is 
achieving the production target. This because of the fact that the certain rules to assess the 
final product can prevent any dispute which will lead to loss of both parties’ benefit and  
delays the project. As a result, an extensive part in the International model is devoted to 
prescribe quantity, quality and delivery times of the output involved. Article 2 attempts to 
identify specific criteria for assessing the product under the contract. Under Article 2.2, the 
seller commits to the availability of the prescribed product based on the timetable set out in 
Article 10. Moreover, according to Article 3.1, the product will have the pre-agreed 
attributes, be of the agreed amount and also correspond to the sub-contracts created for 
their purchase, known as "implementing contracts". In fact, these are fairly standard terms 
of contracts which implied by legislation in jurisdictions such as the United Kingdoms’ SGA 
1979 278 . Therefore, deliberation of pertinent provisions in the International version 
demonstrates that this contractual area is significantly more precise than the arbitration 
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section which is resulted to greater reliability but less flexibility. Accordingly, conformity of 
goods to the standard desired is a fairly common sense requirement, the level of scrutiny 
arranged by the International scheme seems to be proper, whereas under the Iranian 
version, no emphasis is placed on the issue of output conformity in the oil contract which 
illustrate an important comparative disadvantage in Iranian buyback. This disadvantage 
potentially will create the dispute between the parties, and subsequently demotivates the 
foreign investors. This study proposes the integration of this provision of International 
buyback to Iranian version, as it ensures the benefit of both parties through minimising the 
disagreement, and accordingly exceeding the production activities, moreover, such an 
integration will not breach any barriers in Iranian buyback, thus, it is applicable on the basis 
of the evolutionary attitude.  
Overall, this sub-chapter considered the nine vital issues in Iranian and International 
mechanism of buyback through providing the critical comparison of the two models. This 
comparative analysis has been carried out to evaluate the efficiency of Iranian buyback’s 
provisions to point out its deficiencies, and more importantly to offer the necessary 
applicable solutions for the aim of making the Iranian buyback more competitive via 
integrating the advantageous terms of the international buyback279. Accordingly, it has been 
demonstrated that the Iranian version of buyback, as a result of unnecessary restrictive 
provisions, ambiguous terms and lack of certainty in its governing law has considerably 
lower efficiency in comparison with the international scheme with regard to absorbing 
foreign investment280  As a result, this study in this sub-chapter offered applicable reforms 
through highlighting the more attractive provisions of the International model of buyback 
compared to their Iranian version to revise the mentioned shortcomings of Iranian buyback 
for the final aim of Iran to absorb more foreign investment in its oil industry. The next sub-
chapter in line of chasing the most appropriate solutions for the future development of the 
model as the main question of this research will examine the applicability of the production 
sharing agreement for the particular region  of the country in the current legal, political and 
economic environment of Iran. 
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4.6 Introduction of Production Sharing Agreement for Caspian Sea: Inapplicability of the 
proposed model  
As it has been mentioned in the second chapter of this work the production sharing 
agreement has been practiced in Iran for short period of time which increased the income 
of the government in petroleum dealings. However, allowing the ownership of oil product 
by foreigners which was on the basis of PSA model confronted with the essence of the 
nationalisation event that resulted in to introduction of buyback with restrictive provisions 
following the 1979 Islamic revolution281. Further to this previous experience of Iran in 
applying the PSA, recently, this model has been supported amid some Iranian officials; 
however, there has been confusion among them regarding the concept of PSAs, as there is 
the trend for mixing the concept of PSA, and straight possession of oil recourse. As already 
mentioned in the last chapter the straight possession, and exclusive right over Iranian 
natural assets have been forbidden by the Iranian Constitution, while PSA necessarily does 
not require 282  the ownership of mineral reserves 283 , therefore, there would be no 
Constitutional prohibition on PSA model that does not include transfer of any reserves284. As 
a result, this issue has been debating in the Petroleum Ministry and parliament to consider 
the possibility of adoption of PSA for the Caspian block, due to higher risk of field’s 
discovery, as well as the high competition between Iran’s neighbors such as Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan285. The investment department of national Iranian oil company proposed the 
high cost of the operation as barrier that would confront foreign companies, therefore, Iran 
was examining possibility of moving towards to PSA for the Caspian offshore. However, 
Gholamhossein Nozari, the previous Iranian oil minister rejected application of PSA 
regarding the north of Iran by identifying PSA model is as old-fashioned type of petroleum 
deal for the country. He clarified that the modified version of Iranian buyback can provide 
adequate incentives for investors. These conflicting statements highlighted the Iran’s 
internal dispute regarding Iranian model of petroleum contracts, thus, it is expectable that 
any effort for adoption of PSA which may be recognised as a constitutionally prohibited 
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would take even greater political obstacles, as well as longer duration. Therefore, while 
some officials proposed the PSA without granting any ownership rights to the foreigners, 
other voices still support efforts to amend the current mechanism which have been 
continued for more than 10 years to provide incentives for investors. However, the Caspian 
would seem as a clear exception to the buyback model, as the offshore operations’ 
expenses would be higher than onshore fields, thus, investors may not fund the project if 
they solely bear the risk of operation, therefore, this has been asked all the time to enjoy 
more friendly provisions for investors. Moreover, Iran has been faced the high competition 
with the neighbours contest, as they have proceeded with Caspian developments286. Hence, 
it has been argued that PSA shall be exercised merely in Caspian province, and not in for 
Southern part blocks of the country, however, the limitation scope of PSA to Caspian sea 
would generate a greater opposition, due to it can be deduced as the admission of 
insufficiency of Iran’s government selected model. Therefore, in order to justify this 
exclusion regarding the Iranian typical method of petroleum transaction , the government 
needs to demonstrate a sense of urgency on the Caspian block which requires longer time, 
and more legal and political efforts in the current situation of high competition on Caspian 
Sea oil fields; thus, it cannot be an applicable solution, owing to political obstacles towards 
any shift to PSA, as well as, lack of any legal preparation to adopt, and justify radical change 
to the production sharing agreement model287. Accordingly, the special situation of the 
Caspian Sea oil fields that has been examined in the current sub-chapter proves the 
accuracy, and the necessity of applying the evolutionary reforms to modernise the model 
through rendering changes in order to make the buyback more attractive for foreign 
contractor through minimising commercial risks, and creating more financial incentives. 
Such a view which has been chosen by this study is applicable in the current political and 
legal framework of Iran, as it does not breach any obstacles, and more importantly does not 
have high legal and political expenses for the country, particularly following the successful 
nuclear negotiation which led to lifting the sanctions. Such sanctions which suffered Iranian 
economy had terrifying effect on Iran’s oil sector that will be discussed in the next sub-
chapter. 
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4.7 The International sanctions on Iranian oil sector: Harmful economy effect for the 
country  
Following the successful nuclear deal, and subsequently removing the sanctions in 2016, it 
seems essential for goal of present research to analyse sanctions’ effects on Iran’s economy 
with particular reference to oil sector. This analysis is significant to prove the unattractive 
feature of Iranian model of buyback, and its role in aggravating the impact of sanctions. 
Moreover, this sub-chapter will show the necessity, and applicability of improving the 
model from the economy and national security point of view in order to suggest the 
probable future developments in this area. 
The United States has practiced economic sanctions against other countries in order to 
enforce its foreign policy demands, and pursuing certain objectives in such countries. Such 
sanctions have been carried out via other methods, such as pressure exerted through global 
entities including the UNSC and EU. Thus, the US trough utilising diplomatic forces, and 
methods of coercion attempted to promote objectives it sets to achieve, such as deterring 
access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in different countries, especially in the 
Persian Gulf states, as they are of particular attraction to the United States, due to their 
abundance of natural resources. In Iran however, since the Islamic Republic has come into 
power, US demands and coercion through indirect means have not gone unchallenged. 
Initiated by President Carter in 1979, sanctions and other similar measures have continued, 
taking shape in various forms, till the present date288. The US for the purpose of preventing 
countries from concluding a business deal with Iran has equipped itself with variety of 
means including Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), 1996, Iran Sanctions Act (ISA), 2006, and 
comprehensive sanctions in 2012.289 Moreover, the US utilised other legal powers to 
enforce secondary sanctions such as foreign-owned companies with access to the American 
market may be found culpable if conduct business with individuals, firms or governments 
with alleged terrorism links. Companies affected by such measures include banking groups 
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in particular, such as ABN Amro, UBS Bank of Switzerland, HSBC and Credit Suisse, who all 
curtailed business operations within Iran on the basis of the above legislation290. 
Historically, US sanctions have started from November 1979, after removing the Shah 
regime where President Carter subsequently froze all Iran’s assets in America. President 
Reagan in 1987 initiated the sanctions with the passing of the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Act in 1992 which banned the exports of commercial arms sale, nuclear 
technology, missile technology, and sales of dual-use items. In 1995 Senator D'Amato 
presented the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Act, followed by the Iran Foreign Sanctions Act 
which was named by himself as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. This Act penalises any 
American company investing in Iran and Libya, regardless of the amount, as well as, those 
foreign corporations that fund projects with greater worth than 20 million US Dollar within 
oil and gas relevant sector. Moreover, based on this Act the US President was granted the 
right to impose up to two of following six sanctions: the imposition of a maximum of $10 
million by all US financial institutions as a loan ceiling, restriction on US trade assistance, 
prohibition of company's imports and services in the US, the withdrawal or denial of 
licences approving the trading capacity of the company and prohibition from acting as a 
primary dealer of US treasury bonds. Noticeably, this Act, which was known as ILSA, was 
extended and changed in 20 September 2006 to the Iran Sanctions Act, because of 
terminating sanctions on Libya. The new Act was designed to stop Iran's progress in the field 
of nuclear programme, and also to deter its available funds granted to terrorist 
organisations, made effective through Executive Order 12957, prohibition of American 
investment in the petroleum and the Executive Order 12959 regarding the forbiddance of 
investment and trade with Iran in any manner or form, issued in 1995291. In fact, such 
legislation was aimed to limit the amount of investment in Iran by enforcing companies to 
follow the rules in order not to negate access into the American market. The House of Bill 
6198 in December 2011 extended the ISA until 31 December 2016. Moreover, it restricted 
sales of WMD technology or other advanced weaponry to Iran, and provided for the 
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prevention of money laundering by terrorists, and criminal groups292.  In 2012 following the 
huge progress of Iran in its nuclear programme the US Treasury Department have 
attempted to negotiate a military strike in order to coerce Europe and Russia to expand the 
Iranian economic sanctions in order to increase effectiveness, and to halt Iran's nuclear 
programme. In fact, the US was intended to enforce Security Council sanctions against 
Iranian government via means of a wide-reaching travel ban, and by restricting the 
government’s capacity to conduct business outside its territory. Moreover, US officials have 
also endeavored to force International banks to take other measures to block Iranian 
nuclear advances293. As a result, the US government could convince the European Union and 
the United Nation Security Council to provide comprehensive sanctions regarding Iranian oil 
sector, and bank transactions in order to stop Iran to develop its progress in nuclear field. 
Such sanctions were designed to deprive Iran from the International oil market to minimise 
the country’s economy scope. Therefore, any Americans or International company or bank 
which deals with Iran in the field of petroleum industry, and bank transaction would be 
harshly penalised, and subsequently being embargoed, for instance Amro had been fined 
$80 million for not issuing a full report in its dealing with the Iranian Bank, Melli, HSBC, 
Credit Suisse and Commerz bank A.G. have halted dollar transactions294. On the other hand, 
the US Sanctions on Iran have adverse impact on the US economy both directly and 
indirectly. This is because of the fact such sanctions resulted into financial loss for US 
through decreasing the bilateral trades which calculated on the basis of total GDP's of the 
primary participants in the country's economy, namely, Germany, France, Italy, China and 
South Korea, shows that they amount to roughly $12 trillion. Iranian imports from its 
trading partners amounted to an estimate of $4.3 billion, in 2006, and further increased in 
2009, where its imports rose from $12.7 to $21.2 billion by 2010, according to data 
collected by the Central Bank of Iran.295 Moreover, in exchange, $7.1 billion of services and 
goods, by Iran's major trading partners, assuming fixed percentage shares of the trading 
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partners, was imported to Iran296. Assuming instead that Iran would have imported such an 
amount in dollars, then subsequently the United States is losing $6.2 billion every year, in 
the form of exports because of its embargo. Research conducted at the Institute for 
International Economics demonstrates the effect of the sanctions on jobs, wages and trade 
within the US. American exports to the twenty six states being affected by trade measures, 
in 1995, diminished to a threshold of $19 billion below the expected level297. The loss of 
such exports would invariably lead to a figure of 200,000 of job reduction, and cause the 
loss of up to a billion dollars in salary bonuses alone for American employees, thus, many US 
companies have expressed regret towards the sanctions, which have the effect of denying 
them access to Iran's energy fields, unlike their non-US counterparts298. Accordingly, the 
sanctions have also had repercussions on the US economy, costing the US billions of dollars 
per annum, and increasing unemployment amidst American workers, who, as a result of the 
sanctions, lost their jobs, 299however, since the US economy is larger than Iran’s economy, 
and more importantly, unlike Iran, the US economy is not based on oil industry, the effect of 
sanctions for Iran was seriously more terrifying than US for instance collapsing of the Iranian 
currency, thereby decreasing the value of exports which led  to suffer non-oil exports in 
particular, as their value has lessened by 75%, exacerbating the state of the foreign-
exchange debt300.  
Iran has used to be a major player in the global oil markets and is one of the largest oil 
producer and exporter amongst the OPEC countries. During the last decade, Iran on average 
exported roughly 2.5 million barrels a day. In 2010, however, oil prices has risen four times 
the price a decade ago, to about $60 per barrel of oil, and as a result, Iranian oil exports 
have increased to more than $46 billion in 2012, from a meagre $15 billion in 1995, thus, 
Iran received an increased amount of $30 billion, more than that which it obtained twenty 
years ago301. This rising of price expanded Iran’s economy in order to widen and fasten its 
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nuclear progress.  Therefore, the US has tried to apply stricter policy in order to demean the 
power of Iranian adventurism, through sanctions and diplomatic measures. Damage done to 
the Iranian economy due to the global embargo has been created mainly because of lack of 
investment which they have caused. In fact, Iran would have been able to sign more 
beneficial contract with greater feasibility of success and security without sanctions302. This 
is because of the fact that sanctions aimed to force Iran into contracts that were far from 
ideal for the country, and was further coerced in funding itself through various sources at a 
high price, as a result of US manipulation of foreign aid and financing. Therefore, the 
dominant impact of sanctions has been a dramatic reduction in the funds that Iran has 
needed for the development of its oil projects. Owning to the highly capital nature of the oil 
businesses in Iran, a lot of investment is required for the developing of such an industry303. 
A lot of the national Iranian oil companies, such as onshore oil fields, have been in dire need 
of re-structuring and re-development, as a result of the Persian Gulf War, additionally, Iran 
in the past faced the necessity of developing several of its untapped fields. Such 
development work needed capital which Iran lacked, and which, due to the sanctions, was 
unable to receive in the form of debt or loans. Thus, the IOC's cost on the development of 
buyback projects resulted into debt for Iran that more financial difficulty creates for the 
country as IOCs have to be rewarded for all their investment as well as extra costs 
undergone in the process. Sanctions effectively restricted Iran's negotiating powers in 
petroleum deals, and subsequently faced Iran with situation that had to offer high rates of 
return for investment as an incentive to investment. Therefore, Iran had to drop the 
originally proposed 10%, and offered on average between 15% to 18% rates of return to 
foreign investors, for instance the South Pars and the Sirri oilfields, both signed with very 
high rates of return, and close to those demanded by the oil companies themselves304. Such 
excessive charges can be used to calculate the cost of such projects to Iran305. More 
importantly, the unattractive nature of Iranian buyback with its restrictive provisions 
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aggravated the effect of international sanction by discouraging the foreign contractors to 
invest in Iranian oil industry. Therefore, the International sanctions undoubtedly negatively 
impacted Iran’s economy, and its oil sector in particular, via minimising the fund received by 
Iranian government; as well as diminishing the negotiating powers in petroleum deals for 
Iran, thereby generating less appealing terms for the country, as it strove to offer better 
incentives for companies abroad. Consequently, sanctions decreased the rate of Iranian 
extraction of petroleum from average four million barrels each day until 800,000 barrels 
which effectively has harm Iran’s economy. Such terrifying economy effects can justify Iran’s 
ambitious plan to boost its production rate after sanctions, and more importantly 
highlighted the necessity of modernising the model of Iranian buyback in order to remedy 
the adverse effects of sanctions. Considering the time limit of Iran to return to the market, 
the historical, political and legal considerations of the country, and the efficiency of the 
evolutionary approach this study suggests improving the terms, features and functions of 
the current method for the aim of proposing more attractive version of Iranian buyback 
rather than shifting to any other model which can potentially faces serious prohibitions306. 
Furthermore, from the geo-political point of view since modernising the current model will 
engage more number of IOCs to Iran’s oil industry which have mutual interests with Iran’s 
government, can help Iran to resist more effectively against potential future sanctions, thus, 
such improvements within the model will also ensure the national security of the country. 
As it has been mentioned in the beginning of this sub-chapter, the sanctions on Iranian oil 
industry have been removed in 2016 following the successful nuclear deal. This vital 
historical event which led to conclude the many years’ dispute between Iran and western 
countries has some important influences on the current model of oil transaction which will 
be examined in the next sub-chapter. 
 
4.8 The Implications of the Nuclear Deal on Iranian buyback transaction: Ambitious plan of 
Iran to return to the pervious portion via boosting the production rate 
The necessity of reforms to make the Iranian buyback more competitive has been shown in 
different sub-chapters of this chapter. However, imposing the embargo on Iranian 
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petroleum industry following aggravation of the nuclear dispute decreased the possibility of 
successful revision within the existing Iranian contractual framework. In fact, sanctions by 
creating the additional risk for foreign contractor disappointed them to invest in Iran’s oil 
fields, therefore, most of contracts in the previous seven years granted to domestic 
contractors including Petropars and Petroiran Development Company (Pedco). Further to 
sanctions’ damaging effect on Iran’s petroleum industry via burdening high commercial risk 
on IOCs, the recent decrease in price of oil in global market created another limitation for 
Iran in attracting the foreign investment307. As a result, the rate of production which was 
around 3,600,000b per day, reached to 800,000b per day which demonstrated the Iran’s 
failure in chasing its main policy of attracting as much foreign investment as possible in 
order to support the country’s various ambitious economy programs. Nevertheless, 
concluding the agreement amid Iran and the five international Powers and Germany on 
14th of July 2015, and subsequently lifting the sanctions on 1st of February 2016 provided an 
exclusive opportunity for Iran’s economy through removing the sanctions, and increasing 
the rate of production. Based on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran can 
enjoy removing of sanctions imposed by the UN, US and EU by limiting its nuclear 
programme, and subsequently obtaining continuous verification of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA).308 Therefore, Iranian government following removal of sanctions is 
actively seeking the essentially massive investment to increase its capacity of production in 
order to develop its economic situation. It has been estimated that to acquire Iran’s 
production target of 5 million bl per day within the next 5 years the country needs to gain 
more than$100bn of foreign investment which is the ambitious plan for Iran within the 
current model of oil transaction309. Accordingly, this sub-chapter will consider the issue of 
possible energy implications of the nuclear deal, and lifting the sanctions on Iranian oil 
sector in following three sections310 in order to evaluate the situation of returning Iran to 
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the market for the purpose of offering necessary, and applicable reforms to make the 
buyback more attractive through employing the evolutionary approach. 
a) The potential amount of production: Hard way for Iranian oil industry after removing 
sanctions 
The first concern in issue of implication of nuclear deal on Iranian oil industry is the amount 
of additional oil that Iran can offer to global market after concluding the deal, and 
subsequently removing the sanctions. While it seems that Iran can supplement its current 
production of 800,000 barrels to bring an additional 800,000 barrels of crude oil within a 
year, the Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zangeneh, in June 2015, predicted that Iran can 
immediately raise oil exports by 500,000 after removing sanctions, and subsequently 
produce a total of 4MNB within the three months. Achieving this level of export would 
inevitably require foreign investment in addition to releasing the Iranian frozen assets 
including 30 million barrels on floating storage. However, if Iran struggles to find a market 
for these barrels, the lifting of sanctions will not make them any more attractive to 
international buyers, as they may consider that the contents can damage refinery 
equipment311. Noticeably, despite of lifting of major sanctions on Iranian oil industry, U.S. 
restrictions on some kind of investments would still remain which would inhibit European 
investment, as well as Americans. Nevertheless, many international oil companies would be 
prepared to navigate difficult legal and political environments of Iran oil industry including 
the ideological and national opposition to foreign investment in Iranian petroluem market. 
Consequently, although the nuclear sanctions have been removed, Iranian government has 
hard way to reach its plan, as many internal and international obstacles are still existed. 
Accordingly, to reach the huge target of Iran to produce 5MNB/D by 2020, Iran significantly 
needs to have a clear strategy to compete with other oil producers countries to attract 
foreign investment to the Iranian oil industry. This is because of the fact that removing the 
sanctions itself cannot attract the investors to Iran; due to the fact that Iranian buyback as it 
has been mentioned in the third sub-chapter is not as favourable as other commonly used 
mechanism in oil dealings. Therefore, this fact proves the necessity of applying some 
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reforms within the current model of buyback with consideration of time limit for Iran to 
return to the global oil market which is the approach that this study has chosen as the 
evolutionary attitude to increase the efficiency of the model in attracting foreign investment 
with no clash with any current prohibition that can require long time, and serious legal and 
political preparation.  
b) The low price of oil: More challenging situation for Iran to re-join the global oil market 
The second topic on analysing the possible implications of the new deal on Iranian oil 
industry is influence of the low price of oil on returning of Iran to the global oil market. 
Economically, this is atrocious time for Iran to re-join the international energy markets, due 
to the fact that Iran should attempt to re-develop its oil sector at a time when prices are 
low, and global opportunities are limited312. Furthermore, the main response of the market 
of Brent crude oil to the JCPOA was dropping, as the agreed deal means the returning of a 
producer with great opportunities to the global oil market, therefore, returning of Iran to 
the market can reduce the global oil price, while Iranian inventories are stocked around 40 
million bl in storage on tankers ready to be exported after lifting of sanctions through 
agreement in the inspections the JCPOA313. Accordingly, while Iran is actively attempting to 
“surge” oil onto the market to develop its economic situation, the low price of oil will have 
adverse effect on returning Iran, as the less revenue will be acquired by the government 
compared to the time when Iran left the market. The impact of low price of oil necessitates 
applying serious reforms within the framework of the buyback to attract more foreign 
investments in oil sector, as the low price of oil is a demotivating element for foreign 
investors to participate the oil industry, therefore, as it has been mentioned in different 
sub-chapters of this chapter Iran needs to offer more flexible terms of buyback through 
utilising the evolutionary approach to renew its oil sector. 
c) The regional effect of the new deal on OPEC: Geo-political influence of returning of Iran 
to the market 
                                                 
312https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=7&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwj38sHG74DRAhUjOsA
KHaE2A14QFgg-MAY&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bbc.com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east 
33521655&usg=AFQjCNES8mron5mTcvQ9lRgViyy2UpX3wg&sig2=WKqzddMgUgODfe3dSlow9Q&bvm=bv.142059868,d.bGg access on may 
2016 
313 Ibid, 
 
149 
 
The last concern regarding the implication of the new deal on Iranian oil industry is 
consideration of OPEC re-action to returning its pervious second largest producer to the 
international market. Basically, the response of OPEC to return of Iran to global oil markets 
is critical, owing to the fact that Iran’s former market share has rapidly become the market 
share of rival producers such as Saudi Arabia which pumped a record 10.6 million bl a day in 
June 2015314. Although the additional amount of crude oil that Iran will provide to market 
realistically does not appear to be sufficient to create a change in the current scheme of 
OPEC, Iran’s producer neighbors are still unlikely to return to a more cooperative approach 
to the oil market by restoration of the quota system within OPEC which can lead to the price 
war between OPEC members. More importantly, from the geo-political point of view, the 
current conflicts in the region, war in Yemen and Syria, has been aggravated the regional 
competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As a result, following the geopolitical 
competition, Saudi Arabia as the largest oil producer in OPEC will attempt to put pressure 
on Iran through resisting any change in quota system within OPEC in order to not allow Iran 
to achieve more income. Moreover, growing the new radical group called ISIS which threats 
the security of the Middle Eastern countries, and subsequently burdens finical pressure on 
them, as well as low price of oil in the global market will encourage all OPEC members, 
particularly Saudi Arabia to stand against any alterations leading to decrease their rate of 
production. As a result, the new form of geo-political competition in the region is likely to be 
happen, due to the fact that the countries may attempt to develop cross border fields which 
can result in to further tension and even conflict315.  Accordingly, the returning of Iran to the 
international energy market requires changes in the current rate of production of OPEC 
members which has the adverse effect on their interests, therefore, the OPEC members that 
already are struggling to the political problems, and low price of oil will be discontent to 
return of Iran to the market. Consequently, in such a harsh geo-political situation this study 
based on the evolutionary approach highlighted the fact that Iran has to employ effective 
reforms as they are demonstrated in above-mentioned sub-chapters to offer more 
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attractive version of buyback to overcome the political and economy barriers within the 
OPEC to re-join the global oil market316. 
Overall, as it has been shown in this sub-chapter the new deal can provide a great chance 
for both Iranian and International contractors to establish commercial viable agreements 
through granting an opportunity for development of Iran’s oil and gas fields, as well as 
higher income for IOCs. However, it is noteworthy that the solely removing the sanctions 
cannot cover all deficiencies of Iranian buyback to absorb the foreign investments which 
highlights the crucial necessity of required reforms in the current Iranian model of buyback.  
The consideration of the implications of nuclear deal, and removing the sanctions on Iranian 
oil sector from technical, economic and geo-political aspects which have been discussed in 
this sub-chapter pointed out that Iran is facing serious obstacles namely technical 
difficulties, low price of oil and discontent of OPEC members to return the country to the 
global oil market via increasing its rate of production. Such concerns emphasised that the 
framework of buyback has to become more flexible, and modernised through reforming its 
terms on the basis of evolutionary approach that does not clash with any current barriers.  
 
 
 
4.9 The Overview of IPC in comparison with the present buyback: Great but not enough 
forwards steps 
Following the successful nuclear negotiation, and subsequently removing the harsh 
sanctions which have been discussed in details in the past sub-chapter, the new Iranian 
government announced that Iran will offer the more attractive version of buyback with 
more financial incentives, and less restrictive provisions. This is because of the fact that the 
existing contractual scheme is not as attractive as other regional producers which prevents 
foreign investors to take equity stakes in Iranian companies or book reserves. Thus, the new 
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Iranian government have realised that in order to attract the estimated rate of foreign 
investment, the terms of current financing method shall be made considerably more 
relaxing.317 As a result, the international oil and gas companies began to prepare with great 
interest to consider the proposal of Iranian government regarding new contractual structure 
to govern the operation of foreign investors in the Iranian oil and gas industry, thus, many 
international oil companies have already visited Tehran including Shell, Eni, German and 
British trade delegation for the purpose of anticipation of more favorable investment 
terms318 . Therefore, the Iranian government truly realised that solely removing the 
sanctions cannot satisfy all Iran’s needs to absorb foreign investments, as the industry 
situation, and price of oil compared to earlier than imposing  sanctions have been changed 
which highlights the crucial necessity of required reforms in current Iranian model of 
buyback. However, the failure of Iranian government to obtain early economic gains in the 
energy sector, as well as the Conservative Party’s opposition regarding the new terms of 
buyback led to challenges of applicability of new model of buyback, and subsequently the 
durability of the nuclear agreement. Moreover, the serious debate between the 
Government, and the Parliament regarding the necessity of Parliament, and the Security 
Council ratification of the new version of buyback, as well as, reaching the presidency 
election in the next year delayed the process of practicing the new generation of buyback, 
and subsequently created the huge uncertainty with regard to applicability of the model. As 
a result, exercising the new version of buyback depends on the political view of the next 
Government, thus, this fact highlights the influence of political issues on Iran’s energy 
industry which has been historically existed, and discussed in the second chapter. Therefore, 
this sub-chapter is aimed to compare the new version of buyback with current method in 
order to analyse the efficiency of new provisions in attracting the foreign investors, 
moreover, the following table will demonstrate the differences of two versions319.   
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The value of the generated oil in Iran before the sanction was about $100 billion through 
the buyback which was a massive growth compared to $40 billion generated in the past 
twenty years320, however, Iran still desires foreign investment for development of its 
petroleum industry, particularly in exploration phases which need enormous investment321, 
as well as, to finish several exploration fields that their probability of success is almost 70% 
such as the Karoon province (Azadigan, Dar-Khoveen and Yaaran) which is capable to 
generate 2,000,000 b/dduring 60 months, while the current production rate is 700,000 
barrels per day. Therefore, it was estimated by the Iranian Oil Minister that Iran requires 
minimum $40 billion for increasing the oil generation of 4,600,000 b/d322, thus, the country 
is extremely concerned for absorbing international investment for modernising the 
petroleum productions, and also growing amount of petroleum production as Hassan 
Rohani, the new president of Iran, highlighted at the 44th World Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland in January 2014,  present situation of Iran’s petroleum industry, its necessity for 
foreign investment323, and subsequently invited international oil companies to invest within 
Iranian petroleum projects by announcing the Iranian government’s purpose to offer the 
more flexible version of buyback324.  Thus, He, the current president of Iran Hassan Rohani, 
pointed out the most significant elements within the future category in Iranian buyback 
which are below: 
Abolishing all fiscal as well as practical barriers with consideration of the borders of the 
common global legal framework in order to develop the relationship between the country 
and other International petroleum corporations.  
Offering more attractive agreements for IOCs as an incentive for cooperation with the 
country within the discovery as well as operation activities 
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Conveying new knowledge to the country’s oil sector for growing national skills, in order to 
enable domestic corporations to contribute to IOCs within international petroleum market, 
as well as industry325. 
Accordingly, the Iranian Oil Minister, Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, emphasized that the major 
aims of these contacts are encouraging the foreign investments, as well as, transferring the 
newest technologies in oil and gas upstream operations326. Moreover, the department of 
reviewing agreements within NIOC stated that, “Signing the win-win contracts” would be 
the NIOC’s preference regarding defending the “national interests of the country”327, 
moreover it has been pointed out that such agreements are not established to recognise the 
“ownership right” in favour of for international companies328. Thus, applicability of any 
radical change towards another model containing the permission of foreign ownership of oil 
product such PSA has been rejected, while the strategy of the new government is practicing 
the evolutionary approach in order to increase the efficiency of the buyback329. On this 
basis, the new version of Iranian buyback with its changed terms has been debated amid 
Iranian officials330.  
As an consultant of Iranian petroleum department dealing with creating the new transaction 
method, Mehdi Hosseini, has proposed the flexible fee method to guarantee the 
profitability of buyback for foreign contractor even in the event of fluctuations in the oil 
price that will lead to decreasing the associated degrees of risk of compensation for the 
IOCs in a buyback project, while the method of payment in the current model of buyback is 
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fixed which has been discussed in the second sub-chapter that bears the risk of incomplete 
compensation for IOCs, as well as, the risk of non-profitability of the project for NIOC331.   
Although, the new version of buyback similar to the current method does not grant the 
discovery and exploration right at the same contract, as Mehdi Hosseini highlighted the 
prioritisation of the discoverer contractor to conduct the entire development operations of 
the field has been confirmed in this new scheme332. Therefore, the new version in this 
regard does not have any particular novelty other than prioritisation right, unless, the new 
version proposes some financial incentives for discoverer contractors such tax reduction in 
order to motivate them to employ their highest technology and efforts to find oil, thus, this 
provision needs to be more revised, otherwise, it is still an unattractive terms of Iranian 
buyback. In contrast with this element of the above-mentioned provision the new scheme 
changed the common rule of Iranian buyback’s generation via granting another opportunity 
to conduct further exploration, if the contractor fails to find a commercial-scale reservoir333, 
while, in other generations of buyback the agreement would be automatically nulled, if a 
company was not successful in discovering oil after an exploration phase. Accordingly, this 
new element of the discovery right provisions will decrease the high risk of oil discovering 
for foreign partners operating in Iranian energy fields, and subsequently can offer a more 
attractive feature of Iranian buyback for the aim of absorbing foreign investment334.  
The new version includes a novelty regarding the cost estimation issue as it has been 
defined in the last sub-chapters as  a significant risk for foreign contractor in buyback, owing 
to the fact that the price of operation in time of concluding the agreement might be vary 
from the time of actual operation. While in the current method the contractor is obliged to 
provide the cost estimation of the entire operation in the beginning of contractual 
negotiation, based on the new scheme, the Iranian oil ministry annually evaluates necessary 
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expenses, and preserve outcome for supplier by reviewing the reservoirs condition, so as, 
the contractor may be awarded if He can decrease the development costs.  Although this is 
an improvement in the provision of the cost estimation to minimise the risk on the 
contractor, as conducting the annual cost estimation for the oil ministry might be 
sometimes hard because of lack of enough data, and technical experience which will lead to 
the bureaucratic process of finalising the contract, thus, this study proposes the flexible cost 
estimation obligation on the beginning of the project with capacity of annually being 
updated335. Accordingly, this solution will minimise the risk for IOC, and also does not lead 
to any further bureaucratic process of establishing a buyback contract336.  
Basically the duration of the buyback contract as it is showed in this chapter is a crucial 
criticisms of IOCs which also affected the national interest of Iranians in petroleum deals337. 
The short duration of buyback which stems from the negative historical experience of 
concessions will be ended earlier than maximising the field production, thus, it is vital risks 
for IOCs as it is unclear that they can compensate their costs by the end of the contract. 
While the current buyback duration is 5-7 years with the capacity of extending the duration 
which leads to the bureaucratic process of negotiation, the new version proposes the 
duration of 20-25 years which seems more practical in oil and gas industry338. This change 
which does not breach any barriers, can attract more foreign investors, as it ensures the 
profitability of the project, moreover, it will defend the national interest of Iranians in oil 
and gas deals, owing to the fact that the IOCs have enough time for maximising the field 
production, and conducting the provisions of transferring the technology339.  
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In current buyback agreement the contractors are required to pay for all exploration costs 
and recover their investment from any production at a pre-arranged rate of return. The 
Capex set fixed as per agreed MDP with NIOC within 18-24 month from contract date which 
bears a high risk on IOCs, as they are obliged to possess the Capex in the beginning of the 
project. However, in contrast with Capex ceiling in the current model, the new Iranian 
buyback contract includes the JV will create the master development plan and has 
provisions to allow changes in Capex if needed such as a yearly budget and mid-range work-
plan that have to be developed and approved by the JV. Therefore, as a result of this 
change, the risk of providing the Capex will be minimised, as it has to be dealt by JV which 
has more flexibility than Capex ceiling, thus, it removed a restrictive feature of buyback with 
no clash of any prohibition340.  
The issue of geographical differences in oil and gas related activities is significant from the 
point that it is the main element in estimation of the cost of discovery and exploration 
phases, and subsequently the revenue of parties in an agreement. While such a vital topic is 
being left in the current buyback which bears high risk for those contractors working in 
more geographically complex field, as they have to employ more capital and efforts with the 
same reward with contractors operating in less complex field. However, the new scheme 
has this novelty to consider the complexity factor in order to assess the contractors’ reward. 
Based on the IPC new terms, risk-reward element is connected to the complexity of fields 
which ensures to pay companies higher fees for ‘very high risk’ on- and offshore fields 
compared with ‘low-risk onshore’. This new provision will attract more foreign investment 
through taking to account the issue of geographical differences in order to ensure the full 
compensation of the IOCs working in high risk fields341.  
Basically, the high civil risk of area where the oil and gas activities are being operating 
resulted in to considering the issue of civil responsibilities in petroleum legal framework. 
This is because of the fact that such activities may produce dangerous situations for the 
entire city such as fire, different sort of pollutions, disruption of water and harmful effects 
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for the environment. However, the current buyback left aside the issue of corporate civil 
responsibilities which has been shown in the last sub-chapter as an important gap in its 
governing law342. As a result, this gap led to ignoring the rights of oil field’s citizens in Iran 
which is against the core concept of Iranian buyback to protect the national interest of 
Iranians in petroleum deals. In contrast, based on the new version of buyback IOCs are 
expected to undertake civil, and other social projects such as building hospitals, water tank 
and electricity system in oil-producing regions. Although this is a significant improvement in 
Iranian buyback in favor of Iranian citizens, it will bear another obligation on IOCs which in is 
not in comply with the aim of IPC to provide the more flexible provisions to attract foreign 
investors. Therefore, this study in order to ensure the rights of oil field’s citizens, as well as 
not to bear another obligation on IOCs proposes that IPC could determine certain financial 
incentives such as tax reduction for those contractors that carry out the cooperate civil 
responsibilities. Therefore, as this approach will award the IOCs efforts regarding the above 
mentioned issue does not create another contractual duty for IOCs which may be seem to 
be an unattractive provision, and will protect the interest of Iranians, oil fields citizens in 
particular. The second deficiency of this new provision is lack of consideration of 
environmental concerns such as pollution, decommissioning and any change to the field’s 
ecosystem. Lack of this vital topic in both current and the new Iranian buyback, IPC, will 
undermine the rights of Iranians in petroleum deals, as some of such issues have to be 
arranged in the beginning of the operation, moreover, ignoring the environmental concerns 
in oil and gas operations will results in to destroying the environment which has serious 
social effect such as force movement343.  Therefore, this study based on the evolutionary 
approach highlights the necessity of more comprehensive, and up-to-date model of buyback 
to ensure the issue of environmental concerns as a mutual responsibility of NIOC and 
IOCs344.  
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 The subject of local content is vitally crucial in Iranian buyback, as this model is based on 
the idea of protecting the Iranian interest against IOCs. The local content in the current 
buyback is a part of the restrictive provision which only allows IOCs to cooperate with 
Iranian oil companies, thus, this provision created a restriction for IOCs, as they are required 
to cooperate with certain companies which could not commercially beneficial for them. 
However, the IPC chooses the more flexible approach in this regard through permitting IOCs 
to cooperate with Iranian foreign JVs, even though, the first priority is cooperation with 
Iranian companies345. Albeit, this new provision is more flexible than the present provision 
of buyback, it still restricts the IOCs choice to choose their commercial partner which led to 
discourage the foreign investor. As a result, on the basis of the evolutionary approach this 
work proposes to award contractors which work with Iranian companies, so as, this 
provision dose not limit the IOCs party autonomy in the contract.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The current Iranian buyback compared to IPC346 
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Terms of Contract 
 
Current buyback 
 
New Version of buyback , IPC 
 
Ownership right 
 
               NO 
 
                   NO  
 
Method of Payment 
 
      Pre agreed/ fixed 
 
      Flexible/ Unfixed 
 
Discovery and 
Exploration right  
 
 
               Separated  
 
 
 
 
Separated with more flexibility   
 
Cost estimation  
 
 
To be conducted in the 
beginning by the contractor 
  
To be annually provided by 
Ministry of Oil  
 
Duration  
 
 
 
5-7 years with  No reserves 
booking for the IOC 
 
 
            20-25 years 
 
 
 
 
Capex 
 
Capex ceiling; Entire risks on 
IOCs 
 
                   JV plan  
 
Geographical 
differences 
Not being considered  
 
Taken into consideration through  
risk-reward element 
Corporate civil  
responsibility 
       No provision 
 
       Being considered 
Local content 
 
Obligatory  and Strict 
 
 Obligatory  but More flexible 
 
160 
 
 
 
 
 
This sub-chapter compared the provisions of the current buyback with the new scheme of 
Iranian buyback named as the IPC. It has been shown that despite of all criticisms against 
Iranian buyback, the new reforms in buyback may be considered as great forward step for 
ensuring of more progressiveness, and flexibility in the model. The main attempt for the 
above-mentioned aim is combination of the unfixed rate of return with recognition of 
responsibility for NIOC to restore the IOC’s margin by supplying more oil from other projects 
when IOC’s rate of return of a buyback project is affected, as a result of falling the world oil 
price. This is considered as the obligation of Iranian government which distinguishes Iranian 
buyback with other buyback in Venezuela and Algeria347. Therefore, the element of offering 
more oil production to the IOCs in the event of declining the oil price is a significant element 
for ensuring flexibility of the regime which can, subsequently strengthen the bargaining 
power of NIOC in future energy, especially after the removing the sanctions348. Thus, this 
new deal can provide a great chance for both Iranian and International contractors to 
establish commercial viable agreements by lifting sanctions, and subsequently grant an 
opportunity for development of Iran’s oil and gas fields, as well as higher income for IOCs349. 
Consequently, such an attitude within the government confirms the applicability of 
proposed solution of this study for the goal of making the model more attractive through 
applying the evolutionary approach with no need to breach of any laws or shifting to 
another model350. 
However, despite of effective changes regarding applying more flexible requirements about 
cost estimation, duration, capex, graphical differences, SCR, and local content, the 
comparative analysis of two versions has been clarified that the Iranian buyback is in dire 
need to enjoy a comprehensive and up to-date governing law which is  independent of 
political parties. Moreover, the issue of bureaucracy and providing financial incentives and 
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environmental concerns have not been considered in IPC, even though, this study dealt with 
them in the second sun-chapter, and proposed solutions351. Furthermore, the IPC suffers 
from establishment of an academic research institute to collect and organise the related 
data in order to diminish the cost of discovery, and accelerate the process of maximising the 
production rate352. Finally, the different view of political parties towards the IPC, the serious 
debate between parliament and the government regarding the need to ratify the IPC, and 
the future presidential election provide great doubt with regard to the applicability of the 
IPC which plays a main role in creating confusion, and subsequently unattractiveness 
feature of buyback. Other than the framework of the model, the structure of NIOC should 
be upgraded in order to ensure the capability of absorbing foreign investments after 
removing the sanctions which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter.  
 
4.10 Issue of asymmetric data with regard to the shift of NIOCs customers from EU to 
India and China: The crucial need to establish a research institute within NIOC to organise 
and analyse the information 
Following the comparison of the current buyback with IPC which led to prove the necessity 
and applicability of the evolutionary approach towards the future of the model with grater 
changes, analysing the structure of NIOC as the main body of Iranian government in 
petroleum deals seems essential for the aim of Iran to maximise the rate of production 
through absorbing foreign investments. Such analysis is important from the point that some 
criticisms which have been dealt in the past sub-chapters arise from the structure of the 
NIOC. Therefore, this study to provide the full image of Iranian buyback will offer the 
consideration of NIOCs structure with regard to the issue of asymmetric data353. 
The technical insight of IOCs regarding oil fields' features in many cases is more than the 
state government. However, it does not mean that they have complicated technical data 
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that state government do not possess, it rather highlighted that IOCs have more practical 
experience, and information system compared to the host government. This is because of 
the fact that IOCs have been operating in different countries with similar features. Since the 
operation of oil field contains a lot of risks and uncertainties, experience is essential to 
utility the newest technology and framework for increasing the oil recovery of the project. 
Accordingly, although, it seems that NIOC’s data should be more than IOC’s, however, as the 
NIOC’s data are not centralised, organised and converted into information, they would not 
serve the benefit of the NIOC in petroleum arrangements354. Therefore, proper collection, 
processed data and updated information are the main strengths of international companies 
compared to NIOCs which suffers from existed problem in the analysable and useful 
information. Moreover, from the legal point of view since IOCs have concluded numerous 
kinds of contracts with various countries, political systems and domestic rules, they possess 
great experience regarding solving contractual issues, as well as finding solutions to settle 
down the disputes. Therefore, IOCs can enjoy such experiences in order to raise the 
capability of establishing new contracts; however, for NIOC it requires extensive legal 
studies to gain information in mentioned areas which needs to worldwide investigation of 
the oil lawsuits and claims. Although this deficiency cannot absolutely be resolved, it is 
definitely eliminable to a large extent, as there is no need for inaccessible technology to 
gather an inclusive database of the country's petroleum resources and its development 
movement. Such a purpose can be achieved through the organisational, and management 
adjustments of NIOC, as vital information of IOC’s success and failure in using new 
technologies on various oil fields around the worlds is certainly demonstrable. Therefore, it 
would certainly be possible for National Iranian Oil Company to collect database regarding 
the global petroleum resources by using expert personnel355.  
Furthermore, the recent changes in oil market such as self-sufficiency of America which can 
be a large and trustable exporter of oil to EU, utilising the new technology of shield oil in 
European countries such as Poland, and the increasing need of developing countries such as 
China and India towards oil to accelerate their economy will steadily change the buyer of 
Iranian oil from EU to Asia, additionally, although all companies may be familiar with related 
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technology, the practical result of the operation is not recognised to all of them, particularly 
for new entries in Iranian oil sector, Chinese  and Indian oil companies. Therefore, in this 
scenario the importance of having an institute for NIOC to generate such information is 
absolutely clear for Iran, as NIOC can enter into contractual negotiations with IOCs which 
have not worked in Iran in a more dominant position through achieving technical and 
financial information on IOCs, epically considering the fact that the number of companies 
that cooperate with Iranian government is not much356. As a result, although gathering 
information on status of projects, level of investments, financial condition and new 
investment opportunities of an international company is certainly difficult, it is not 
impossible, as it enables NIOC to update its current data which facilitates the cooperation 
with new partners such as Indian and Chinese oil companies357. Consequently, this study 
highlights the dire need of  NIOC to have an institute to provide the symmetric information, 
as NIOC in negotiations with IOCs can protect the Iranian national interest in better way, 
thus, Iranian research institute should gather and centralised the data of Iranian fields, as 
well as, financial ,technical and  legal data of IOCs.  
 
4.11 Conclusion: The dire need of Iran in applying the necessary reforms after lifting the 
sanctions  
The economic inefficiency of the Iranian model of buyback, as well as the adverse economic 
situation of the oil business in the world require the Iranian government to consider the dire 
need of improving its method of oil transactions. Moreover, the harmful effect of sanctions 
on Iranian oil industry which suffered the economy of Iran emphasised the urgency of such 
reforms within the mechanism of buyback, as the current practice of the model aggravated 
the adverse influence of sanctions358. As it has been discussed in first three chapters the 
historical, political and legal considerations of buyback demonstrated that the most 
applicable alternative to absorb more foreign investment following the lifting the sanctions 
is applying the evolutionary approach, as any shift to another contractual framework will 
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confront with serious historical, political and legal barriers. Moreover, examination of the 
four generations of Iranian buyback proved the applicability of such approach which has 
been practiced by Iranian government, even though, this study emphasised on the 
inadequacy of applied reforms within the buyback. Therefore, based on these carried out 
analyses this chapter employed the evolutionary approach to improve the Iranian buyback 
considering all discovered historical, political and legal concerns. This chapter through 
examining the criticisms received by both parties in buyback highlighted the shortcomings 
of buyback arising from the nationally supportive nature of the model, and proved the 
necessity of having balance between interests of both parties through changing the legally 
binding provisions to financially incentives terms, providing the independent legal 
framework, and certain governing law for the model. Furthermore, critical comparisons of 
Iranian buyback with production sharing agreements, service contracts and international 
version of buyback showed that many restrictive features of Iranian buyback can be revised 
through integrating the developed terms of above-mentioned mechanisms with no clash 
with any prohibition which will improve the efficiency of the model such as provisions 
related to duration of contract, transfer of technology, method of payment, arbitration and 
termination of agreement359.  Therefore, it is possible to integrate certain aspects of other 
financing scheme to elevate the current version of Iranian buyback, due to the fact that the 
Constitutional prohibition of PSAs or other service contracts do not determine that their 
essential parts are unmatchable to existing buyback’s structure which has been applied in 
this chapter. 
The consideration of practicing the production sharing agreement in Iran illustrated the 
inapplicability of employing revolutionary approach because of the historical, political and 
legal barriers that have been resulted from concessionary deals and the nationalisation 
event. Finally, this chapter demonstrated the fact that merely removing the sanctions is not 
adequate for Iranian governments to reach its aim to renew Iran’s oil industry, as well as to 
return to its previous position in the global oil market, thus, carrying out serious reforms 
within the present model of buyback is essentially required as they have been prescribed in 
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this study. Accordingly, following the analysis of Iranian buyback from historical, political 
and legal angles in the past three chapters it has been highlighted in this chapter that Iran 
considering its ambitious plan, as well as the situation of market is in dire need to carry out 
reforms to make the buyback more attractive, thus, this chapter employed the evolutionary 
approach to propose reforms that they can modernise the model with no clash with any 
constraints introduced in previous chapters. However, following this substantive analysis of 
the buyback it seems vital to examine the practical procedure of Iranian buyback in the next 
chapter in the form of considering some oil projects. Such consideration which is missed in 
many studies will provide the practical analysis of Iranian buyback for the aim of illustrating 
the restrictive provisions of buyback, and more importantly to point out the effect of 
applying evolutionary reforms on the model form the practical point of view. 
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Chapter 5:  The Case study on Iranian Buyback: The examination of the evolutionary 
approach from the practical point of view 
 
5.1 Introduction: Function of Buyback in Practice 
Following the introduction of buyback after occurrence of the 1979 Islamic revolution Iran 
concluded limited number of contracts with foreign contractors to develop its oil fields. 
However, realising the inefficiency of the model to reach the country’s economy’s aims 
resulted in re-evaluation of buyback in the early 1990s360, and accordingly beginning the 
introduction of four generations of buyback which have been discussed in the third chapter 
of this study. Therefore, such inefficiency highlighted the fact that Iranian government is not 
able be isolated from petroleum global contractual framework, as well as the country’s need 
to access the overseas technical and financial investment. As a result, Iranian government in 
consequence of poor economy situation endeavored to improve the terms of buyback with 
consideration of the Constitutional prohibitions which this study proposed it as the 
evolutionary approach towards the future of Iranian buyback, thus, Iranian government 
began to offer more attractive version of buyback to govern its projects in order to 
accelerate the establishing of buyback contracts to develop the Iranian oil fields361. 
Accordingly, following the substantive analysis of Iranian buyback carried out in the last 
three chapters from historical, political and legal perspectives this chapter will consider the 
practical examination of Iranian buyback through analysing four oil field projects. In fact, 
this chapter which is divided in to four sub-chapters will highlight the effect of unattractive 
features of buyback which have been discussed in details in the third and the fourth chapter 
of this work on low efficiency of the current function of model on the past projects from the 
practical view, and more importantly will point out the practical influence of carrying out 
the proposed reforms in the last chapter based on the evolutionary approach on the future 
mechanism of  Iranian buyback. 
Providing the practical consideration of Iranian buyback which has been missed in many 
studies on the issue of Iranian buyback will enable this work to offer the fully understanding 
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of the function of buyback in order to foresee the future development of the model. Such 
consideration will prove the necessity, and applicability of applying vital reforms within the 
framework of the model on the basis of evolutionary approach to modernise mechanism 
the model in this particular time after the removing the nuclear sanctions, and low price of 
oil in the market.  
Accordingly, for above-mentioned aims the first sub-chapter will consider the Bangsetan 
project, and will show the practical effect of unnecessarily restrictive provisions of Iranian 
buyback on demotivating the both domestic and international contractor, as well as the 
influence of carrying out the proposed reforms in the last chapter from the practical view. 
The second sub-chapter via examining the Azadegan project deals with the impact of 
offering an attractive version of buyback on resisting against the foreign sanctions, and 
accordingly will prove the efficiency of applying the evolutionary reforms in future practice 
of the model. The serious need of the county to carry out some reforms within the buyback 
will be scrutinised in the third sub-chapter through considering the adverse effects of the 
high competition in the oil market, former sanctions and unstable governmental policy 
toward foreign involvement in oil industry which have been extracted from concerning the 
Southpars project. Analysing the Yadavaran project in the last sub-chapter will demonstrate 
the effect of unattractive method of oil transaction on aggravating the consequence of 
nuclear sanction on Iranian oil industry, and subsequently will show the Iranian government 
conservative position in applying some limited reforms within the model which highlights 
the accuracy of chosen solutions of this study to apply the evolutionary approach rather 
than shifting to any model362.  
5.2 The Bangestan oil field project363: Consequence of unattractiveness of the model on 
NIOCs’ decision to replace the foreign contractor by the domestic oil company  
The Bangestan field, around Ahwaz within Khoozestan region, is a large oil block. This 
contract concluded between NIOC and PIDC364 with value of $900 million that predicted of 
massive production level, 80,000 and 110,000 b/d; however, this contract terminated in the 
early stages, as the two parties rapidly fell into dispute. PIDC claimed the non-verification of 
                                                 
362 Mohammad Reza Saber, Buyback Contracts in Upstream oil and gas sector and its legal effects, International commercial law PHD 
dissertation, Azad University, International Postgraduate Centre, 2007, Tehran. 
363 Kakhki, Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati (2008) A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the context of international petroleum 
contractual systems, Durham theses, Durham University.  P218 
364 Petrol Iran Development Company 
 
168 
 
the project as the reason to create the dispute, while NIOC proposed the difference amid of 
preservation, as well as operation structure with what has already been agreed upon as the 
key element for finishing the deal365. This sub-chapter in the following section is aimed to 
demonstrate the deficiency of the model from practical point of view to emphasis the 
necessity and efficiency of the applying the solutions that this study have offered based on 
the evolutionary approach. 
 
a) Unnecessarily restrictive provisions of buyback: The main reason of the dispute  
Basically, most of Iranian oil fields including the Bangestan field are suffering from the drop 
in production, as a result of ageing the wells which increases the cost, and the time of 
operation. Therefore, NIOC focused on finding a solution for this problem, as well as to 
increase generated b/d of Bangestan field. For this purpose, NIOC began to negotiate with 
foreign oil companies including BP, Shell, Total and Eni regarding the operation of the 
Bangestan oil field which led the companies to submit bids for the 3 phases of Bangestan, 
however, NIOC refused to accept their bids, since the plan was included different stages 
within the length 15 to 20 years, while NIOC offered 3 to 5 years contract for only one phase 
of the field. Therefore, as it has been mentioned in the last chapter, the unnecessary 
restrictive provisions of Iranian buyback mainly resulting from short duration of the 
contract, and separation of different phases of the operation demotivated the foreign 
contractors to establish the deal with NIOC. In fact, they were reluctant to invest in Iranian 
oil fields for such short periods, owing to the fact that the operation seems to remained 
uncompleted in such considerably small period particularly with technical difficulties arising 
from ageing the wells, thus, they refused to fund such expensive projects that contains such 
high commercial risk366.  Due to their failure to reach an agreement, NIOC was forced to 
consider the establishing of the deal with the national oil companies, thus, NIOC quickly 
concluded the deal with Petroleum Iran Development Company. However, the restrictive 
provisions of Iranian buyback as mentioned in the case of foreign oil companies created the 
dispute between NIOC and PIDC which resulted in to early termination of the deal.  
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Accordingly, as it has been discussed in the fourth chapter of this work the unnecessarily 
restrictive provisions of Iranian buyback stemming from the legal framework of the model 
demotivated the both national and international contractor, and subsequently failed the 
parties to reach an agreement. In order to revise these unattractive provisions of buyback 
for the aim of absorbing more foreign investment in oil industry after removing the nuclear 
sanctions this study based on the evolutionary approach proposed the applicable reforms in 
the last chapter that do not breach any barrier in Iran. This study regarding the issue of 
short duration of buyback suggests that the necessary duration of every contract should be 
determined after precise estimation of capacity of the field, and necessary operation 
activities to maximise the rate of production. Applying such a change which does not breach 
any legal, political and historical barriers ensures the interest of both parties in maximising 
the production rate, as well as avoids the negative experience of Iranians regarding the long 
duration of the concessions to exploit the Iranian natural resources367. Moreover, this study 
as proposed in the last chapter regarding the separation of granting the discovery right from 
development right suggests that the NIOC should be obliged to grant the development right 
to the contractor that successfully finished the discovery phase. This reform that does not 
confront any constrains will change the unnecessarily restrictive provision of buyback to the 
financial incentive which ensure the benefit of both parties, as in this scenario the foreign 
contractor is motivated to quickly start the production phase which is in favour of NICO as 
well.  
 
5.3 Development of Azadegan field368: Japanese Investment in Iranian oil sector despite of 
American pressure 
Azadegan field, in southern part of Iran, around Iraqi edge, is Iranian biggest oil field with 
estimation of 27 billion b/d. Following complex discussions with Japanese, they promised 
for 4 billion dollar during 36 months which led both governments to establish a 3 billion 
dollar deal to operate the field369. This sub-chapter in succeeding part is aimed for 
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considering efficiency of offering more attractive version of buyback based on the proposed 
solutions of this study in the fourth chapter of this work.  
 
a) American pressure to terminate the deal: The influence of commercially beneficial deal 
for foreign contractor 
The American pressure on Japanese government was announced by the English newspaper 
370 for terminating the oil agreement with Iranians in order to minimize the revenue of the 
country because of the US goal to stop the Iran’s nuclear program. However, since 
Japanese's petroleum industry was massively dependent upon receiving Middle Eastern 
oil371, such dependency secured the oil agreement amid Iranians and Japanese In fact, Japan 
signed the contract, despite the pressure from the US, as its economy needed Iran as the 
reliable supplier to provide petroleum for Japan industry.  Moreover, NIOC proclaimed that 
this project was interesting for Japanese, as Iranian experts conducted special discovery 
analysis, as well as field’s research372. Therefore, Japan had a particular interest in 
developing of this field to operate the project as the contractor. On the other hand, NIOC 
was also motivated to grant the contract to Japan, as the corporation contains absolutely 
positive reputation in operating the petroleum fields during the history, especially within 
period of the Persian Gulf War373. Furthermore, NIOC was chasing to provide an opportunity 
for national Iranian companies to display themselves at the international level374. 
Overall, this deal was concluded despite the foreign pressure, US in particular, as it was 
beneficial for both parties. It demonstrated the fact that if a contract is commercially vital 
for forging investors; they do sign the contract to operate in the field, even if in the event of 
pressure from other powerful countries. The signing of this project by Japan despite the 
American pressure showed that if Iran can make the current model of buyback more 
attractive by removing the unnecessarily restrictive provisions of buyback, and creating 
financial incentives as they have been demonstrated in the last chapter of this work, foreign 
contractors will be willing to work in Iran’s field, particularly in this present time after 
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removing the nuclear sanctions. Therefore, this case proves the Iranian oil industry with no 
need to shift to another model can absorb more foreign investment via carrying out the 
evolutionary reforms, as this method, as has been discovered in the last chapter, will create 
financial incentives, and accordingly will offer more commercially beneficial deal to IOCs.    
 
5.4 South Pars project375: Offering more flexible terms for foreign investors, as a result of 
high competition between Iran and Qatar 
A discovered block in the Southern part of with estimation of eventual production of 
100,000 bp/d376 of crude oil which was supposed to be shared by Iran and Qatar. The high 
capacity of the filed, as well as the competition with Qatar motivated Iranian government to 
accelerate the negotiation with contractors through minimising the bureaucracy, and 
offering more flexible terms of buyback, as NIOC announce the Iranian government 
willingness to conclude the agreement regarding the project until May 2003 which resulted 
in creation of special interest amid foreign large oil companies such as Total, Gazprom, BP 
and Malaysia's Petronas. Therefore, the government’s intention to quickly develop the 
South Pars field resulted in to establishing the several contracts with foreign oil companies 
for operation of the field. The two following sections will examine the case from practical 
point of view in order to demonstrate the efficiency of reforms that this study on the basis 
of evolutionary approach proposed in the last chapter regarding the shortcomings of 
buyback to make the model more attractive.  
 
a) The US bilateral sanction regarding the deal: Impact of offering more flexible terms of 
buyback 
While Iran was determined to attract foreign investors to participate the operation of the 
field, US sanctions appeared to inhibit some foreign contractors to participate the Iran's 
energy industry. The US attempted to avoid the foreign contractors to invest in Iranian oil 
sector through applying the American bilateral embargo, 1996, which used to deter several 
European, Japanese and Australian energy companies from undertaking development 
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projects in Iran377. Nevertheless, the situation was distinguishing in this project, owing to 
the fact that the tendency of the government was in favor of foreign involvement in oil 
industry, as a result of high competition with Qatar. Therefore, NIOC began to offer more 
flexible terms of buyback such as minimising the length of negotiation and bureaucracy, and 
technical consultancy in order to attract foreign investors to the south pars project.  As a 
result, several large oil companies such as Total, Lukoil and Petronas, despite the US 
sanctions established the buyback with Iran for development of South Pars field. 
Accordingly, as it has been mentioned in the last sub-chapter establishing this project 
showed the fact that the more attractive version of Iranian buyback can absorb more 
foreign investment even in the event of foreign imposing sanctions which confirms the 
efficiency of the evolutionary reforms, in the last chapter, rather than the revolutionary 
approach towards the future tendency of the model. Moreover, this case has been 
highlighted the fact that the contractors operating in Iran challenges the US sanctions on 
Iranian oil industry, as the terms of buyback were more flexible for them, thus, approves the 
accuracy of this study’s proposal to apply the evolutionary approach, as NIOC could resist 
the imposing sanctions of US through offering more favorable terms by reforming the 
current provisions of buyback without any clash with legal or social prohibitions378. Hence, 
these facts prove the accuracy, applicability and efficiency of employing the evolutionary 
approach rather than shifting to another model on the basis of the revolutionary approach 
which will be legally, historically and politically confronted in the current situation of Iran, 
therefore, there is no need to move towards the revolutionary approach which confronts 
many barriers as it has been discussed in the last chapters of this study. 
 
b) The Change in Iran’s governmental policy: Instability of buyback tendency towards 
foreign involvement 
Following the initial South Pars contract, NIOC in the light of shifting the government to 
Conservative party began to progressively tighten the flexible terms that offered to other 
developers379. This change in the policy of NIOC towards foreign involvement in oil industry 
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has been stemmed from the fact that the Conservative party supports the desirability of 
foreign contractor’s involvement in energy industry which places in the heart of the political 
debate between Iranian "conservatives" and "reformists". Applying such a policy by the new 
government, as well as the US sanctions to impede investment in the Iranian energy sector 
resulted in to hinder the foreign contractors, and subsequently minimise the role of them in 
Iran’s oil industry. Therefore, many foreign oil companies left the contracts which were 
subsequently granted to the domestic contractors. Accordingly, as it has been mentioned in 
the last chapter the Iranian model of buyback needs to have certain and clear provisions of 
governing law that are independent from the policy of the different governments in order to 
be stable in the event of changing the government. Such change as it has been considered in 
the last chapter on the basis of evolutionary approach does not breach any barrier, and 
more importantly will remove the financial risk of changing the attitude towards foreign 
contractor380. 
Accordingly, this case illustrated the existence of political concerns, until recent, regarding 
foreign involvement in oil sector which highlights the applicability of evolutionary reforms 
rather than revolutionary changes, as the Iranian political atmosphere will resist against 
such radical alteration. Moreover, offering more flexible terms of buyback in this project 
which enabled NIOC to resist the imposing sanctions of US through preserving the foreign 
contractors confirmed the proposal of this study to introduce the evolutionary approach as 
the future alternative of the model381. More importantly, this project emphasised the 
influence of changing the government on attitude of buyback foreign involvement in oil 
industry which requires, as it has been discussed in the previous chapter, Iran to revise its 
petroleum governing law to provide more certain and less ambiguous provisions with 
independency from different political wings. Clearly, offering such a law with above 
mentioned elements can play vital roles in attracting foreign investors to Iran, as they enjoy 
the possibilities of understanding, and predicting the law of the country through ensuring 
the stability of attitude in buyback in the event of changing the governments.  
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5.5 The Yadavaran Oil Field382: The influence of unattractive model of buyback on 
aggravating the nuclear sanctions’ impact on Iranian oil industry 
The Yadavaran field, in Khuzestan province, is originally comprised of two former fields 
which are Koushk and Hosseinieh. Following finding the connection between the two above-
mentioned fields, the both fields was renamed as the Yadavaran field with estimated 
capacity of 18 billion b/d measured to be recoverable383. Iran began to negotiate a contract 
with Sinopec and the Chinese company which was predicted to begin in 2009 384 . 
Accordingly, this case is vital from the point that it established in the time that the US and 
EU aggravated the nuclear sanctions in order to minimise the income of the Iranian 
government from petroleum deals to force the country to stop its nuclear plan, therefore, 
the Iranian government had to offer more attractive version of buyback to preserve the 
foreign contractor working in Iranian oil industry for the purpose of increasing its revenue 
from petroleum deals. This sub-chapter will consider the influence of offering more 
attractive version of buyback from the practical point of view which can confirm the 
efficiency of reforms that have been offered by this study on the basis of evolutionary 
approach. 
 
a) Offering more flexible terms with no clash with any barrier: The only applicable 
solution for current mechanism of buyback 
Imposing the nuclear sanctions on Iranian oil industry from UN, US and EU to stop Iran to 
develop its nuclear plan considerably reduced the rate of oil production from Iranian field. 
In fact, this imposed sanction which combined with unattractive mechanism of Iranian 
buyback resulted in to exclusion of many oil companies from Iranian oil sector which 
decreased the revenue of Iranian government, and considerably damaged the economy of 
Iran. Such event brought the Iranian government to the conclusion that the buyback is in 
dire need of reform to increase the income of the country through absorbing foreign 
investment385. Therefore, Iranian government decided to offer more flexible model of 
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buyback through increasing the rate of return, prolonging the duration of contract and more 
flexibility regarding the obligation of providing the cost estimation prior to the beginning of 
the project. Noticeably, Iranian government offered all these reforms to preserve its 
revenue from petroleum deals as the main income of the country. Accordingly, these 
reforms truly addressed some of criticisms that have been examined in last chapter which 
can act as financial incentives for foreign contractors through minimising the commercial 
risk of operating in Iranian fields386. 
Overall, as it has been shown in this project, some vital changes have been applied within 
the structure of the model to modernise its mechanism which were effective in preserving 
the interest in some IOCs to continue their operation in Iran387. Although this fact confirms 
the efficiency and applicability of the evolutionary approach, this study as it has been 
mentioned in the last chapter emphasised the necessity of developing the extent of more 
serious improvements within the framework of Iranian buyback to reach the Iran’s 
ambitious economy plan.   
 
5.6 Conclusion: The Practical influence of applying the evolutionary approach regarding 
the future development of Iranian buyback 
Basically, present research key goal is to provide comprehensive consideration of Iranian 
buyback from various perspectives in order to propose applicable alternative to increase the 
efficiency of the model. Achieving such goal is not possible without offering the substantive 
analysis of Iranian buyback which have been provided in the first four chapters of this study 
along with examining the practical aspect of the model through considering function of the 
previous projects. In fact this is the distinguishing feature of this work to offer the practical 
study of Iranian buyback in this chapter for the aim of showing the adverse effect of 
unattractive features of the model, as well as demonstrating the potential influence of 
applying the evolutionary reforms, as they have been considered in the last chapter, on the 
future development of Iranian version of buyback.  
This chapter from the practical point of view emphasised the necessity of utilising applicable 
reforms regarding the Iranian method of transaction, as a result of high competition of Iran 
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with other regional producer, as well as the deficiencies of the model including the 
unnecessary restrictive provisions such as short duration of contract which deterred many 
international and domestic oil companies from undertaking petroleum projects in Iranian oil 
fields that could be improved via employing reforms that have been proposed in the last 
chapter on the basis of the evolutionary approach with no need to either shift to any other 
model or breach any barrier in Iran.  Moreover, this chapter showed that offering more 
flexible terms of buyback through applying some reforms could attract the foreign 
contractors even in the event of sanctions against the country which highlights the 
applicability of chosen solution of this study to apply the evolutionary approach which was 
also taken by the Iranian government, as it has been pointed out since the unattractive 
version of buyback aggravated the adverse effect of nuclear sanctions, the Iranian 
government had to apply some limited changes in the model.  
As a result, this chapter confirmed that some efforts have been carried out to make Iranian 
buyback model more attractive, however as it has been suggested in the last chapter the 
extent of reforms must be developed to other unattractive elements of the model including 
political and legal barriers. Accordingly, ensuring such reforms by Iranian government, 
firstly, proved the fact that Iran understood the necessity of applying some changes within 
the mechanism of buyback, and more importantly it confirms the applicability of the 
evolutionary reforms towards the future of buyback, thus, since the analysis of Iranian 
buyback from different angles demonstrated the applicability and efficiency of the 
evolutionary approach as the future alternative of the model,  the examination of the model 
though practical sight in this chapter showed an applicability, as well as effectiveness of 
such solution. Moreover, present case study indicated that despite all deficiencies 
considered in the present and the past chapters regarding the model, they did not prevent 
foreign investment in Iranian oil fields, in fact, whilst the buyback contract is not sufficiently 
attractive method to for developing the petroleum industry, it has reached to few important 
achievement in absorbing investments. Thus, such success confirmed the applicability of 
required reforms within the model on the basis of the evolutionary approach rather than 
shifting to another method, as this shifting certainly will face historical, political and legal 
barriers which has high expenses for the country, especially with consideration of the time 
limit for Iran to return to the global market after lifting the nuclear sanctions. Therefore, 
despite of all changes applied in above-mentioned projects, the Iranian buyback still has 
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high capacity to being modified to compete with commonly used models in the world in 
attracting foreign investors. Accordingly, based on examination of Iranian buyback from 
practical point of view in this chapter the most applicable solution in the current situation 
for Iran towards the future of buyback is to continue more serious reforms that have been 
proposed in the fourth chapter of this work in order to create more flexibility and financial 
incentives, as well as removing, and minimising the restrictive terms and financial risks 
within the buyback. As a result, the main attitude in this study towards the future of 
buyback is employing the evolutionary approach through utilising the applicable reforms 
that do not breach any historical, political and legal barriers for the aim of absorbing more 
foreign investment in order to develop the Iranian oil industry. Consequently, following the 
analysis of Iranian buyback from substantive and practical point of view, and more 
importantly proposed reforms, the short review of the entire thesis will be offered to 
respond the question of this research by combining the historical, political, geo-political, 
legal and practical examination to draw the final conclusion of this work in proposing the 
most applicable alternative to make the Iranian method of transaction more attractive for 
foreign contractors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion: The superiority of the evolutionary approach over the revolutionary 
attitude as the future alternative of Iranian buyback 
Iran as a country with a large amount of natural resources and significant political role in the 
reign has been actively chasing solutions to revitalise the country's economy situation 
through increasing its oil production rate. However, some historical, political, geo-political 
and legal concerns that have been examined in this work restricted Iranian government to 
reach its aim to increase the rate of oil production. The main barrier which has been 
stemmed from the historical, political, geo-political concerns is the Constitutional limitations 
on oil contacts that forbid any ownership or control of foreigners over Iranian natural 
resources. Such restriction which has been based on the idea of nationalisation of Iranian oil 
and gas reserves resulted in to introduction of buyback agreements with its restrictive 
provisions, as the only permitted mechanism to circumvent the legal prohibitions, as well as 
attracting foreign investment. However, many years of practicing Iranian buyback 
demonstrated its low economy efficiency compared to other commonly used model such as 
production sharing agreement, even though, Iran has offered four generations of buyback. 
As a result, this study choses issue of the possible ways of making the Iranian buyback more 
attractive as the research question, and attempted to reply this question by offering five 
chapters to examine the Iranian buyback from different aspects in order to ensure the 
applicability and effectivity of the alternative that will be offered for the future of the 
model. More importantly, this study recognised some gaps in the similar researches on the 
issue of Iranian buyback including lack of historical, geo-political, political examination, and 
also failure to provide the solutions to modernise the Iranian buyback following the critical 
analysis of the model that all have been offered in this work. Therefore, this study proposed 
the comprehensive analysis of Iranian buyback through five chapters for the aim of 
suggesting the applicable reforms to make the model more attractive. As a result, having 
considered the relevant subjects to the topic of Iranian buyback contract in details in 
pervious chapters, this section is designed to review issues have been previously analysed in 
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former chapters of this study to conclude this work by replying the research question of this 
thesis which is possible solution to make the Iranian buyback more attractive.  
Examining the historical concern of Iranian buyback demonstrated that the foreign powers 
took the advantage of the poor economy situation of Iran in the 19th century, and imposed 
the exploitative concessions with unbalanced terms on Iran, as the country was in dire need 
of obtaining income. Such features of concession as the main Iranian method of oil 
transactions in Pre-Nationalisation era created the negative attitude of Iranian regarding the 
involvement of foreigners in oil industry; moreover, this attitude has been aggravated 
following the foreign pressure to impede the effort of Iranian government to make the 
terms of concessions more balanced which led to invade of Iran, and controlling its 
resources during the Second World War. Therefore, consideration of the historical elements 
of Iranian buyback showed that the negative experience of Iranians towards foreign 
involvement in oil sector resulting from the exploitative concessions, as well as ignoring the 
national interest of Iranians in petroleum deals stemming from foreign pressure to preserve 
the terms of concessions are the two major historical reasons of introduction of Iranian 
buyback which prohibited any kind of ownership of foreigners over oil product as the main 
historical concern of Iranian buyback. As a result, based on the historical examination of 
Iranian buyback carried out in the first chapter, shifting to any model that allows the foreign 
ownership of Iranian oil and gas fields will be confronted with this historical concern, thus, it 
demonstrates the superiority of applying the evolutionary approach through utilising the 
applicable reforms which has been chosen by this study. Accordingly, this study covered an 
important gap in other researches which is lack of providing the historical analysis of the 
Iranian buyback. This consideration is a vital issue, as understanding the reasons of adopting 
such a harsh model, and foreseeing its future development will be impossible without 
examining the historical concern of Iranian buyback.  
Political and geo-political analysis of Iranian buyback demonstrated the formation of 
transferring the public discontent resulting from the exploitative concessions to the 
nationalisation of Iranian oil and gas reserves. In fact, the nationalisation event which led to 
adoption of buyback was the response of Iranians towards foreign involvement in oil sector, 
due to the fact that Iranian people recognised the value of their natural resources. As a 
result, this event changed the petroleum legal framework of Iran from concessionary deals 
to contractual system in order to protect the national interest of Iranians in petroleum 
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transactions that is the core trend in current model of Iranian buyback, and created some 
unnecessary restrictive provisions such as transfer of technology and obligation of foreign 
companies to employ Iranian worker in oil project. However, following the removal of the 
Nationalist Government through foreign coup, Iran under pressure of great powers began to 
exercise the production sharing agreement model which denied the main idea of 
nationalisation via allowing the foreign ownership of oil and gas resources. Such a radical 
shift resulted in to public discontent, and generated the economic root of the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution that nullified all the pervious petroleum deals, and applied the Iranian buyback 
with its harsh and restrictive provisions. Therefore, the political and geo-political 
consideration of Iranian buyback highlighted the strong concern against any model that 
permits the ownership of oil product by foreigners, thus, it showed the superiority of the 
evolutionary approach from the political and geo-political perspective that has been 
selected by this study as the effective alternative. Consequently, examining the Iranian 
buyback from the political and geo-political point of view within two absolute significant 
petroleum relevant occasions of Iranian petroleum contractual background, 1951 
Nationalisation and 1979 Islamic Revolution, provided more completed image of the Iranian 
buyback which has been missed in many similar researches on the topic of Iranian buyback. 
Lack of such analysis leads to an inconclusive study on Iranian buyback, as the issue in 
question has strongly attached to the political and geo-political events, moreover, it will 
decrease the applicability of the alternative that this study proposes for the aim of 
increasing the efficiency of the model, due to the fact that it might breach the political and 
geo-political concerns. 
The legal analysis of the Iranian buyback explained the idea behind the adoption of the 
Iranian model of buyback from the legal view. This examination demonstrated that the 
Iranian buyback is a compromising solution to follow the Constitutional prohibition 
regarding the foreign ownership of Iranian petroleum sector, and meeting need of country 
to absorb foreign investment to the oil sector as the main source of income for Iranian 
government, therefore, the buyback model is the only possible way for Iranian government 
to govern its oil transactions. However, the nationally supportive nature of Iranian buyback 
resulting from the idea of the nationalisation event created significant financial risks on 
foreign contractors through ruling many unnecessary restrictive provisions such as fixed rate 
of return. Therefore, a serious necessity is existed for Iran to improve the terms of buyback 
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which has been reflexed via offering four generations of buyback that illustrates the 
applicability of the evolutionary approach with regard to the Iranian buyback. More 
importantly, although the Iranian model of oil transaction is in dire need to be modernised, 
it does not mean every change within the current model can be applicable, as utilising any 
mechanism that includes the ownership of Iranian oil by foreigners will be rejected on the 
basis of the Iranian Constitutional prohibition. As a result, examination of Iranian buyback 
from legal point of view determined the superiority of the evolutionary approach through 
employing the applicable reforms which has been chosen by this study to make the model 
more competitive with other common methods of oil transactions. Accordingly, providing 
the autopsy of the core concept of the Iranian buyback from the legal perspective is 
essential form the point that such analysis highlighted the unattractive features of the 
model through clarifying the present practice of Iranian buyback. Therefore, lack of such 
consideration is in contrary with the goal of this work to offer the comprehensive 
understanding of Iranian buyback from different angles; moreover, it will deprive this study 
from precisely proposing the applicable reforms to improve the problematic provisions of 
buyback with no clash with any historical, political and legal concerns in the current 
environment of Iran after removing the nuclear sanctions. 
The critical dissection of Iranian buyback dealt with the effectiveness and applicability of the 
evolutionary approach towards the future of Iranian buyback. For this aim, examination of 
the criticisms received by both parties in buyback highlighted the unnecessary restrictive 
provisions of the model which have been precisely revised on the basis of the evolutionary 
attitude via rendering a balance between the interests of both parties in buyback, changing 
the legally binding provisions to financially incentives terms, and providing the independent 
legal framework with certain governing law for the model with in the Iranian oil legal 
framework. In addition, critical comparison of Iranian buyback with other internationally 
common methods of oil transactions indicates that many unattractive features of Iranian 
buyback can be revised by integrating the developed terms of other mechanisms which do 
not breach any prohibitions in the present situation of Iranian petroleum framework such as 
provisions related to transfer of technology, method of payment, arbitration and 
termination of agreement. Therefore, the critical dissection of Iranian buyback firstly 
pointed out the shortcomings of Iranian buyback, and in the next stage employed the 
evolutionary approach regarding the future of the model in order to examine the 
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effectiveness and applicability of such attitude for the purpose of modernising of the model. 
In other words, subsequent to illustrating the applicability of the evolutionary approach in 
historical, political, geo-political and legal consideration of the model the critical dissection 
of Iranian buyback proved the effectiveness of such attitude via reforming the unattractive 
elements of the model which showed the superiority of the evolutionary approach 
regarding the future of Iranian model of buyback. Consequently, many similar researches on 
the issue of Iranian buyback merely examined the current mechanism of buyback including 
its deficiencies, and subsequently failed to provide solutions to improve the efficiency of the 
model, while the main goal of this study to provide the examination of Iranian buyback from 
different angles for the aim of offering applicable alternative to make the model more 
competitive as the final outcome of this work. The consideration of Iranian buyback from 
the practical perspective examined the function of buyback in governing of some projects of 
Iranian oil industry in order to analyse the effect of unattractive elements of the model on 
its efficiency, and also foreseeing the future trend of Iranian buyback for the purpose of 
offering the applicable and effective alternative. The analysis of the four Iranian projects 
established in the framework of buyback demonstrated the harmful effect of the 
unattractive features of buyback including the unnecessary restrictive provisions, inflexible 
mechanism, and lack of certain, clear and independent governing law of model in 
demotivating the foreign investors to participate the Iranian oil sector. More importantly, 
consideration of Iranian buyback from practical view showed the applicability and efficiency 
of carrying out the evolutionary approach rather than the revolutionary one, due to the fact 
that despite limiting scope of changes that have been carried out to make Iranian buyback 
model more attractive in analysed projects, such limited changes were effective in 
absorbing foreign investment, thus, employing the evolutionary approach in order to utilise 
more serious reforms can make the model more attractive with no need to shift to any 
other method. Therefore, the examination of Iranian buyback from practical perspective 
demonstrated the superiority of the evolutionary approach through providing the efficiency 
and applicability of such approach in practice. Accordingly, offering the consideration of 
Iranian buyback from practical outlook through analysing some projects which is a vital gap 
in many studies on the issue of Iranian buyback enables this work to examine the efficiency 
and applicability of proposed reforms in this study regarding the future of the model. Lack 
of such analysis will result in to incomplete understanding of the function of buyback, as 
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well as the great doubt regarding the efficiency of proposed reforms in practice of the 
model.  
Consequently, this work has provided detailed examination of Iranian buyback from 
different perspectives in order to comprehensively analyse the Iranian model of buyback for 
the purpose of offering the applicable alternative that can make the model more attractive. 
As a result, this study considered the Iranian buyback from historical, political, geo-political 
and legal points of view, and, more importantly, suggested solutions to improve the 
efficiency of the buyback. Further than the substantive analysis of the model, examining the 
practical aspect of the model through considering the previous projects has been carried 
out to determine the efficiency of the chosen method, the evolutionary approach, to 
modernise the buyback. Consequently, both substantive and practical analysis of Iranian 
buyback carried out in this work demonstrates the efficiency and applicability of the 
evolutionary approach rather than any radical shift on the basis of the revolutionary 
attitude, thus, this study has proven the superiority of the evolutionary reforms over radical 
change in the present Iranian oil industry, even though, the scope of this approach has to be 
developed to enable the model to compete with other model in attracting investors.  
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8. Appendix 
1. Definition of Iranian Buyback from the Council of Ministers Perspective 
 
According to the part five of Article 85 of the Iranian Third Development Plan, a joint 
proposal submitted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Iranian Central Bank with 
regard to the Regulations of Buyback contracts388. 
Consequently, the Council of Ministers issued a decree, which included a number of 
provisions to define the precise nature of the Iranian Buyback arrangements389. They are as 
follow: 
Article Two of the decree explained the basic nature of the agreements by stating that:  
Buyback transactions apply to the transaction methods whereby the investor is responsible 
to provide the investment needed for all or a part of the project to the fund required 
equipment and services. This contains all financial facilities such as capital, services and 
intermediate goods needs for the operation, construction, development and enhancement 
of production or services units. The facilities will be compensated by exportation of goods 
and services acquired by the investment.  
Article Three specified that the "Law Concerning Attraction and Protection of Foreign 
Investment" would regulate all benefits achieved through Buyback transactions. 
Subsequently, this law requires guarantees against confiscation and nationalisation of both 
                                                 
388 Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
389 The Decree was signed by the First Deputy President Hassan Habibi on 29th January 2001 
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property and funds, as well as granting of supplementary protections against sudden 
changes in export laws.  
Article Five rules the situation when the implementation of contracts on the "export of 
mutually agreed upon goods and services", being obstructed by any changes in laws and 
regulations and subsequently, led to the non-fulfilment of the "Investments Receivers’ 
commitments". This Article certifies that: The matured instalments shall be paid to the 
beneficiary in accordance with the same foreign exchange stated in the pertinent contracts 
and in compliance with the regulations of the Law Concerning Attraction and Protection of 
Foreign Investment390.   
In order to ensure the fulfilment of the investors commitments, the Article Six is authorised 
the Investment Receiver to export all output from a single factory, manufacturing 
organisation/company. The Article Seven clarifies that the relevant domestic authority 
would indicate the rate of repayment. For the purpose of facilitating the export of the goods 
or services within the framework of all pertinent regulations, this Article provides that the 
Organisation for Investment, Economic and Technical Assistance of Iran is in charge of 
notifying the Customs, Export Advancement Centre, Central Bank and the managing bank.  
Under Articles Eight and Nine, some protections are guaranteed in favour of the investors 
such as exemption of foreign exchange from any duties, as well as no obligation to return 
the earnings to Iran391. 
Based on the Article Thirteen, any changes to the contract which may affect the financial 
commitments of the parties are restricted. In this regard, the Article determined that: 
Any amendment, alteration or extension of the contract which may cause changes in the 
financial commitments of the contracting parties, shall be permitted only after the 
declaration of opinion of the Organisation for Investment, Economic and Technical 
Assistance of Iran and ratification of the related Ministry and the independent organisation. 
Article Fourteen of the decree requires forming a committee board in order to facilitate the 
procedure of resolving problematic issues, as well as accelerating the process of buyback 
operations. This board is comprised of representatives from the Ministries of Economic 
Affairs, Commerce, and Foreign Affairs, the Management and Planning Organisation, the 
                                                 
390 Petroleum Iran, about Buy-back agreements, (http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html) 18th November 2013 
391 ibid 
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Central Bank, the Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industries and Mines. The aim of the 
board is adopting measures to pursue reports on the conduction of all buy-back projects, 
examining arouse issues, and more importantly, proposing solutions to resolve any 
problems or difficulties for in the event of specific disagreement392.  
 
 
2. Terms and Conditions of Iranian Buyback  
Before defining the terms and conditions of Iranian buyback, the terminology of the 
contract should be clarified for the purpose of providing the deep understanding of the legal 
feature of per side performance in agreement. They are as follows: 
• The Supplier: It can either be a natural or legal entity, which is responsible for funding the 
project, as well as transferring the expertise and the technology to the NIOC. 
• The Buyer: The Buyer in the Iranian Buyback agreements is national Iranian oil company 
that works with authorization of Iran’s Oil Ministry Oil. While NIOC obliged to compensate 
the supplier by sharing the end product, it receives the abovementioned services and the 
technology. 
• Capital Costs:  It refers to the necessary capital to fund all the direct expenditures of the 
project which is covered by the supplier, such as building and engineering the structures, 
purchasing and installing the major equipment, and service-provider fees393.  
• Non Capital Costs: This type of cost is comprised the indirect expenses in operation of the 
development phase which are not categorized in the capital costs classification, such as 
custom duties, training the personnel and paying taxes394.  
• Cost Recovery: Based on the Iranian Buyback, while the foreign party is charged with 
developmental operations, both financially and technically, it enjoys the reimbursement in 
the form of petroleum output. 
• Operating Costs: It consists of all typical expenditures connected to petroleum production, 
labour force maintenance, conducting repairs, and providing vital equipment, including 
pipes, storage tools, drilling machinery and platforms. 
                                                 
392 Petroleum Iran, 21/02/2014 [http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html] 
393 Mobaser et al, op.cit., pg. 54 
394 Rabiee, Faranak, 'Hoghoogh-e-Gharardadha', (Contract Law), Tehran 1391, pg 76 
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• Petroleum Costs: Petroleum Costs are embodied those expenditures which are payable by 
the supplier and mostly defined within the contractual documents pertaining to field395. 
• Development Operations: It is known as conduction operated by the supplier in order to 
develop the certain block as well as assessing its capacity. This conduction could contain the 
following activities396:  
I. Development of wells, including drilling and any other operations with the aim of 
enhancing the quantity of oil being acquired. 
II. Building the installation of drilling platforms, implementation and any other required 
articles for purposes of extraction, processing, and delivering oil to the market. 
III. Providing accommodation, health care facilities, education area and administrative 
centre for the personnel397. 
• Exploration Expenditure: Generally, it represents all expenses created as a result of 
exploration activities related to the particular oil field.  
I. All implements and machineries which are necessary for the act of exploration of oil field. 
II. Logistical costs which are consisting of property rent charges, labour and fuel and 
reparation. 
III. The provision concerning the education of the Iranian personnel to prepare qualified 
technical staff for the final aim of returning the field to the Iranian authorities. 
IV. Costs stemming from the preserving of the original environmental condition, as well as 
the avoidance of pollution resulting by the operations398. 
V. Customs duty payments regarding imported equipment and supplies which are required 
for the conduction of oil operations. 
• Development Phase: It specifies the scheduled time while the supplier exploits the oil field 
based on the development frame. 
• Effective Date: It is the date which the contract commences to the force according to 
agreed provisions and conditions. 
• Master Development plan: MDP is an illustration for forthcoming issue of the oil field 
operation. It is designed to describe the accurate conduction of the field including 
                                                 
395 Ibid. 
396 Petroleum Iran, Iranian oil information portal (http://www.petroleumiran.com/buy-back.html) 21st September 
2013 
397 Farshad Gohar, Naser, 'Seyri Dar Gharardadhaye Naftiye Iran',{ A Survey On Iran's Oil Agreements) Tehran, 1391, pg 262 
398 Mobaser, op.cit., pg.56 
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requirements for the platforms' structural integrity, and a detailed time scale for the 
structure stages, the route for the pipe network, and contingency plans for emergencies399. 
• Maximum Effective level: It clarifies the most probable amount of generated product with 
regard to prevention from loss of oil pressure and any physical damage to the field400. 
 
 
3. International Model of Buyback Contract401 
                                               
 
                                                     Buyback contract 
 
Between 
X (The individual's name or identity of 
company) 
Address of office/Town/Country(Land) 
Y (The individual's name or identity of 
company) 
Address of office/Town/Country(Land) 
 
 
Whereas 
Under a Primary Contract dated------- (hereinafter the "Primary Contract") and the Technical 
Assistance Contract dated---- (hereinafter the "technical assistance contract"), X has sold to 
Y, and Y has purchased from X, under the terms and conditions set forth in the primary 
contract and the technical assistance contract, the machinery and equipment and patents 
                                                 
399 Rabiee, op.cit., pg 76 
400 Mobaser, op.cit., pg. 54 
401 This part is begin borrowed from Kakhki, Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati (2008) A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the 
context of international petroleum contractual systems, Durham theses, Durham University.  P 267 
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and know-how and technical assistance specified therein (hereinafter ''the equipment 
technology"), to manufacture---- (hereinafter ''the products") in Y -land. 
By way of buy-back, and under the terms and conditions set forth in this contract, Y agrees 
to sell to X, and X agrees to purchase from Y, products as specified herein. 
Now, therefore, the parties to this contract agree as follows: 
 
Article 1: The buyback commitment 
1.1 X hereby agrees to buy (or cause the purchase) from Y, under the terms and conditions 
set forth in this contract, products manufactured by Y using the equipment/ technology sold 
by X, and take delivery of the said products. 
1.2 Y hereby agrees to sell to X (or to his assignee (as defined below in Article 6)), under the 
terms and conditions set forth in this Contract, such Products, and to accept the purchase 
by X of such Products as buy-back within the framework of this Contract. 
Article 2: The products 
2.1 The assortment of products to be sold and purchased under this contract is agreed upon 
by the parties in accordance with the provision of article 10 below. 
2.2. Y hereby warrants that sufficient products of the agreed assortment will be available at 
the times specified in article 10 of this contract. 
Article 3: Conformity of the products 
3.1 The products to be delivered shall correspond to the specifications and quality agreed 
upon in the primary contract, and must be of the quantity and assortment required by the 
individual purchase contracts (hereinafter "implementing contract(s)  to be concluded 
within the framework of this contract between Y or his assignee (as defined below in article 
6) in his capacity of seller of the products (hereinafter "the implementing seller" , and X, or 
his assignee (as defined below in Article 6) in his capacity of buyer of the products 
(hereinafter ''the implementing buyer" 
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3.2 The products must be contained or packaged m the manner required by the respective 
implementing contract. 
Article 4: Total value of the buy-back commitment 
4.1. During the term of this Contract X shall purchase from Y Products for the value of either 
(A)----- Or 
(B) Not less than-----per cent ( ---%) of the total------price of the primary contract as specified 
in Article X of the contract, plus not less than ---- per cent (----%)of the total price of the 
technical assistance invoiced in accordance with Article X of the technical assistance 
contract. 
4.2. The value of each of the implementing contracts to be applied against X's buyback 
commitment under this contract shall be---- value of the respective Implementing contract. 
4.3. The value of each of the implementing contracts, if invoiced in a currency other than 
the currency in which X's buyback commitment is set forth here above, shall be applied 
against X's commitment at the exchange rate quoted by the central bank of------ at the date 
of the invoice issued in respect of such implementing contract. 
Article 5: The price of the products will be either: 
(A) 5.1The prices of the Products offered under this Contract shall correspond to 
(1) The price generally charged at the time of the conclusion of the respective implementing 
contract for such products under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned402. 
(2) The fair average market value of the products in the territory (as defined below in pare. 
7.1) under competitive terms of delivery and payment. 
(3) The prices of competing products, of essentially similar specifications and quality 
standards than those of the products, in the territory (as defined below in pare. 7.1) under 
competitive terms of delivery and payment. 
                                                 
402 Article 55 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980. 
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(4) The quotation of the product at the ---- exchange on the date when the respective 
implementing contract is concluded. 
(B) 5.1The prices of the products shall be agreed upon from case-to-case by respective 
implementing seller and implementing buyer of the products; 
(C) 5.1 X and the assignee(s) shall be granted most-favoured-customer conditions in the 
territory with regard to the products. 
5.2. The prices of the products shall be quoted and paid for in---- 
Article 6: Assignment 
(A) 6.1 X shall not be entitled to assign its buy-back undertaking under this Contract, either 
as a whole, or any part of it, to any other entity without the express written consent of Y. 
Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
(B) 6.1 X may assign the whole, or a part, of its buy-back undertaking under this contract, to 
any third party 
6.2 In the event that X (hereinafter "the assignor") shall assign any part of its buy-back 
commitment under this contract to a third party (hereinafter "the assignee") 
(A) All rights and obligations of the assignor under this contract with regard to the assigned 
part shall terminate at the time when the assignment contract between the assignor and 
the assignee becomes effective, and the respective rights and obligations shall be vested in 
the said assignee; provided that in the said agreement the assignee assumes all the 
obligations of the assignor agreed upon in this contract with regard to the part so assigned 
(B) The assignor shall remain responsible, jointly and severally with the assignee, for the 
fulfilment of all of its obligations agreed upon in this contract. 
6.3. X agrees to include in its agreement with any assignee appropriate provisions whereby 
the assignee commits itself to be bound by this contract with regard to the assigned part of 
the buyback commitment, as if this contract had originally been executed by the assignee. 
In consideration for the said commitment, Y agrees to be bound by this contract against the 
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respective assignee, with regard to the assigned part of the buy-back commitment, as if this 
contract had originally been executed with the assignee. 
6.4. In the event that a party shall assign any part of its buy-back obligations under this 
contract to an assignee· it must give notice to the other party of the assignment. If the 
notice is not received by the "other party within a reasonable time after the assignment, the 
party will be liable for the damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
Article 7:Re-sale of the products 
7.1. X or its assignee(s) shall have the right to re-sell the products in the territory agreed 
upon below in paragraph 7.2 (hereinafter "the territory"). 
(A) 7 .2. The territory shall include all countries in the world. 
(B) 7.2. The territory shall include the countries set forth in appendix with respect to each of 
the products or product groups mentioned therein. 
(C). X-land 
7.3. The products shall not be re-sold outside the territory without the written consent of Y. 
7.4. It is agreed by the parties hereto that the restrictions set forth in paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3 
above shall be construed as undertakings from the part of X or the Assignee, to refrain from 
actively putting the products in the market outside the territory.  
Article 8: Reference 
Each implementing contract as may be entered into by a party or its Assignee in accordance 
with the terms of this contract, must explicitly refer to this contract and state that the said 
implementing contract is made in fulfilment hereof. The parties agree to include m their 
agreements with any assignee appropriate provisions to that effect.  
Article 9: Terms of delivery 
Unless otherwise agreed in the individual implementing contracts, the terms of delivery of 
the products will-----  
Article 10: Time schedules for performance 
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10.1. Deliveries of the products by Y will commence ----days/months after the completion of 
the performance test and acceptance of the equipment/technology under the primary 
contract and the technical assistance contract. 
10.2. It is presently estimated that the buy-back commitment agreed upon in article 4 above 
will be fulfilled according to the following schedule: 
10.3. Actual quantities and assortments of products to be delivered will be negotiated and 
agreed upon in the individual implementing contracts to be concluded not later than 
days/months before the beginning of each year/quarter/month with regard to the said 
year/quarter/month. 
10.4. When actual quantities and assortments are agreed upon, X's remaining buyback 
commitment and X's own needs for products and prevailing market conditions in the 
territory for the various assortments of the products will be taken into consideration. It is 
agreed, however, that, until the total buyback commitment has been fulfilled, the value of 
products to be sold by Y and bought by X each calendar year will be at least---- and not more 
than-----. 
10.5. Sufficient Implementing Contracts to cover the whole of X's buyback obligation as 
agreed under paragraph 4.1 above, must be concluded by---- 
Article 11: Lack of conformity 
11.1. X must examine the products delivered to him within as short a period as is practicable 
in the circumstances. 
11.2. X loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the products if it does not give 
notice to Y specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within----after it has discovered or 
ought to have discovered it. 
11.3. Further rights and obligations of the parties with regard to the lack of conformity of 
the products will be governed. 
(A) By the provision of the law applicable to this contract. 
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(B) By the provision of the guarantee conditions attached to this contract as appendix ( ), 
and by the provisions of the law applicable to this contract. 
Article 12: Payment of the products 
12.1. The Products shall be paid for in the currency agreed upon in paragraph 5.2 above, 
and in the manner set forth in paragraph 12.2 below. 
12.2. Each delivery of the products shall be paid against the original documents set forth in 
paragraph 12.3 below. 
(A) Through direct bank transfer to the bank account in Y land of the implementing seller of 
the respective products. 
(B) Through an irrevocable and transferable letter of credit, allowing partial and trans-
shipments, to be opened in the amount of the respective implementing contract at the 
latest----days after the signing of the said contract, in the respective implementing seller's 
favour, and to be confirmed by the bank in Y land designated by the said implementing 
seller, such letter of credit to be valid for a period of-----days/weeks/months after the 
agreed date of delivery of the respective products. 
12.3. The products/letter of credit shall be payable against the following documents: 
------- 
------- 
12.4. The Implementing Buyer shall bear all exchange and bank charges as well as any other 
costs, including the confirmation charges of Letters of Credit but excluding the charges of 
the 
Bank of Y -land for transferring the funds to the Implementing Seller's account. 
Article 13: Monitoring the performance 
13.1. Both X and Y shall keep records on all implementing contracts concluded within the 
framework of this contract. Each such record (hereinafter "the evidence account") shall be 
in the form set forth in appendix ( ) to this contract. 
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13.2. The evidence accounts maintained by X and Y shall be compared and agreed by the 
parties through exchanges of letters on a quarterly basis during the term of this contract, 
the first occasion being no later than----- 
13.3. X and Y hereby agree that the evidence accounts, compared and agreed in accordance 
with paragraph 13.2 above, shall constitute final and conclusive evidence as to the 
performance of their obligations under this contract. 
Article 14: Liability 
14.1. In the event that X's buy-back commitment, agreed upon in this contract, has not been 
fully performed by the date mentioned in paragraph 10.5 above, X shall, upon written 
demand by Y remit to Y as agreed and liquidated damages----percent-----%) of the value of 
the products yet to be purchased under paragraph 4.1 hereof. 
14.2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 14.1 above, X shall not be obligated to 
make any payment mentioned therein insofar as the lack of performance of X's buy-back 
commitment is due to the failure of the implementing seller to deliver products of the 
quality, price or cumulative value specified in Articles 3, 5 and 10, respectively, of this 
contract. 
14.3. If the lack of performance of X's buy-back commitment is due to the reasons set forth 
in paragraph 14.2, Y shall, upon written demand by X, remit to X as agreed and liquidated 
damages-----percent----% of the value of the products yet to be purchased under paragraph 
4.1. 
14.4. As guarantee for the due performance of its obligations under this article 14 X shall 
issue to Y a bank guarantee, acceptable to Y, for the sum of .The bank guarantee shall be 
essentially of the form and contents as set forth in appendix ( ) attached to this contract. 
14.5. As a guarantee for the due performance of its obligation under this article 14 Y shall 
issue to X a bank guarantee, acceptable to X, for the sum of----The bank guarantee shall be 
essentially of the form and contents as set forth in appendix ( ) attached to this contract. 
14.6. The payment by the respective party of the agreed and liquidated damages, set forth 
in paragraphs 14.1 and 14.3 above, shall be in full and final settlement of all claims that the 
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other party may have against the first party arising out of or in connection with the breach 
by the first party of his obligations under this contract.  
Article 15: Relief 
15.1. A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the 
failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that it could not reasonably be 
expected to take the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
or to have avoided or overcome the impediment or its consequences. 
15.2. Exemption under this article 15 shall be available to the affected party for the period 
during which the impediment prevents it from fulfilling his obligations under this contract. If 
the effect of the impediment lasts for more----than months, each party shall be entitled to 
terminate this contract upon written notice to the other, and neither party shall be liable to 
the other for any expenses or losses thereby incurred. 
15.3. The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment 
and its effects on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party 
within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known 
of the impediment, he is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt. 
15.4. A party may not rely on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that such 
failure was caused by the first party's act or omission403. 
Article 16: The effect of the termination of the primary contract of the implementing 
contracts 
16.1 In the event that the primary contract should subsequently be terminated without the 
equipment/technology having been transferred and accepted, this contract shall become 
automatically null and void and with no effect. 
16.2 For the purposes of this contract, X's buy-back commitment, agreed upon herein, or a 
respective part thereof, as the case may be: 
                                                 
403 Articles 79 and 80 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980. 
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(A) Shall be deemed fulfilled even if any implementing contract should later be terminated, 
through no fault on the part of X, for whatever reason. 
(B) Shall not be deemed fulfilled insofar as any implementing contract should later be 
terminated, irrespective of the grounds for which the implementing contract was 
terminated. In this case X shall be obligated to conclude (a) fresh implementing contract(s) 
corresponding to the value of the terminated implementing contract(s) such fresh 
implementing contracts to be then carried out in accordance with the provisions of this 
contract. 
Article 17: Prior commitments, effective date, amendments, and governing language 
17.1. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this contract, this contract supersedes and 
invalidates all other commitments or representations which may have been made by X and 
Y either orally or in writing prior to the date of signature of this contract. 
17.2. This contract shall come into effect only upon the entering into force of the primary 
contract and upon the signing of this contract by both parties and upon the approval of this 
contract by the competent authorities and/or financial institutions in Y land and/or X land. Y 
shall immediately notify X and X shall immediately notify Y by cable or telex of such 
approval, and the date of such notification, the latest of such notifications shall be the date 
on which this contract comes into effect. Unless the approvals are obtained within-----
days/months from the signing of this contract, it shall be considered null and void and with 
no effect. 
17.3. Amendments to this contract will be effective only if they are made in writing and 
signed by legally authorized representatives of the parties, and if approved by the 
competent authorities and/or financial institutions in Y land and X land. 
17.4. The -----text of this Contract is the governing text 
Article 18: Applicable law 
This contract shall for all purposes be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the 
law of 
 
217 
 
Article 19: Settlement of disputes 
19.1. All disputes or differences which may arise between the parties out of or in connection 
with this Contract, and which cannot be settled amicably shall be subject to arbitration by---
- arbitrator(s) under the rules of----  
19.2. The award of the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on the parties. 
19.3. The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in the----language. 
19.4. The place of arbitration shall be----- 
 
4. Overview of the Iranian Buyback Contract404 
                            (Paydar West Field Asmari and Bangestan Reservoirs) 
                          National Iranian Oil Company, South Fields (Year 1999) 
 
 
Article 2-Scope of service  
Contractor responsible to N.I.O.C. for operations and is to provide all capital, technology 
and skills necessary for the conduct of Development Operations for this Contract, and shall 
bear the Petroleum Costs required in carrying out Development Operations, and to recover 
such costs as provided in Clause 22 hereof, and bear the risks that sufficient production 
additional production of Crude Oil, and or Natural Gas may not be produced from the 
Contract Area in order to recover all such Petroleum Costs. 
Article 3 -Term (Duration) 
3.1. N .I.O.C. hereby authorizes Contractor to conduct development Operations in the end 
of the Development Phase in (To Be Negotiated) field. The conclusion of the Development 
                                                 
404 This part is being borrowed from Kakhki, Mohammad Mehdi Hedayati (2008) A critical analysis of Iranian buy-back transactions in the 
context of international petroleum contractual systems, Durham theses, Durham University.  P 270 
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Phase, under the Master Development Plan, for (To Be Negotiated) Field is (To Be 
Negotiated) months, unless extended by mutual agreement. 
3.3. This Contract shall commence on the Effective Date, and shall continue through the 
Development Phase and thereafter until Contractor has recovered all Petroleum Costs and 
remuneration fee in accordance with Clause 22 ... which period shall not exceed (To Be 
Negotiated) years from the date on which ... Field has commenced first/additional 
production, unless extended by agreement. 
Article 5- Rights of NIOC 
N.I.O.C. shall exercise all necessary control and supervision and has all rights to utilise the 
Contract Area for purposes not related to this Contract, except that such usage shall not 
prevent or hinder the carrying out of the Development Operations within the Field. N.I.O.C.s 
rights include inter alia: 
(c) - Insurance 
N.I.O.C. has the option to provide any legally required insurance coverage of materials and 
equipment, pursuant to 12. 
Article 6- NIOC Assistance 
6.1 Land and water reasonably required by Contractor for the purpose of Development 
Operations shall be acquired by the N.I.O.C. and put at the disposal of Contractor. The 
purchase prices shall be either paid by N.l.O.C. or included in the Petroleum Costs if paid by 
Contractor. 
Article 7 - Rights and Obligations of Contractor 
7.2 Contractor shall register a branch office in Iran for the purpose of following and 
complying with local laws. 
Article 8 - Levies, Charges, Fees and Taxes 
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8.1 Any Iranian corporate income tax, Social Security Charges, or other levies imposed are 
payable by Contractor and an amount representing such charge shall be compensated by 
the N.l.O.C. to Contractor. 
8.2 Contractor shall not be entitled to recover as Petroleum Costs 
, and taxes charges, fees and levies upon its income levied outside of Iran nor any taxes, 
charges, fees and taxes of any nature that are paid directly by N.l.O.C. 
Article 11 -Fixtures and Installations 
11.2 - Ownership of Assets - All lands and assets acquired by the Contractor shall be the 
property of N.I.O.C., except for machinery and equipment imported on a temporary basis 
pursuant to provisions of clause 25 hereof. 
Article 12 - Liability and Insurance 
12.1 - Insurance - Contractor shall maintain insurance coverage in amounts required and 
N.I.O.C. may exercise the option to provide, at the Contractor cost, such coverage at rates 
not greater than market rates elsewhere. 
Article 13 - Local Employment and Training 
13.1 Contractor shall give priority to Iranian citizens in employment, or personnel to carry 
out the Development Operations, limiting the employment of foreign personnel to only 
positions where qualified Iranian citizens are not available. In regards to the requirements 
set out in the above Article, it can be added that the foreign company is obligated to prove 
that a non-Iranian employee has skills that are not available on the domestic employment 
market. Additionally, it is mandatory for training to be provided to Iranians with the purpose 
of eventually substituting the foreign worker. A further requirement is that the foreign 
employer must, on a mandatory basis, donate a sum of money that is a certain percentage 
of the foreign worker's pay (which must be at least IR 560.00 (about US$70), as of 2001)). 
With regard to the expatriate employees' legal status, they must acquire a work permit from 
the Department for Employment of Expatriates at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(MLSA), as well as a simultaneously applied-for, one-year duration, renewable residence 
permit. If the company wishes to terminate their employment, they must navigate a 
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complicated process, including a permission to terminate from the Labour Boards, which 
rarely favours the employer in their judgements. 
Article 16- Operator ship 
16.1 N.I.O.C. shall be the operator for all facilities, immediately after commissioning and star 
up. 
Article 17- Joint Management Committee 
17.1 Joint Management Committee ("JMC") of five representatives from each party. N.I.O.C. 
shall function as the JMC Chairman until the end of the first year, and thereafter JMC 
chairmanship shall alternate between members annually. 
Article 18 - Master Development Plan and Budget 
18.1 Master Development Plan, including Work Programs and Budgets for the Development 
Phase I attached as Appendix "[...]". Capital Costs shall be equal to or less than (To be 
Negotiated) for the field to carry out the Development Operation, expended over (To Be 
Negotiated) years from effective date in the manner set out in more detail in Appendix "X". 
First or additional production in the field is projected to occur within (To Be Negotiated) 
months after the Effective Date. 
The amount is Sub-Clause 18.1 shall be the contracts ceiling, which shall not be increased. 
Article 22 -Cost Recovery and Remuneration Fee 
22.1 Contractor shall recover Petroleum cost, together with bank charges from the month 
the expenditure occurred at a rate equal to LffiOR plus/minus (To Be Negotiated) percent. 
22.3 Remuneration Fee- In additional to the Capital Costs, Non-Capital Costs, Bank Charges 
thereon and Operating Costs, Contractor shall be entitled to a remuneration fee of (To Be 
Negotiated ) US Dollars to be paid commencing the first month following the date of 
first/additional production from the field as follows: (To Be Negotiated) In case of any 
changes required and approved by JMC in order to achieve the objectives of the 
Development Operations set forth in the original Master Development plan Contractor shall 
only be entitled to recover the additional related capital costs, resulting from all such 
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approved changes up to the ceiling amount pursuant to clause 18.1 and subject to clause 
18.3. In such case the Remuneration Fee shall remain fixed and unchanged. 
22.4 - Payment in Oil - Petroleum costs and the remuneration fee shall be paid to the 
Contractor. Oil/gas out of (To Be Negotiated) percent of the product produced from the 
field and delivered to Contractor pursuant to the crude oil/gas sales agreement. In the event 
that the petroleum Cost and Remuneration Fee are not fully paid during the Amortization 
Period, Contractor shall be entitles to receive Crude oil/Gas produced from the field as a 
result of Development Operation carried out by Contractor, pursuant to the Long Term 
Sales Agreement, until such Petroleum Costs and Remuneration fees are recovered, or the 
terms expires pursuant to clause 3.3. 
Article 24- Use of National Companies and Equipment 
Contractor shall use the service of Iranian firms for the provisions of maximum utilization of 
Iranian content of the project with due regard to the laws of Iran. 
Article 25- Exports and Imports (Customs) 
25.1. Materials and equipment are not available in Iran shall be imported in the name of 
N.I.O.C. Any customs duties shall be paid by the Contractor and shall be reimbursed as non-
capital costs. 
Article 27 -Assignment 
27.1 Any assignment by Contractor shall require the prior written consent of N.I.O.C., and 
which shall be granted or refused within thirty days of receipt by N.I.O.C. of notice from 
Contractor that it intends to make such an assignment. 
Article 31 -Governing Law 
Contract governed, interpreted by the laws of Iran. 
Article 32 -Arbitration 
Any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract or the breach, 
termination or invalidity thereof, shall be finally settled by arbitration before three 
arbitrators. Any award of the arbitrators shall be final and binding on the parties. Either 
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party may seek execution of the award in any court having jurisdiction over the party 
against whom execution is sought. 
APPENDIX "A" -Description of the Contract Area 
APPENDIX "B"- Accounting Procedure 
APPENDIX "C" - Long Term Crude Sales Agreement 
 
Quantity 
JMC under the Service Contract shall advise Seller (N.I.O.C.) and Buyer (Contractor) of the 
recoverable costs to be due to Buyer of the recoverable costs to be due to Buyer and the 
Service Contract (Service Contract Fees) during the next Quarter. Based upon the forecasted 
Service Contract Fees due to Buyer, Buyer shall furnish to Seller a statement of the volume 
of Crude Oil to be lifted in the lifting Quarter in order to compensate Buyer for the 
forecasted Service Contract Fees. 
Payment 
The Proceeds receivable by Seller under this Agreement shall be used to reduce the 
amounts owed to Buyer by Seller under the Service Contract and therefore no payments to 
Seller are required to pay Seller not post letters of credit or other guarantees of payment, 
relative to such deliveries, except as to any Crude Oil that Buyer may purchase from Seller in 
excess of amounts owed to Buyer under the Service Contract. 
APPENDIX "D" -Agreement on Procedure for Arbitration 
3 - The place of arbitration shall be agreed upon by the parties to the dispute. In the event 
that an arbitration site cannot be agreed upon prior to the appointment of a third 
arbitrator, then the arbitral tribunal shall, as its first act, convene in Tehran, Iran, to decide 
upon the site of arbitration. 
4 - Each party shall appoint an arbitrator, and two arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a 
third arbitrator who shall act as chairman of the tribunal whom shall be from a country 
other than those of which the Parties are nationals. 
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11 -Referral of matters on dispute to arbitration by either party, shall if necessary to subject 
to the obtaining of the approvals of the appropriate authorities of the parties concerned.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
